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IS THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE SACROSANCT.
RETAINING FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN
HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION
ARic K. SHORT :
"Most Americans would probably be surprised to learn
that victims of atrocities committed in Bosnia are suing the
leader of the insurgent Bosnian-Serb forces in a United States
District Court in Manhattan."




During the past twenty years, the number of lawsuits filed
in U.S. courts by persons alleging human rights abuses occur-
ring in foreign countries has grown steadily. In that time, citi-
zens of the Philippines, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Israel, Burma, Indo-
nesia, Ghana, Guatemala, Argentina, Algeria, South Korea,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and many other countries have filed suit
in U.S. courts alleging human rights violations committed in
their home counties by persons or corporations resident
outside the United States. Handling this new breed of case
has presented federal courts with a variety of procedural and
* Associate, Vinson & Elkins, L.L.P. J.D., The University of Texas
School of Law, 1996; A.B., Georgetown University, 1993. 1 am grateful to
Andrew Vollmer and Steven Ratner for their thoughtful and helpful com-
ments on earlier drafts. I also thank Liz Morris, Carolyn WVilliams, Roger
Kapp, and Dr. Ernest Metzger for their generous assistance, and my fatther
and brother for their encouragement. Without the support of Vinson & El-
kins, this article would not have been possible, though the opinions e-
pressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of the Finn or its clients; in
particular, Charles Berry, Molly Cagle, David Tuckfield, and John Riley de-
serve special thanks. Most importantly, my heartfelt gratitude goes to Tan)a
and Zachary, whose enthusiasm for this project and belief in me never %%-i
vered, and who selflessly accepted countless nights and weekends without a
husband and father, respectively, for the sake of this manuscript. This arti-
cle is dedicated to my mother, for all the reasons that I anm only now, too
late, beginning to appreciate.
1. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995).
2. Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 2 All E.R. 72, 72
(Eng. GA 1982).
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substantive challenges, with none more important or contro-
versial than subject matter jurisdiction. As non-resident plain-
tiffs bring their cases into U.S. courts in ever-growing num-
bers, they often rely on one of the oldest jurisdictional provi-
sions in effect today: the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).
The ATS, established by the Judiciary Act of 1789, 3 is an
important, though before 1980 seldom-used, vehicle that pro-
vides federal subject matter jurisdiction in cases brought "by
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States."4 Although ATS litiga-
tion has increased substantially over the past twenty years as
plaintiffs in human rights cases have used it to seek relief in
U.S. courts, 5 significant disagreement has existed over how
properly to interpret and apply the statute. Scholars and
courts have debated whether the ATS merely confers federal
court jurisdiction or whether it provides not only a federal fo-
rum but also a federal cause of action; 6 whether the ATS ever
was intended to reach human rights claims; 7 what exactly a "vi-
olation of the law of nations" is meant to be and whether that
phrase should be construed as referring only to such violations
as they existed in 1789 or whether the "law of nations" under
3. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (1789) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1999)).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1999).
5. The ATS's language does not limit the statute's applicability to
human rights disputes. However, expansive interpretations of the ATS, first
by the Second Circuit in Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980),
and later by other courts, have encouraged significantly the use of the ATS
in human fights cases. Today, the ATS is used almost exclusively in the
human rights context, with non-human rights suits filed under the ATS few
and far between and almost always unsuccessful. See, e.g., Hamid v. Price
Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that claims of
fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and misappropriation of funds in connec-
tion with allegedly fraudulent bank activities did not trigger jurisdiction
under the ATS); Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1983) (ruling
that state lottery's decision to pay lottery winnings partly through an annuity
and not in one lump sum was not actionable under the ATS as a "shockingly
egregious violation[] of universally recognized principles of international
law").
6. See Kenneth C. Randall, Further Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute and a
Recommendation, 18 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 473, 477-95 (1986) [hereinafter
Randall, Further Inquiries].
7. BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RiciTrrs
LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 12-17 (1996).
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the ATS is a constantly developing concept that incorporates
newly-recognized international legal rights and obligations;8
and whether federal courts, consistent with the U.S. Constitu-
tion, may exercise jurisdiction over suits between aliens for vio-
lations of the law of nations. 9
One issue that has been raised recently in scholarship and
litigation that deserves further analysis is whether tie ATS
does or should confer jurisdiction on U.S. courts that is im-
mune from the traditional forum non conveniens analysis.
The once academic question of whether human rights cases
ever should be subject to such an analysis has now become, in
recent litigation, a practical issue raised by plaintiffs. In a re-
cent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit,10 the court established an unprecedented approach to
this issue that undermines the invocation of forum non con-
veniens in human rights cases. How future courts address the
interplay between forum non conveniens and the ATS will
have significant implications for the development of interna-
tional human rights law and federal court practice and %%ill be
particularly important given what, in all likelihood, will be a
growing number of human rights claims brought in U.S.
courts by citizens of other countries.
Plaintiffs who flee human rights abuses in foreign states
also often flee corrupt governments or judiciaries incapable of
providing them justice. Many human rights plaintiffs in the
United States may not be able to return to the countries of
abuse to seek judicial compensation from their abusers, and
they should not be forced to do so by U.S. courts. However,
recent arguments seeking the abolition of forum non con-
veniens in ATS suits go too far, attempting unnecessarily to tie
the hands of federaljudges when lawsuits before them have no
significant connection to the United States, when relevant con-
siderations urge dismissal, and when foreign courts fully are
capable of administering justice in those cases.
8. Compare Filarliga, 630 F.2d at 881 (holding that "courts must interpret
international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among
the nations of the world today") wilh Tel-Oren v. Lib)an Arab Republic, 726
F.2d 774, 813-19 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (arguing that the
ATS should be extended only to the set of torts recognized in 1789 s violat-
ing the law of nations).
9. See Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 501-02 (9th Cir. 1992).
10. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
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I argue in this article that no reasonable basis exists to
justify federal courts refusing to consider forum non con-
veniens arguments in cases brought under the ATS; in fact,
good reasons exist to retain the doctrine in its undiluted form.
The purpose and design of forum non conveniens make it suf-
ficiently flexible to be invoked in even the most compelling
human rights cases brought in the United States. If applied
properly, the doctrine will identify ATS cases that cannot and
should not be dismissed to foreign fora; however, if forum non
conveniens operates as it should, it also will determine when
alleged violations of the law of nations would be addressed
more appropriately by the courts of other countries. By identi-
fying such exceptional cases meriting dismissal, the doctrine
will help advance a global development of customary interna-
tional law norms in the area of human rights and will help
ensure that U.S. courts do not antagonize international rela-
tions unnecessarily.
Part II of this article reviews the purpose, history, and de-
velopment of the ATS and the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens. Part III analyzes and evaluates the primary arguments
raised by those seeking abolition or significant curtailment of
the doctrine in ATS cases: (1) the statute's express language
and legislative intent make forum non conveniens inapplica-
ble; (2) weighing forum non conveniens considerations would
nullify the ATS; and (3) U.S. interests support elimination of
forum non conveniens in human rights suits. Because the ar-
guments for abolition do not withstand critical analysis and be-
cause the doctrine plays an important and needed role in all
disputes-including human rights cases-I ultimately con-
clude that forum non conveniens should be retained in ATS
lawsuits. Part IV proposes a slight modification to the forum
non conveniens analysis in human rights lawsuits to account
for the frequent existence of significant sovereign interests in
those cases. It then analyzes forum non conveniens arguments
in a recent suit brought under the ATS by Holocaust survivors
and the heirs of Holocaust victims against three Swiss banks to
highlight the continued importance of the doctrine and the
critical role that sovereign interests play in such an analysis.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
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II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Before turning to an evaluation of the use of the ATS and
forum non conveniens in modem federal court practice, I
look at history. An understanding of what the ATS was in-
tended to accomplish when it was first passed, why courts first
began considering the doctrine of forum non conveniens, and
how this statute and doctrine developed over time allows for
an informed analysis of how the concepts might be interpreted
and applied today.
A. The ATS: From a Tool of Foreign Policy to a Vehicle for
Human Rights Plaintiffs
The statute that has been relied on with increasing fre-
quency over the past twenty years to establish federal court ju-
risdiction in suits alleging international human rights viola-
tions is, in fact, over two hundred years old' and -as devel-
oped at a time when "international human rights," as a
concept, had no meaning.12 Although no legislative history
exists to reveal the specific purpose of the ATS as it was codi-
fied in the Judiciary Act of 1789,13 the issues confronting the
United States during its early history suggest why the ATS first
may have been drafted.
14
11. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (1789) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1999)).
12. Td-Oren, 726 F.2d at 813.
13. See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
William R. Casto, The Federal Courts' ProtedtiveJurisdiclion over Torts Committled
in Violation of t1w Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L RE%,. 467, 467 (1986). Judge
Friendly once referred to the ATS as "a kind of legal Lohengrin; although it
has been with us since the firstJudiciary Act... no one seems to know from
whence it came." rIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
14. A significant amount of scholarly attention has focused on the mean-
ing, historical context, and use of the ATS. For a more exhaustive teatment
of these issues, see Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, FederalJurisdirlion
over International Human Righits Claims: The Alien Ton Claims Act After Filardga
v. Pefia-Irala, 22 HAiv. IrNr'L LJ. 53 (1981); Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien
Tort Statute and theJudiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 Am. J. I,,-r'L L
461 (1989); Casto, supra note 13; Anthony D'Amato, The Alien Tort Statute
and the Founding of the Constitution, 82 Ahi. J. INT'L L 62 (1988); William S.
Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the
"Originalists," 19 HASTINGS INT'.L & CoMp. L REv. 221 (1996);Joan Fitzpat-
rick, The Future of the Alien Tort Claims Aa of 1789: Lesons From In re Marcos
Human Rights Litigation, 67 ST.JOHN'S L RE%. 491 (1993); Randall, Furtier
Inquiries, supra note 6; Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdicion over Interna-
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
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1. Early History
In the years leading up to 1789, complying with the law of
nations and maintaining sound relations with foreign sover-
eigns were fundamental components of the United States's
continued development and security.15 The prospect of inter-
national disputes or aggression from foreign countries was par-
ticularly threatening to the young United States, which would
need many years of development before it could stand firm in
conflicts with other nations. 16 According to the Federalists,
relegating matters of international concern to the states-in
particular, the responsibility to adjudicate claims of foreign
subjects-was a sure recipe for drawing the United States into
unwanted international conflict.
17
Under the law of nations as it existed during this time,
each country was obliged to open its courts to foreign subjects,
allowing them to bring suit within the country's territory. I At
the same time, a denial of justice to a foreign subject or the
apparent condoning of a wrongful act against such person by
the United States would make this country "answerable not to
tional Law Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 1 (1985) [hereinafter Randall, Inquiries]; Joseph M. Sweeney, A Tort
Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 445
(1995). I am particularly indebted to the research undertaken and pub-
lished by Professors Casto and Randall.
15. See D'Amato, supra note 14, at 64; Stewart Jay, Tie Status of the Law of
Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819, 821-25 (1989); Randall,
Inquiries, supra note 14, at 12-13.
16. See D'Amato, supra note 14, at 63.
17. In The Federalist, John Jay observed that "(iut is of high importance to
the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations . . .and ... it
appears evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one
national Government than it could be... by thirteen separate States." Ti.-
FEDERALIST No. 3, at 43 (JohnJay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). "Under the
national Government, treaties... as well as the laws of nations, will always be
expounded in one sense, and executed in the same manner-whereas adju-
dications on the same points and questions in thirteen States... will not
always accord or be consistent; and that, as well from the variety of indepen-
dent courts and judges appointed by different and independent govern-
ments as from the different local laws and interests which may affect and
influence them." Id; see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 14, at 492-93; Randall,
Inquiries, supra note 14, at 15.
18. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(Robb, J., concurring) (citing I LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW
§ 165a (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955)).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
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the injured alien but to his home state."19 In this way, a pri-
vate act committed by one individual against another person,
such as an act against an ambassador or other public minister,
occurring in this country,20 could escalate into an interna-
tional incident-a result the ill-prepared United States wanted
desperately to avoid.
2 1
The likelihood of such an international incident was very
real in 1781 because the Continental Congress had little power
over foreign affairs and, in fact, lacked power even to redress
violations of treaty or the law of nations. Accordingly, the bur-
den of enforcing the lav of nations fell on state tribunals-
notorious for their anti-foreigner bias and lack of predictable
decisions.2 2 Realizing its lack of direct power in this area and
also the profound importance of consistent, responsible adju-
dications of such claims, the Continental Congress passed a
resolution in 1781 recommending that the states "provide ex-
peditious, exemplary and adequate punishment" for "infrac-
19. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 783 (Robb, J., concurring) (citing J.xws
BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 284-91 (6th ed. 1963)). As Alexander H,unil-
ton stated this concern:
The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for
the conduct of its members .... As the denial or perversion of
justice by the sentences of courts, as well as in any other manner, is
with reason classed among the just causes of war, it %ill follow that
the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in
which the citizens of other countries are concerned.
THE FEDE AUST No. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). James Madison noted that one of the fundamental defects of the
Confederation was that it "could not cause infractions of treaties, or of the
law of nations to be punished; that particular States might by their conduct
provoke war without control." JAMEs MDISON, JOURN %L OF THE FE%.
CONVNMTiON 60 (Erastus H. Scott ed., 1894) (1787); see also D'Amato, supra
note 14, at 64; Randall, Inquiries, supra note 14, at 20-21.
20. See 21 JouRNALs OF -ME CONTINENTAL CoNcRss 1774-1789, at 1136-
37 (Library of Cong. ed., 1912).
21. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 782-83 (EdwardsJ., concurring) ("The focus of
attention, then, was on actions occurring within the territory of the United
States, or perpetrated by a U.S. citizen, against an alien. For tflese acts, the
United States was responsible.").
22. See Dodge, supra note 14, at 235-36 ("We well know, sir, dtat foreign-
ers cannot get justice done them in these [state] courts..." (quoting 3 TtIE
DEBATES IN THE SEERAL STATE CONVmONS ON THE ADOTION OF -niE FED.
ERAL CONSTrrUTION 583 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1881))); Randall, Inquir-
ies, supra note 14, at 21.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
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tions of the law of nations."23 In particular, the resolution re-
quested that the states "authorise suits to be instituted for
damages by the party injured, and for compensation to the
United States for damages sustained by them from an injury
done to a foreign power by a citizen.
''2 4
The Federalists' concerns with the national government's
inability to enforce the law of nations proved prophetic in
1784. In that year, a French citizen, Chevalier De
Longchamps, assaulted French Consul General Marbois in
Philadelphia. 25  Although the international community
clamored for justice,26 there was little the Continental Con-
gress could do, apart from offering a reward for De
Longchamps's capture so that he could be tried in Penn-
sylvania state court.2 7 De Longchamps ultimately was tried
and convicted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for a crime
against the law of nations. 28
23. 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, supra note
20, at 1136; see also Casto, supra note 13, at 490; Dodge, supra note 14, at 226-
27. The particular violations that the states were asked to remedy included
violations of safe-conducts, acts against friends of the United States, acts
against ambassadors and other public ministers-including personal injury
and damage to property, and violations of treaty. See 21 JOURNALS OF TiHE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, supra note 20, at 1136-37. The resolu-
tion also recommended criminal penalties for the identified violation. See id.
at 1137 (noting that "public faith and safety" required "that punishment
should be co-extensive with such crimes"). These prohibited acts generally
correspond to the major "offenses against the law of nations" that Blackstone
had identified in his Commentaries: "1. Violation of safe-conducts; 2. In-
fringement of the rights of ambassadors; and, 3. Piracy." 4 WILLIAM BLAcK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *68. See generally Jay, supra note 15, at 821-28.
24. 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, supra note
20, at 1137; see also Dodge, supra note 14, at 227.
25. See Dodge, supra note 14, at 229-30; Randall, Inquiries, supra note 14,
at 24-25; Alfred Rosenthal, The Marbois-Longchamps Affair, 63 PA. M,\G. HST.
& BIOGRAPHY 294, 294 (1939).
26. See Casto, supra note 13, at 491; Randall, Inquiries, supra note 14, at 24-
25; Rosenthal, supra note 25, at 295-96.
27. Casto, supra note 13, at 492; see also Rosenthal, supra note 25, at 295.
Pennsylvania's initial handling of the Marbois Affair likely reinforced con-
cerns about states' adjudication of international law claims. Once captured,
De Longchamps escaped from police custody, leading to an investigation of
possible collusion between the police and De Longchamps. See Rosenthal,
supra note 25, at 295.
28. See Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 116-18 (Pa.
Oyer & Terminer 1784). For his "atrocious violation of the lav of nations,"
De Longchamps was fined and sentenced to two years in prison. Id. at 117-
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
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The Marbois Affair and other similar cases- were surely
in the minds of those who sat down to craft the Judiciary Act of
1789 foloing the new Constitution's grant of judicial power
to the federal government over "Cases affecting Ambassadors,
[and] other public Ministers and Consuls" and disputes "be-
tween a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citi-
zens, or Subjects." 30 Indeed, Oliver Ellsworth-idely consid-
ered to be the primary architect of theJudiciary Act of 1789-
was a member of the Continental Congress that passed the
1781 Resolution recommending action on the part of the
states.3 1 Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 Nwas drafted to
read as follows: "[T]he district courts... shall also have cogni-
zance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the
circuit courts as the case may be, of all causes where an alien
sues for a tort only32 in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States."3 3 Today's version of the ATS,
18. As a result of the diplomatic unease following the Marbois Affair, Con-
gress passed a Resolution on April 27, 1785, "strongly recomrnend[ing] to
the legislatures of the respective States [that they] pass laws for he exem-
plary punishment of such persons as may in future by violence or by insult
attack the dignity of sovereign powers in the person of their ministers or
servants." 28JouRNALs OF -ME CONTrNENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 314-15
(Library of Cong. ed., 1912); see also Rosenthal, supra note 25, at 300.
29. In 1788, a New York City constable broke into the house of the Dutch
Ambassador Van Berckel and arrested one of his servants. Once again, the
Continental Congress was forced to sit back and watch an individua-this
time a U.S. citizen-be convicted of a violation of the law of nations in state
court. See Dodge, supra note 14, at 230. The incident involving Van Berckel
likely further inflamed Federalists' concerns about the impotency of the fed-
eral government in the area of international affairs.
30. U.S. CONsr. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Dodge, supra note 14, at 229-30.
31. See Casto, supra note 13, at 495 n.155; Dodge, supra note 14, at 231.
32. Commentators have disagreed over the original purpose of the word
"only" in the ATS. Compare Casto, supra note 13 (suggesting that the drafters
of the Judiciary Act extended the ATS to jurisdiction over a "tort only" to
exclude minor commercial claims that othenvise would have been brought
by British merchants against U.S. citizens) with Sweeney, supra note 14 (pos-
iting that the ATS was intended to confer jurisdiction over prize cases in
which the legality of the capture was not in issue-where a "tort only" was
being litigated).
33. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (1789) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1999)). Section 9 of the Judiciary Act %%-as
only one part of a broader effort to vest jurisdiction over matters involving
foreign citizens-and thereby possibly touching on foreign aftars-ihli the
national government. As already noted, Article III of the new Constitution
granted the federal judiciary power to hear cases involving ambassadors and
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
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codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350, has been modified only slightly in
the 212 intervening years since its adoption.
34
Early invocations of § 9 of the Judiciary Act do not shed
much light on the intended purpose of the statute, though it
was used on at least two occasions to establish jurisdiction in
maritime cases3 5 and in a dispute involving British subjects
whose property in Sierra Leone allegedly was attacked and de-
other public ministers, as well as disputes involving foreign states and/or
citizens thereof. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2. Other portions of the Judiciary Act
also point to a federalizing of the power to oversee matters involving foreign
citizens. Section 9 of the Judiciary Act gave district courts exclusive jurisdic-
tion over admiralty and maritime causes and seizures under the law of the
United States, as well as exclusive jurisdiction over all suits against consuls or
vice-consuls. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9. Section 11 of the Judiciary Act ad-
dressed jurisdiction of circuit courts and granted them "alienage jurisdic-
tion"-cognizahce over cases with a minimum amount in controversy of
$500 and parties that included a state or a foreign citizen. Judiciary Act of
1789 § 11. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was addressed in Section 13,
which granted the Court exclusive jurisdiction over all cases against ambassa-
dors and other public ministers, as well as original but not exclusive jurisdic-
tion over suits brought by ambassadors or other public ministers, or in which
a consul or vice-consul is a party. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 13. Without the
early version of the ATS, suits brought by a foreign citizen alleging a viola-
tion of the law of nations where the amount in controversy was below $500
would have been relegated to state court. The combined effect of the alien-
age jurisdiction provision and the early version of the ATS was that federal
courts could hear most matters involving foreign citizens that could affect
the foreign relations of the United States, but British creditors, who would
likely be suing U.S. citizens in contract and for a sum under $500, were ex-
cluded from federal court. See Casto, supra note 13, at 468 n.4.
34. Slight modifications to § 9(b) occurred in 1878, 1911, and 1948,
dealing mostly with how to denote the fact that federal jurisdiction over
these matters would not be exclusive. See REVISED STATUTES OF THE UNITED
STATES, PASSED AT THE FrsT SESSION OF THE FoRTI--TnIRD CONGRESS, § 563
(1878); Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1093; H.R. Ru'.
No. 80-308, app. at 124 (1947) (reviser's notes); see also Casto, supra note 13,
at 468 n.4.
35. See Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607) (af-
firmingjurisdiction under the ATS and general maritime principles where a
French ship captain brought suit to recover the value of slaves allegedly sto-
len from his vessel at port in the United States); Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F.
Cas. 942, 943 (D. Pa. 1793) (recognizing that the court was "particularly
vested with authority where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the
laws of nations ... and this is a case falling under that description" in a
dispute involving the capture of an English vessel by a French ship near the
United States).
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stroyed by U.S. and French citizens.36 The "modern" era of
ATS litigation-in particular, use of the statute as a mecha-
nism to obtain jurisdiction over international human rights
claims-was ushered in by the Second Circuit's groundbreak-
ing decision in Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala in 1980Y.3
2. Filartiga and Subsequent Interpretations
In Filartiga, a Paraguayan doctor and his daughter sued
the former Inspector General of Police from Asunci6n, Para-
guay for the alleged torture and murder of the doctor's son.-"
The Second Circuit held that in applying the ATS, a "rarely-
invoked provision" of federal law, 39 courts "must interpret in-
ternational law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and
exists among the nations of the world today."40 The court
went on to decide that "although there is no universal agree-
ment as to the precise extent of the 'human rights and funda-
mental freedoms' guaranteed to all by the [United Nations']
charter, there is at present no dissent from the view that the
guarantees include, at a bare minimum, the right to be free
from torture."41 Judge Kaufman reversed the lower court's
dismissal for want of subject matter jurisdiction 42 and con-
cluded that "an act of torture committed by a state official ...
violates established norms of the international law of human
rights and hence the law of nations."43
The sweeping opinion in Filartiga recognized federal juris-
diction under the ATS for an ever-growing universe of interna-
tional human rights claims, and it opened the floodgates to
further similar claims in U.S. courts. Most suits brought under
36. See Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57 (1795). Later, in 1907,
the Attorney General observed that the ATS would apply to allegations of
Mexican citizens that a U.S. company had diverted the flow of die Rio
Grande River, and thus altered the border between the United States and
Mexico, in violation of treaty. See Mexican Boundary-Diversion of the Rio
Grande, 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 251 (1907). The Attorney Genernl con-
cluded that the ATS provided "a right of action and a forum" for citizens of
Mexico to sue for damages in the United States. Id. at 252.
37. Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
38. See id. at 878.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 881.
41. 1& at 882.
42. See id. at 878.
43. Id. at 880.
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the ATS since Filartiga follow a similar fact pattern: A non-U.S.
citizen files suit in federal court alleging brutal acts that took
place at the hands of a non-U.S. citizen (usually a current or
former member of a foreign government) outside the United
States that violated the plaintiff's fundamental human
rights. 4 4 Among recent ATS cases, two are of particular note:
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic45 and Kadic v. Karadzic."
6
In Tel-Oren, representatives of individuals murdered in an
armed attack on a civilian bus in Israel in 1978 filed suit
against a variety of defendants, including the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization (PLO).47 Plaintiffs alleged that defendants
were responsible for several tortious acts in violation of the law
of nations and treaties and that jurisdiction was exercised
properly by the federal court under a variety of provisions, in-
cluding the ATS. 48 Although the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's dismissal, each
member of the three-judge panel issued a separate, lengthy
opinion stating the reasons for his individual vote.4 9 The Tel-
Oren opinion is noteworthy because it provides detailed analy-
ses of how and when ATS jurisdiction can be sustained, and
also because it highlights the significant difference of opinion
that exists about the history and proper use of the ATS, even
among federal appellate judges.
50
According to Judge Edwards in Tel-Oren, the ATS confers
both jurisdiction and a right of action, though, after a discus-
sion of the development of international law, he concluded
44. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11 th Cir. 1996) (concern-
ing allegations of torture committed by an official of the former Ethiopian
government brought by former Ethiopian prisoners); Alomang v. Freeport-
McMoran, Inc., No. 96-2139, 1996 WL 601431 (E.D. La. Oct. 17, 1996) (con-
cerning allegations that defendant company engaged in human rights viola-
tions in Indonesia against mine workers); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp.
162 (D. Mass. 1995) (concerning charges brought by nine expatriate citizens
of Guatemala and one U.S. citizen against a former Guatemalan government
official for injuries allegedly caused by Guatemalan military forces).
45. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
46. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
47. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 774.
48. See id.
49. See id
50. I will not discuss in any depth Judge Robb's concurring opinion in
Tel-Oren, as his conclusion that the matter was a nonjusticiable political qucs-
tion is not directly relevant to my analysis. See id. at 823-27.
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that the law of nations may not prohibit politically motivated
terrorism, "no matter how repugnant it might be to our own
system."51 While he agreed with the basic structure of analysis
set out in Filartiga, Judge Edwards concluded that the law of
nations does not impose "the same responsibility or liability on
non-state actors, such as the PLO, as it does on states and per-
sons acting under color of state law."52 Nevertheless, Judge
Edwards recognized an expanding set of offenses actionable
under the ATS: "[C]ommentators have begun to identify a
handful of heinous actions-each of which violates definable,
universal and obligatory norms-and in the process are defin-
ing the limits of section 1350's reach."
5 3
In stark contrast to Judge Edwards, Judge Bork deter-
mined that the ATS provides only a forum for particular plain-
tiffs, and that the law of nations or a treaty provision must
grant them a cause of action to maintain suit under § 1350.1"
After a review of historical analyses, Judge Bork determined
that the intent of the 1789 drafters is unknown, but, at a mini-
mum, "in 1789 there was no concept of international human
rights."55 Judge Bork further resisted a "too sweeping" con-
struction of the ATS that would authorize tort suits for the vin-
dication of any international legal right.56 UnderJudge Bork's
reasoning, the ATS's "current function would be quite modest,
unless a modem statute, treaty, or executive agreement pro-
vided a private cause of action for violations of new interna-
tional norms which do not themselves contemplate private en-
forcement."
57
Eleven years after the Tel-Oren decision and fifteen years
after its decision in Filarliga, the Second Circuit revisited the
ATS. In Kadic v. Karadzic, Croat and Muslim citizens of Bosnia-
51. Id at 796.
52. Id. at 776.
53. Id. at 781 (citations omitted).
54. See id. at 799. In 1992, and in response to judge Bork's opinion in
Td-Oren, Congress passed the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L
No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(1999)). See H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 3-4 (1991), reprinted in4 U.S.C.CAN.
84, 86 (1992) (noting that the Act was passed to provide "an unambiguous
and modem basis for a cause of action" in light ofJudge Bork's opinion in
Tel-Oren).
55. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 813.
56. Id. at 812.
57. Id at 816.
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Herzegovina brought suit alleging that they were victims of
"various atrocities, including brutal acts of rape, forced prosti-
tution, forced impregnation, torture, and summary execu-
tion."5 8 The plaintiffs claimed that Radovan Karadzic, acting
in his official capacity as head of the Bosnian-Serb military
forces, directed the atrocities committed by his troops.' In an
important decision in the development of international law,
the Kadic court held that "certain forms of conduct violate the
law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the
auspices of a state or only as private individuals."60 The court
ruled that individual conduct-apart from any state action-
may violate the law of nations.61 In particular, the court ruled
that private persons may incur individual liability for acts of
genocide and war crimes, but that "torture and summary exe-
cution-when not perpetrated in the course of genocide or
war crimes-are proscribed by international law only when
committed by state officials or under color of law."
62
B. The Evolution of Forum Non Conveniens in Scottish
and U.S. Law
The federal doctrine of forum non conveniens has its
roots in the Scottish concept of "forum competens," dating back
to at least 1610.63 Although early Scottish decisions reported
58. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1995).
59. See id. at 237.
60. Id. at 239.
61. See id.
62. Id. at 243.
63. See Vernor v. Elvies, 11 Dict. of Dec. 4788 (Scot. Sess. Cas. 2nd Div.
1610). "The Lords will not find themselves Judges betwixt two Englishmen,
being in this country not animo remanendi sed negociandi lantum .... "
(Roughly translated: [not] with the intention of remaining, but just on busi-
ness.) For other discussions of the history, development, and application of
the forum non conveniens doctrine, see Edward L. Barrett, Jr., The Doctrine of
Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CAL. L. REv. 380 (1947); Alexander M. Bickel, The
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens as Applied in the Federal Courts in Matters of
Admiralty, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 12 (1950); Paxton Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1929); Robert
Braucher, The Inconvenient FederalForum, 60 HARv. L. REv. 908 (1947) ;Joseph
Dainow, The Inappropriate Forum, 29 U. ILL. L. REv. 867 (1935); Maria A. Maz-
zola, Forum Non Conveniens and Foreign Plaintiffs: Addressing the Unanswered
Questions of Reyno, 6 FoRDhrAM INT'L LJ. 577 (1983);Jeremy D. Morley, lFo-
rum Non Conveniens: Restraining Long-Arm Jurisdiction, 68 Nw. U. L. REv. 24
(1973).
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under the rubric of forum competens appear to have addressed
the power of a Scottish court to hear certain disputes where
litigants were non-residents,64 courts soon began to focus on
their discretion to dismiss cases properly within their jurisdic-
tion.6 5 The confusing use of the phrases "fonrm competens" and
"forum non competens" to refer to a discretionary act of a compe-
tent court in declining jurisdiction where it properly could be
extended was dropped in the late 19th century in favor of the
phrase "forum non conveniens."6 6
64. See, e.g., Col. Brog's Heir v. _ , 11 Dict. of Dec. 4816, 4816 (Scot.
Sess. Cas. 1639); Anderson v. Hodgson and Ormiston, 11 Dict. of Dec. 4779,
4779-80 (Scot Sess. Cas. 1747); see also Braucher, supra note 63, at 909.
65. See La Soci~t6 du Gaz de Paris v. La Soci6td Anonyrne de Navigation
"Les Armateurs Franais," [1925] Sess. Cas. (H.L) 332, 361, aff'd, [1926]
Sess. Cas. (H.L) 13 (Lord Anderson) ("The plea of forum non ompetens, as
originally used, goes the length of asserting that the exercise ofjurisdiction
(although jurisdiction exists) is entirely incompetent because of the nature
of the case."); Longwvorth v. Hope, 3 M. 1049, 1053 (Sess. Cs. 1865) ("[T]he
plea usually thus expressed does not mean that the forum is one in which it
is wholly incompetent to deal with the question. The plea has received a
wider signification, and is frequently stated in reference to cases in which the
Court may consider it more proper for the ends ofjustice that the parties
should seek their remedy in another forum."); see a/soJohn Palmer Parken
and Mandatory v. Royal Exchange Assurance Co., 8 D. 365, 369-70 (Sess. Cas.
1846) ("[T]here may be cases in which, although the jurisdiction is un-
doubted, courts may stay proceedings, in order that the parties may try the
question in the tribunals of another country, which are more fitted for the
determination of the same.... But the propriety of this course does not
depend upon want ofjurisdiction to entertain the action.").
66. See Brown v. Carnvright, 20 Scot. L. Rep. 818, 819 (Sess. Cas. 2nd Div.
1883); LaSocitidu Gaz deParis, [1925] Sess. Cas. (H.L.) at 344 (LordJustice-
Clerk Alness) ("In the earlier cases the plea Nas thus stated-forum non
competens. But it was recognized that that Nas an inaccurate statement of
the plea. The plea is open even where the competency of the Court in
which it is taken to try the case is indubitable. And so the form of the plea
was altered, and it was stated no longer as forum non competens but as fo-
rum non conveniens."). Note, however, that Lord Dunedin as not thor-
oughly pleased with the emphasis placed on convenience by the new phrase:
"In my view, 'competent' is just as bad a translation for "compeen? as 'conve-
nient' is for 'conveniens.' The proper translation for these Latin words, so fiar
as this plea is concerned, is 'appropriate.'" Sce La Socit6 du Gaz de Paris v.
La SocitE Anonyme de Navigation "Les Armateurs Franais," [1926] Sess.
Cas. (H.L.) 13, 18; see also Macadam v. Macadam, 45 Scot. Jurist 525, 526
(Sess. Cas. 2nd Div. 1873); Prescott v. Graham, 20 Scot. L Rep. 573 (Sess.
Cas. 1883); Wtuiim M. GLOAG & ROBERT Q.NDLISH HENDERSON, INrRODUG.
TION TO THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 40 (Alexander B. Wilkinson et al. eds., 9th
ed. 1987); Braucher, supra note 63, at 909.
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The developed doctrine of forum non conveniens under
Scottish law was articulated in the 1926 case La Socigtg du Gaz de
Paris v. La Socit6 Anonyme de Navigation "Les Armateurs Fran-
fais. ,6 7 Lord Chancellor Cave explained the doctrine as re-
quiring dismissal where, "after giving consideration to the in-
terests of both parties and to the requirements of justice, [it
appears] that the case could not be suitably tried in the Court
in which it was instituted, and full justice could not be done
there to the parties, but could be done in another Court."68
The appropriate analysis was explained succinctly by Lord
Sumner: "The object, under the words 'forum non con-
veniens' is to find that forum which is the more suitable for
the ends of justice, and is preferable because pursuit of the
litigation in that forum is more likely to secure those ends."(!'
Although the Scottish doctrine did include convenience as a
factor,70 the underlying concern was broader than simple con-
venience: The court would make its decision based on which
forum would be "preferable for securing the ends ofjustice."71
67. [1926] Sess. Cas. (H.L.) 13; see also Sim v. Robinow, 19 R. 665 (Sess.
Cas. 1892).
68. La Societj du Gaz de Paris, [1926] Sess. Cas. (H.L.) at 16-17. In an
earlier iteration of this case, Lord Justice-Clerk Alness observed that "it is not
enough that the forum is inconvenient from the point of view of the Court,
or from the point of view of the defender only, but it must be plain (1) that
another forum is open to the parties, and (2) that that other forum is more
suitable for the trial of the cause from the point of view of the interests of
the parties and for the ends ofjustice." La Societl du Gaz de Paris, [ 1925] Sess.
Cas. (H.L.) at 447.
69. La Socieitl du Gaz de Paris, [1926] Sess. Cas. (H.L.) at 22.
70. See id at 17.
71. Id at 22. Reflecting on the phrase "more convenient and preferable
for securing the ends of justice," Lord Sumner opined that "[tihe true
course is to leave out the words 'more convenient and,' because one cannot
think of convenience apart from the convenience of the pursuer or the de-
fender or the Court, and the convenience of all these three... is of little, if
any, importance. If you read it as 'more convenient, that is to say, prefera-
ble, for securing the ends of justice,' I think the true meaning of the doc-
trine is arrived at." Id. See La Sociit du Gaz deParis, [1925] Sess. Cas. (H.L.)
at 350 (Lord Justice-Clerk Alness) ("The action is French in its origin,
French in its incidents, French in its problems, French in its proof, French in
its atmosphere and horizon."); see also Barrett, supra note 63, at 406-07; B.D.
Inglis, Jurisdiction, the Doctrine of Forum Conveniens, and Choice of Law in Conflict
of Laws, 81 LAW Q. REv. 380, 382 n.8 (1965) (observing that "[iln the Scot-
tish cases the application of the Scottish rule seems to rest largely on the
'ends ofjustice' rather than the convenience of the parties").
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In the United States, maritime jurisdiction law from
around the 19th century provides the most direct U.S.-based
source of doctrine supporting the later development of forum
non conveniens.72 In its 1885 decision The Belgenland, the U.S.
Supreme Court explicitly recognized that federal courts enjoy
discretion in determining whether to assert jurisdiction over
maritime claims involving foreigners, such as suits for collision
damages at sea, that "arise under the common law of na-
tions."T3 Nevertheless, the Court made clear that a factual
analysis of each case would be necessary to determine whether
the dispute would be governed by the law of a foreign coun-
try-as in suits for wages or ill-treatment-in which case it
might prove "inexpedient" for the U.S. court to take jurisdic-
tion.74 In such cases, the Court cautioned, it would be impor-
tant to obtain the consent of a consul or minister of the for-
eign country before asserting jurisdiction, "not on the ground
that [the trial court] has not jurisdiction, but that, from mo-
tives of convenience, or international comity, it will use its dis-
72. See Collard v. Beach, 87 N.Y.S. 884 (N.Y. App. Div. 1904); Gardner v.
Thomas, 14 Johns. 134 (N.Y. 1817); Brinley v. Avery, I Kirby 25 (Conn.
1786). The Gardner court recognized that U.S. courts "may take cognizance
of torts committed on the high seas, on board of a foreign vessel where both
parties are foreigners; but I am inclined to think it must, on principles of
policy, often rest in the sound discretion of the Court to afford jurisdiction
or not, according to the circumstances of the case." Gardne; 14 Johns. at
137-38; see also Mason v. The Blaireau, 6 U.S. 240, 264 (1804) ("[It has been
suggested] that upon principles of general policy, this court ought not to
take cognizance of a case entirely between foreigners, [rather] than from
any positive incapacity to do so. On weighing the considerations drawn from
public convenience, those in favor of the jurisdiction appear much to over-
balance those against it.... ."); The Sirius, 47 F. 825, 827 (N.D. Cal. 1891)
("That the court may, in its discretion, take jurisdiction of the case is not
disputed, but it is urged on the part of the claimant that in the present in-
stance such discretion ought not to be exercised in favor of the jurisdic.
tion.").
73. The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 365 (1885); see also Can. Malting Co. v.
Patterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413 (1932). "Obviously, the proposition tat a
court having jurisdiction must exercise it, is not universally true; else the
admiralty court could never decline jurisdiction on the ground that the liti-
gation is between foreigners. Nor is it true of courts administering other
systems of law. Courts of equity and of law also occasionally decline, in the
interest ofjustice, to exercise jurisdiction, where the suit is between aliens or
nonresidents, or where for kindred reasons the litigation can more nppropri-
ately be conducted in a foreign tribunal." Id. at 422-23, 423 n.6.
74. The Bdgenland, 114 U.S. at 363.
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cretion whether to exercise jurisdiction or not."75 In maritime
cases involving the "common law of nations," the existence of
jurisdiction was "beyond dispute; the only question [was]
whether it [would be] expedient to exercise it.
' ' 7 6
In later U.S. cases involving torts committed on the high
seas, the Belgenland decision served as a model for analysis,
with courts repeatedly recognizing their discretion to decline
hearing cases even though they had jurisdiction over tort
claims brought by foreign seamen. 77 Nevertheless, after vary-
ing degrees of factual analyses, many of these cases eventually
were dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. 78 One of the more
interesting aspects of these cases is the frequency with which
U.S. courts both sought and factored into their considerations
the wishes of foreign consuls or ministers whose countries
might have a direct interest in whether the U.S. court exer-
cised jurisdiction.7 9 In some of these cases, a treaty was in
place decreeing that consuls and consular agents would enjoy
exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising on merchant ships
from their nations.80 The most noteworthy cases, however, are
those where the interests or views of the foreign officials were
defined and factored into courts' jurisdictional decisions, but
75. Id. In these cases, the foreign consul should be notified, and though
the court is not "absolutely bound by [the opinions of consul, it] will always
pay due respect to ... his wishes as to taking jurisdiction." Id. at 364.
76. Id. at 365-66.
77. See, e.g., The Paula, 91 F.2d 1001, 1002 (2d Cir. 1937) ("[T]hat i suit
in admiralty between aliens may be entertained or dismissed in the exercise
of a sound judicial discretion is clear beyond dispute."); The Noddleburn, 30
F. 142 (D. Or. 1887).
78. See, e.g., The Ferm, 15 F.2d 887, 888 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (decliningjuris-
diction in maritime personal injury case); The Roxen, 7 F.2d 739, 741 (E.D.
Va. 1925) (same); The Iquitos, 286 F. 383, 384-85 (W.D. Wa. 1921) (same);
The Walter D. Wallet, 66 F. 1011, 1013 (S.D. Ala. 1895) (same).
79. See The Astra, 34 F. Supp. 152, 154 (D. Md. 1940). After initially re-
jecting the argument that the court lacked jurisdiction to decide a claim for
injuries sustained while at sea, the trial court eventually dismissed the Norwe-
gian plaintiff's claims where the Royal Norwegian Consul General was au-
thorized by Norwegian law and was prepared to assume jurisdiction over the
dispute. See id.
80. See, e.g., The S.S. Emmy, 39 F. Supp. 871, 871-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
Courts facing maritime wage and tort claims often resorted to treaties in
force to determine whether jurisdiction could be asserted. See The Gambit-
sis, 14 F.2d 236, 236 (E.D. Pa. 1926) (recognizing that the subject matter of
the suit was committed to resolution by consular agents, the court observed
that "[t]he want ofjurisdiction is not subject to the discretion of the court").
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where no treaty was cited mandating deference to the foreign
officials.81 These cases demonstrate a clear concern about in-
ternational comity and the interests of foreign countries on
the part of U.S. courts evaluating jurisdictional issues in dis-
putes involving foreign citizens.
Without clear guidance, lower federal courts8 2 struggled
to apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens before 1947.8-
81. See, e.g., The Fern, 15 F.2d at 888. In The Fenn, the consul general of
Sweden joined in the request that the District Court declinejurisdiction over
a suit for personal injuries abroad a Swedish ship on open waters. See id. In
refusing to hear the case, the court stated that it would "not exercise [its]
jurisdiction against the protest of the consul of the country to which the
vessel belongs, except under special circumstances of extraordinary hard-
ship." Id.; see alsoThe Ivaran, 121 F.2d 445, 445-47 (2d Cir. 1941) (declining
jurisdiction over a claim for injuries sustained at sea where the foreign con-
sulate could provide a remedy to plaintiff); The Sirius, 47 F. 825, 827 (N.D.
Cal. 1891) (noting, in accepting jurisdiction, that "[i]n the present case die
British consul has in writing requested the court to adjudicate the cause").
For a general discussion of the use of the doctrine in maritime disputes, see
Bickel, supra note 63. See generaly The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 363-414
(1885).
82. Prior to the application of forum non conveniens in federal court, it
had emerged in jurisdictional disputes in state court. For a discussion of the
use of forum non conveniens in state court practice, see Barrett, supra note
63, at 389-93; Blair, supra note 63, at 20-30; Braucher, supra note 63, at 911-
18.
83. In 1932, the U.S. Supreme Court observed that "[c]ourts of equity
and of law ... occasionally decline, in the interest ofjustice, to exercise
jurisdiction, where the suit is between aliens or nonresidents, or where for
kindred reasons the litigation can more appropriately be conducted in a
foreign tribunal." Can. Malting Co. v. Patterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 422-
23, 423 n.6 (1932); see also Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 288
U.S. 123, 131 (1933) (recognizing that although "no definite rule of general
application can be formulated" to address discretionary dismissal in such
cases, "it safely may be said that jurisdiction will be declined whenever con-
siderations of convenience, efficiency and justice point to the courts of tie
State of the domicile as appropriate tribunals for the determination of the
particular case"). Nevertheless, lower courts have struggled with dhis con-
cept. See, e.g., Momand v. Paramount Pictures Distrib. Co., 19 F. Supp. 102,
104 (D. Mass. 1937) ("The facts [sic] that it may be more convenient to
parties and will avoid protracted litigation in this court if this case is tried in
Oklahoma are circumstances which do not make die jurisdiction of this
court dependent upon the exercise of a [sic] discretion."); Doyle v. North-
ern Pac. Ry. Co., 55 F.2d 708, 710 (D. Minn. 1932) ("There is nothing in te
decisions of the Supreme Court or of the Circuit Court of Appeals which
wouldjustify the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. We
are told, in effect, that we have a duty to try cases of which we havejurisdic-
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In that year, the U.S. Supreme Court sought to fill this void by
creating a standardized process-if not a clear sense of what
weights should be assigned under that process-for deciding
forum non conveniens cases in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.84 In
observing that the doctrine allows a court to "resist imposition
upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by
the letter of a general venue statute," the Court also recog-
nized that "[w] isely, it has not been attempted to catalogue the
circumstances which will justify or require either grant or de-
nial" of forum non conveniens8 5 The importance of Gilbert is
that the Court, for the first time, provided examples of the
now-familiar factors to be considered in the forum non con-
veniens inquiry. From this analysis, the "rare case [ ]" would be
identified warranting the court's invocation of its "power to
decline jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances.
'a6
First, the doctrine of forum non conveniens "presupposes
at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to pro-
cess."87 Although an available, alternative forum is a require-
ment under the doctrine, the Gilbert Court observed that "un-
less the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plain-
tiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed."a8
tion .... I reach the conclusion that I am without power to refuse jurisdic-
tion or to dismiss upon any of the grounds urged by the defendants."); see
also The Saudades, 67 F. Supp. 820, 821 (1946) ("[A]n American court may
not refuse to try a case brought by an American citizen, unless it feels that
injustice would be done by allowing him to proceed in his own court.").
Some lower courts questioned whether the doctrine even existed. See Sacco
v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 56 F. Supp. 959, 960 (E.D.N.Y. 1944) (observ-
ing that although the "so-called doctrine of forum non conveniens" was "the-
oretically a qualification on jurisdiction," it had been applied to date only in
admiralty and equity cases). But cf. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Kepner,
314 U.S. 44, 55-56 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (referring to the "fa-
miliar doctrine of forum non conveniens under which a court having statu-
tory jurisdiction may decline its facilities to a suit that in justice should be
tried elsewhere," and noting that forum non conveniens is a "manifesta-
tion[ ] of a civilized judicial system" and "firmly embedded in our law").
84. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
85. Id. at 507-08.
86. Id. at 504, 509.
87. Id. at 506-07.
88. Id. at 508.
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Second, the court should consider both "private interest"
and "public interest" factors.8 9 Among the private interest fac-
tors to be considered are:
the relative ease of access to sources of proof; aaila-
bility of compulsory process for attendance of unwill-
ing, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing,
witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would
be appropriate to the action; and all other practical
problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious
and inexpensive.90
The Supreme Court also identified a partial list of public inter-
est factors to be considered: the administrative difficulties
flowing from court congestion; the "local interest in having lo-
calized controversies decided at home"; the interest "in having
the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the
state law that must govern the case"; the avoidance of unneces-
sary problems in conflict of laws, or in the application of for-
eign law; and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unre-
lated forum with jury duty.91
Thirty-three years after Gilbert, the Supreme Court revis-
ited forum non conveniens-this time in an international con-
text-and provided its most recent, substantive treatment of
the doctrine in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno.92 In Piper, the Su-
preme Court tweaked its forum non conveniens inquiry in a
variety of ways, explaining more fully how the doctrine should
be applied in appropriate cases. First, the Court ruled that a
plaintiff may not defeat a forum non conveniens motion
"merely by showing that the substantive law that would be ap-
plied in the alternative forum is less favorable to the plain-
tiff[s] than that of the present forum."93 Second, the Court
emphasized "the need to retain flexibility" in evaluating forum
non conveniens factors.94 In particular, the Court observed
that if "central emphasis were placed on any one factor, the
forum non conveniens doctrine would lose much of the very
89. Id. at 508-10.
90. Id at 508.
91. Id. at 509.
92. Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
93. Id. at 247.
94. I. at 249.
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flexibility that makes it so valuable."95 Third, and possibly
most importantly, the Court made clear that although there is
ordinarily a "strong presumption" in favor of a plaintiff's
choice of forum, that presumption "applies with less force
when the plaintiff or real parties in interest are foreign."' 6
The Court reasoned that this distinction supported the under-
lying consideration in forum non conveniens analyses, which
recognizes that "[w]hen the home forum has been chosen, it
is reasonable to assume that this choice is convenient," but
where the plaintiff is foreign, "this assumption is much less
reasonable."
97
Lower federal courts have applied the doctrine of forum
non conveniens frequently and in a wide variety of contexts
since Gilbert and Piper,°9 ranging from In re Union Carbide Corp.
Gas Plant Disaster,"9 where personal injuries caused by an ex-
plosion in India were at issue to Scottish Air International, Inc. v.
British Caledonian Group, PLC,100 involving complex, interna-
tional corporate transactions. Although some questions aris-
ing in the forum non conveniens analysis remain unsettled,
such as the weight to be given the forum choice of a plaintiff
living outside the judicial district where suit is filed,10 courts
95. Id. at 249-50.
96. Id at 255.
97. Id at 255-56.
98. See, e.g., Capital Currency Exch. v. Nat'l Westminster Bank, 155 F.3d
603, 609 (2d Cir. 1998) (dismissing antitrust suit on forum non conveniens
grounds); Murray v. British Broad. Corp., 81 F.3d 287, 292 (2d Cir. 1996)
(same, unfair competition); Creative Tech., Ltd. v. Aztech Sys. PTE, Ltd., 61
F.3d 696, 703 (9th Cir. 1995) (same, intellectual property); Howe v.
Goldcorp Invs., Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, 951 (1st Cir. 1991) (same, securities);
Kempe v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 876 F.2d 1138, 1145 (5th Cir.
1989) (same, RICO); Transunion Corp. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 811 F.2d 127, 129-
30 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (same, RICO); Faber-Plast, GmbH v. Klein-
ert, 997 F. Supp. 846, 848-50 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (same, contract); In re Sili-
cone Gel Breast Implants Liab. Litig., 887 F. Supp. 1469, 1476 (N.D. Ala.
1995) (same, products liability).
99. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.
1987).
100. Scottish Air Int'l, Inc. v. British Caledonian Group, PLC, 81 F.3d
1224 (2d Cir. 1994).
101. The Second Circuit in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Co. reversed the district
court's forum non conveniens dismissal, in part because the lower court
"weighed against the plaintiffs that none of them were residents of the
Southern District of New York, but did not count in favor of their choice of a
U.S. forum that two of them were residents of the United States." 226 F.3d
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have adopted a fairly uniform approach to addressing dismis-
sal motions. For example, courts often make their forum non
conveniens dismissals conditional on various factors,102 includ-
ing the defendants' agreements to submit to the foreign
courts' jurisdictionsl03 or their waivers of certain defenses they
might othenvise assert in the alternative fora.
104
C. The ATS and Forum Non Conveniens in Current Federal
Practice: Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
The ATS and forum non conveniens have developed over
time to a point of relative stability in today's federal court prac-
tice. Although the ATS may have been enacted first as a for-
eign policy tool to ensure that citizens of other countries
would not be forced to sue in state court, and in particular, to
88, 103 (2d Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court has never addressed this ques-
tion directly, however, the Second Circuit's approach appears suspect. A
decision, for example, to grant deference to the form choice of a plaintiff
resident in a U.S. district iar from the one in which trial is set is inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's observation that "[w]hen tie home foru hIs
been chosen, it is reasonable to assume that this choice is convenient." Pipr
Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 255-56. The Ninth Circuit's approach to this issue is
more logical and also consistent with Piper. In Gemdni Capital Group, In. Z.
Yap Flshing Corp., the Ninth Circuit affirmed a Haaii trial court's decision in
a forum non conveniens analysis to grant less deference to the forun choice
of plaintiffs not resident in Hawaii than it would have to the forum choice of
Haiaii residents. 150 F.3d 1088, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 1998). The court ob-
served that because plaintiffs were not resident in Hawaii, the Piperpresump-
ion of convenience for choices of home fora did not apply. Se id. at 1091.
Contrary to the Wiwa court's holding, the choice of a forum outside the
district in which a plaintiff resides should not be considered-uithout fac-
tual analysis or inquiry-to be more convenient for that plaintiff than a fo-
rum outside the United States.
102. See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 257 n.25 (suggesting that "district courts
might dismiss subject to the condition that defendant corporations agree to
provide the records relevant to the plaintiffs claims"); Harrison v. Wyeth
Labs. Div. of Am. Home Prod. Corp., 510 F. Supp. 1, 6 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (con-
ditioning forum non conveniens dismissal on defendant submitting to the
jurisdiction of the United Kingdom and proiding, at its oun expense, all
documents, witnesses, or other evidence under its control needed for fair
adjudication of plaintiffs' claims).
103. See, eg., Mercier v. Sheraton Int'l, Inc., 981 F.2d 1345, 13,15, 1319-50
(1st Cir. 1992).
104. See Winex, Ltd. v. Paine, No. 89-2083, 1990 WL 121483, at :9 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 15, 1990) (requiring that defendant submit to the jurisdiction of
the foreign court and waive any defenses based on delay as prerequisites to
dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds).
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address disputes involving foreign ambassadors inside the
United States, the statute is seen now by many lower federal
courts as conferring jurisdiction in a broad range of interna-
tional human rights cases. 10 5 Furthermore, with the Supreme
Court's articulation and clarification of the forum non con-
veniens analysis in Gilbert and Piper, a doctrine from Scotland
with 400 year-old roots is alive and well in federal court.
The ATS and forum non conveniens are not just stable,
independent concepts in federal litigation; with increasing fre-
quency, ATS cases trigger forum non conveniens analyses.
This tandem should not be surprising given the significant for-
eign components of most ATS suits. The plaintiff is always a
foreign citizen, because he or she must be, and the defendant
is rarely a U.S. citizen. Most importantly, the allegations at is-
sue in the dispute almost always involve activity in a foreign
country. This fact leads to the existence of evidence, includ-
ing relevant documents and witnesses, abroad. ATS suits also
involve claims that implicate international relations and re-
quire the application of foreign law. All of these foreign as-
pects to ATS disputes make them amenable to forum non con-
veniens analyses and, at least theoretically, particularly suscep-
tible to dismissal under the doctrine.
Despite the apparently obvious forum non conveniens ar-
guments that surface as a matter of course in such cases, no
federal court yet has taken jurisdiction under the ATS and suc-
cessfully dismissed the action on forum non conveniens
grounds. 10 6 Perhaps sensing an opportunity to create a pro-
tected niche for human rights cases, plaintiffs in two recent
lawsuits, as well as at least one commentator, have raised argu-
ments that human rights disputes should never be dismissed
under the doctrine. One of the most noteworthy contribu-
105. Other possible avenues for obtaining jurisdiction over defendants in
human rights cases include: (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000), which grants Fed-
eral courts jurisdiction over cases that arise under the U.S. Constitution and
laws of the United States; (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000), federal court diversity
jurisdiction, triggered by the existence of transitory tort jurisdiction in state
court and total diversity among the parties; (3) 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1999),
which governs supplemental jurisdiction; and (4) the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1999)); see also STEPHENS & RATNER, supra
note 7, at 31-39.
106. See STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 7, at 151.
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tions to this debate is the Second Circuit's recent decision in
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
0 7
In Wiwa, plaintiffs alleged that they suffered human rights
abuses at the hands of Nigerian authorities that acted in con-
spiracy with defendants, and they sought to establish jurisdic-
tion and recover damages under the ATS.108 After the district
court dismissed plaintiffs' suit on forum non conveniens
grounds, 10 9 the Second Circuit reviewed the propriety of that
ruling. In the Wiwa decision, the Second Circuit focused its
attention on the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA),110
which supplemented the ATS in 1991 and created a federal
cause of action in the case of torture or extrajudicial killing
committed under the actual or apparent authority of a foreign
nation.' The Wiwa court opined that neither the ATS nor
the TVPA has "nullified, or even significantly diminished the
doctrine of forum non conveniens." However, the court then
proceeded to reverse the district court's dismissal because, in-
ter alia, it had not given proper credit in the forum non con-
veniens analysis to the U.S. policy interest implicit in the TVPA
favoring U.S. adjudication of certain human rights claims''! _
a policy interest never before recognized by a federal court.
The Second Circuit committed over three pages to a re-
view of this purported policy,113 and it reversed a ruling com-
mitted to the sound discretion of the trial court, 1 4 suggesting
that it considered the existence of the policy relevant and
highly persuasive. In particular, the court opined that the
"new formulations of the [TVPA] convey the message that tor-
ture committed under the color of law of a foreign nation in
107. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.. 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
108. See id. at 91-93.
109. See id. at 91-94.
110. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L No. 102-256, 106 Stat.
73 (1992) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1999)).
111. See Whwa, 226 F.3d at 104-05; see also Torture Victim Protection Act of
1991.
112. See V1iwa, 226 F.3d at 108.
113. Id at 103-06.
114. SeePiper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981) (observing that a
trial court's decision on a forum non conveniens motion may be reversed
only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion; where the court has
considered all relevant public and private interest factors, and where its bal-
ancing of these factors is reasonable, its decision deserves substantial defer-
ence").
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violation of international law is 'our business'" and that "[i]f
in cases of torture in violation of international law our courts
exercise their jurisdiction conferred by the [ATS] only for as
long as it takes to dismiss the case for forum non conveniens,
we will have done little to enforce the standards of the law of
nations."
1 15
If the Second Circuit's decision in Wiwa is followed and
applied in future cases, it could have a profound impact on
federal court practice. In a surprising reworking of the tradi-
tional forum non conveniens analysis that appears to lack clear
textual, legislative, doctrinal, or policy-based support, the Sec-
ond Circuit allocated considerable weight to one side of the
balance that courts use in evaluating forum non conveniens
motions. The resulting federal approach to human rights dis-
putes would significantly undermine the application of forum
non conveniens in most human rights cases and would force
individuals and companies with no meaningful connections to
the United States into U.S. courts to face broad discovery, class
actions, and the possibility of punitive damages.
As the number of ATS suits filed in the United States rises
in the years to come, plaintiffs likely will continue to rebut
what appears to be a logical and oftentimes sound jurisdic-
tional defense in human rights cases by arguing for a disman-
tling of the traditional forum non conveniens doctrine. The
following section evaluates the arguments presented by the
Wiwa court and others seeking the explicit or implicit aboli-
tion of forum non conveniens in ATS lawsuits.
III. ABOLISHING FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN ATS SUITS-
EVALUATING THE ARGUMENTS
Three main arguments have been raised in support of the
position that suits under the ATS should be immune from or
115. Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 106. This pronouncement by the Second Circuit is
in apparent direct conflict with its prior observation that the ATS and the
TVPA have done nothing to nullify or even to diminish the forum non con-
veniens analysis, and it betrays what appears to be an underlying hostility of
the court to the application of the doctrine in recent human rights cases.
With the Wiwa decision and the Texaco litigation discussed later, Jota v. Tex-
aco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998), the Second Circuit, within the past
year, has failed to affirm two trial court dismissals of ATS/TVPA lawsuits on
forum non conveniens grounds, despite the fact that those decisions were
entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
[Vol. 33:1001
IS T. E ALIEN TORT STATrI'E &ACROANCT?
receive deferential treatment in forum non conveniens analy-
ses: (1) the forum non conveniens doctrine conflicts with the
language and legislative intent of the ATS; (2) application of
the doctrine in human rights suits would nullify the ATS; and
(3) U.S. interests warrant the abolition of forum non con-
veniens in ATS cases. As discussed below, more careful evalua-
tion of these arguments suggests that they are unpersuasive
and, in fact, may overlook important policy considerations
supporting retention of the doctrine.
A. Forum Non Conveniens Does Not Conflict rwith § 1350's
Express Language or Legislative Intent
An evaluation of the propriety of eliminating forum non
conveniens in ATS disputes should begin at the most basic
level-statutory language and legislative intent. There is a
clear understanding in the federal courts that Congress legis-
lates against a backdrop of common law principles. 116 The Su-
preme Court has given notice to lower federal courts that they
"may take it as given that Congress has legislated ith an ex-
pectation that the [common law] principle will apply except
'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'"" ' 7 Ac-
cording to the Court, "[iln order to abrogate a common-law
principle, the statute must 'speak directly' to the question ad-
dressed by the common law."" 8 One commentator has ob-
served that "[w]hen there is no indication that Congress...
intended to abolish a well-established common-law doctrine
through the passage of a statute, the act will be interpreted in
a way that will preserve the common-law doctrine."1 '0 Those
seeking to undermine forum non conveniens in ATS suits
must clear this basic hurdle of statutory interpretation.
As discussed later in this section, the Wivwa court hinges its
approach to forum non conveniens on the express language
and legislative intent of the TVPA, which supplements the
ATS. In contrast, others have cited directly the ATS's wording
116. See Collinsgru v. Palm)-a Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225. 231 (3d Cir.
1998).
117. Id (quoting Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104.
108 (1991)).
118. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993).
119. 3 SUTHERIAND STATUTORY GONSTRucrION § 61.03 (Norman Singer
ed., 5th ed. 1992).
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and purpose as supporting their arguments for abolishing the
doctrine in human rights cases. In particular, recent litigation
against Texaco, Inc. raised these issues.
Two lawsuits were filed against Texaco in the early 1990s
that alleged similar facts and subsequently were consolidated
for pretrial purposes: Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. and Aslianga v.
Texaco, Inc.120 In both cases, plaintiffs alleged that Texaco ac-
ted negligently and recklessly as part of its oil exploration and
production operations in Ecuador, causing property damage
and personal injury to residents of Ecuador and Peru, as well
as destruction to the regional environment. 12' Plaintiffs
sought jurisdiction under several statutes, including the ATS;
as a separate cause of action, plaintiffs also alleged that Texaco
violated the ATS.
122
During pretrial proceedings, Texaco filed a motion to dis-
miss, in part, on forum non conveniens grounds, which the
trial court granted.1 23 In their briefing on forum non con-
veniens, plaintiffs observed the "undeniable tension between a
statute which grants a federal forum to plaintiffs and a com-
mon law doctrine which may deny them the same forum based
upon the purported inconvenience of a defendant" and re-
sponded that the express language and legislative intent of the
ATS rendered the doctrine of forum non conveniens inappli-
cable.1 24 Relying on a federal court jurisdiction treatise, plain-
120. SeeJota, 157 F.3d at 155. The court identified Aguinda as Dkt. No. 93
Civ. 7527 and Ashanga as Dkt. No. 94 Civ. 9266.
121. See Complaint at 3, Aquinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (No. 93-7527), available at http://members.freespeech.org/
texacorainforest/case/index.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2001) [hereinafter
Aguinda Complaint];Jota, 157 F.3d at 155-56. The caption of the order of
the District Court granting Texaco's motion to dismiss spells plaintiff's name
incorrectly as Aquinda rather than as Aguinda. SeeJota, 157 F.3d at 157 n.5.
122. See Aguinda Complaint, supra note 121, at 3, 35;Jota, 157 F.3d at 159.
123. See Aquinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
The district court's dismissal was vacated by the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, and the case was remanded for a full weighing of forum non con-
veniens factors and a determination of whether Texaco would subject itself
to the jurisdiction of the courts of Ecuador. Seeiota, 157 F.3d at 155. On
remand, the trial court has reopened the record on the pending forum non
conveniens motion and appears poised to deny the motion because of
changed political conditions in Ecuador. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., Nos.
93 Civ. 7527 (TSR), 94 Civ. 9266, 2000 WL 122143 (S.D.N.Y.Jan. 31, 2000).
124. Plaintiffs' Reply Brief to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals at 9, 11,
Jota, 157 F.3d 153 [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Reply Brief]. Despite the Aguinda
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iffs argued that forum non conveniens "is inapplicable 'if the
language and legislative purpose of a statute reveal a Congres-
plaintiff' broad attacks against forum non conveniens in ATS suits, they
asked the court to create only a narrow rule whereby the doctrine would be
inapplicable in ATS cases where the defendant is a U.S. citizen. &e idl. at 14.
Plaintiffs' primary argument for establishing a distinction between U.S. and
foreign defendants comes from Federalist No. 80, in which Alexander Ham-
ilton states, in part, that
[t]he Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for
the conduct of its members.... As the denial or perversion of
justice... is with reason classed among the just causes of war, it will
follow that the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all
causes in which the citizens of other countries are concerned ....
THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). The Texaco plaintiffs appear to interpret Hamilton's reference to
"members" of the "Union" as denoting U.S. citizens, with the result being
that federal courts must hear claims brought by aliens when the defendant is
a U.S. citizen. This interpretation cannot be correct. Federalist No. 80 ad-
dresses federal-state relations and, in particular, the extent to which the fed-
eraljudiciary should have cognizance over claims that might aggravate inter-
national relations. See THE FEDRAusr No. 80, supra, at 476-77 (noting that
"[slo great a proportion of the cases in which foreigners are parties involve
national questions that it is by far most safe and most expedient" for na-
tional, rather than state, tribunals to hear all such cases); see also D'Amnto,
supra note 14, at 64-65. The "members" of the "Union" to which Hamilton
refers are the individual states, not the citizens of the states. The broader
concern facing the Founders during this time was not that the act of an
individual U.S. citizen would draw the United States into war, but that a
rogue decision by a state court might do so. Se supra notes 15-28 and ac-
companying text. AsJames Madison observed, "[i]f we are to be one nation
in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect of other nations." Ti w FEDER.
masT No. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). In fact,
no ATS research completed for this article has revealed any particular con-
cern on the part of the Founders that cases involving American defendants
were so important to national or international concerns that federal courts
must hear such disputes.
Because the Texaco plaintiffh do not justify in a meaningful uay a differ-
ence in treatment of ATS defendants based on nationality, I treat the distinc-
tion between U.S. and foreign defendants as immaterial to the general ques-
tion of whether forum non conveniens should be abolished in ATS disputes.
Of course, nationality of the defendant in any forum non conveniens analy-
sis does and should factor into the overall balancing of considerations. Se
Lony v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 935 F.2d 604, 608 (3d Cir. 1991)
("It is, as Alice said, 'curiouser and curiouser' that defendant would seek to
move the action from its home district to a forum more than 3,000 miles
away."); see also Reid-Walen v. Hansen, 933 F.2d 1390, 1395 (8th Cir. 1991);
Manu Int'l, SA v. Avon Prods., Inc., 641 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 1981).
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sional intent to vest in the plaintiff an absolute power to
choose a United States forum."'
1 25
1. Concurrent Federal Jurisdiction Under the ATS
The Texaco plaintiffs did not articulate in detail how the
express language of the ATS preempts forum non conveniens
except to observe, simply, that the ATS "has... express lan-
guage giving plaintiffs access to a federal forum." 2 6 Any pro-
position that the ATS mandates a U.S. forum in federal court
is inconsistent with the language and history of the ATS and
does not account for the difference between the ATS's lan-
guage and the wording of other jurisdictional grants that, ar-
guably, are truly exclusive.
From the outset in 1789, the language of the ATS did not
confer exclusive jurisdiction on federal courts. 127 In its initial
wording, in fact, the phrase "concurrent with the courts of the
several States"128 was included in the ATS, making it clear that
federal courts would share jurisdiction in such cases. Despite
the absence of an explicit reference to concurrent jurisdiction
in the statute today, it is widely accepted that states retain con-
current jurisdiction over all matters within the scope of the
ATS, and aliens are free to pursue claims in state court for
torts allegedly committed in violation of international law.'29
125. See Plaintiffs' Reply Brief, supra note 124, at 12 (quotingJANIFS WsI.
MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACrIMCE § 111.76 (3d ed. 2000)). Moore's
treatment of this topic arises in the context of specific venue provisions
which, I explain later, do not exist in the ATS or the TVPA. See MOORE ET
AL., supra, § 111.76.
126. See Plaintiffs' Reply Brief, supra note 124, at 11; see also Memorandum
of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 18,
Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Plaintiffs'
Memorandum of Law]. Plaintiffs also do not explain why Moore's reference
to a "United States forum"justifies their demand for a "federal forum." See
supra note 125.
127. See Casto, supra note 13, at 508-10; D'Amato, supra note 14, at 63;
Randall, Inquiries, supra note 14, at 22-23 (observing that the non-exclusivity
of federal jurisdiction in this area may have resulted from a compromise
between Federalists, who preferred that all matters involving foreigners be
decided at the federal level, and anti-Federalists, who would have rather
states address such matters).
128. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (1789) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1999)).
129. See Alomang v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 718 So. 2d 971 (La. Ct. App.
1998) (reversing trial court's dismissal on subject matter jurisdiction and
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Other provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1789 did grant exclu-
sive jurisdiction to federal courts,130 indicating that the Act's
drafters were aware of their ability to craft exclusive jurisdic-
tion provisions and their intentional choice to avoid such juris-
diction in the case of the ATS.13t As a result, the ATS allows,
but does not mandate or require, suit in federal court, and its
express language contains no suggestion that suits under the
statute may not be dismissed in appropriate cases.
By way of comparison, some federal courts have held that
forum non conveniens is precluded when plaintiffs sue under
the Jones Act13 2 for injury or death to a seaman. 133 In the
cases that have barred forum non conveniens considera-
tions, 4 courts have focused on the existence of a specific
venue provision in the Jones Act, which makes the inapplica-
venue grounds of a class action suit brought by Indonesian citizens alleging
international human rights violations and recognizing subject matter juris-
diction for personal injury claims under Louisiana state law): Sm'EN R.
RATNER &JASON S. ABRAMS, AccouNTrBnLfm" FOR HULNL% RicTs ArocrrlEs
IN INTERNATIONAL LA-,v: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LE.aC.Y 205 n.39 (1997);
Casto, supra note 13, at 508-09.
130. See supra note 33, listing various grants of exclusive jurisdiction in ie
Judiciary Act of 1789, including the exclusive grants to the federal courts for
admiralty and maritime claims, as well as claims against consuls and vice-
consuls.
131. Of course, "exclusive" in the context of ie Judiciary Act of 1789
meant exclusive of state courts-the drafters were concerned with carving
up the cognizance of the federal and state judiciaries and identif)ing points
of overlap and exclusivity. Nevertheless, the fact that ie ATS's express
wording allows such cases to be brought in state court undermines the argu-
ment that ATS claims must be heard by federal courts under all circum-
stances and, for example, never be dismissed to a foreign forum.
132. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (2000).
133. See, e.g., Zipfel v. Halliburton Co., 832 F.2d 1477, 1487 (9th Cir.
1987); Szumlicz v. Norwegian Am. Line, Inc., 698 F.2d 1192, 1195 (11 th Cir.
1983); Needham v. Phillips Petroleum Co. of Nor., 719 F.2d 1,181, 1483
(10th Cir. 1983).
134. See Creative Tech., Ltd. v. Aztech Sys. PTE, Ltd., 61 F.3d 696, 699-700
(9th Cir. 1995) (observing that the Jones Act contains a "special provision[ I
mandating venue in the United States district courts"). Cf. Gulf Oil Co. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 505 (1947) (explaining that in cases under the Federal
Employer's Liability Act (FELA), "plaintiff's choice of forum cannot be de-
feated on the basis of forum non conveniens . . because the specia venue
act under which [FELA] cases are brought was believed to require it"): Balti-
more & Ohio RLR Co. %% Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 54 (1941) (noting in the
related field of suits under FELA that when the statute us enacted 'it filled
the entire field of venue in federal courts," and that "[a] privilege of venue
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bility of the doctrine at least arguable.' 35 In Jones Act suits,
"[]urisdiction ... shall be under the court of the district in
which the defendant employer resides or in which his princi-
pal office is located."1 36 Congress's inclusion of the specific
districts where Jones Act suits may be brought supports the no-
tion that it intended to eliminate the possibility that such suits
would be brought anywhere else-either in another judicial
district in the United States or outside the country. 
37
Nevertheless, the forum non conveniens doctrine is so en-
trenched in federal practice that courts have resisted insulat-
ing even federal statutes with specific venue provisions from a
forum non conveniens analysis. In fact, the doctrine has been
held inapplicable to actions under federal statutes only where
there is a specific venue provision and some indication "that
Congress implicitly spoke to, and rejected, the application of
[the] forum non conveniens doctrine to a suit thereunder."1
38
In undertaking this evaluation, federal courts have found no
such congressional intent in suits brought under the United
States Copyright Act, 139 U.S. bankruptcy laws,1 40 U.S. securities
laws,141 the Lanham Act, 142 the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt
Organization Act (RICO),143 and the Warsaw Convention.' 44
granted by the legislative body which created this right of action cannot be
frustrated for reasons of convenience or experience").
135. Several federal circuits have disagreed with the proposition that
Jones Act suits are insulated from forum non conveniens analysis, see, e.g., In
re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 821 F.2d 1147, 1163 n.25 (5th Cir.
1987), vacated sub nom. on other grounds, Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Lo-
pez, 490 U.S. 1032 (1989); De Mateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895, 903 (3d
Cir. 1977); Gazis v. Latsis, 729 F. Supp. 979, 985 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
136. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (2000).
137. See Creative Tech., Ltd., 61 F.3d at 699-700.
138. Id at 700 (quoting La Seguridad v. Transytur Line, 707 F.2d 1304,
1310 n.10 (11th Cir. 1983)); see also MooRE, supra note 125, § 111.76.
139. See Murray v. British Broad. Corp., 81 F.3d 287, 290-91 (2d Cir. 1996);
Creative Tech., Ltd., 61 F.3d at 699-700.
140. See Baumgart v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 981 F.2d 824, 829-31 (5th
Cir. 1993).
141. SeeAllstate Life Ins. Co. v. Linter Group, Ltd., 994 F.2d 996, 1002 (2d
Cir. 1993); Howe v. Goldcorp Invs., Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, 947-50 (1st Cir.
1991).
142. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 431
(9th Cir. 1977).
143. See Transunion Corp. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 811 F.2d 127, 130 (2d Cir.
1987) (per curiam).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
[Vol. 33:1001
IS THE ALIEN TORT STATUrE SACROSANCT?
In each of these areas, federal courts have dismissed suits on
forum non conveniens grounds even though the statutes in-
volved contained provisions specifying the location of proper
venue.
Even if specific venue provisions somehow preempt forum
non conveniens analyses in general, the ATS speaks only to a
general grant ofjurisdiction and is silent as to venue,'-1 stating
only that "district courts shall have original jurisdiction" where
the statutory requirements are met.146 Since 1789, Congress
has made no attempt to narrow or expand venue in ATS suits,
choosing only to vest in the federal courts the power to hear
such disputes if they should be filed anywhere in federal dis-
trict court. A reasonable construction of the ATS's text does
not appear to reflect a congressional desire to vest such juris-
diction in the federal courts exclusively and absolutely, partic-
ularly in the absence of a specific venue provision.
In this way, the ATS is no different from other jurisdic-
tional grants that provide but do not mandate a federal forum.
For example, the federal diversity statute states that "district
courts shall have original jurisdiction" where the amount in
controversy is sufficient and residential diversity exists among
the litigants. 147 Under federal question jurisdiction, "district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States." 148 Like the ATS, neither the federal diversity nor the
federal question statute contains a venue provision specifing
the federal districts in which suit may be brought, and suits
relying on the existence of diversity or a federal question as
144. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 821 F.2d 1147, 1162
(5th Cir. 1987), vacated sub noin. on other grounds, Pan Am. World Aim-ays,
Inc. v. Lopez, 490 U.S. 1032 (1989).
145. Venue in an ATS suit properly is established under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b), which allows non-diversity suits to be brought in: "(1) a judicial
district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same
State, (2) ajudicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omis-
sions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property tiht
is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) ajudicial district in which any
defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may oth-
erwise be brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (2001).
146. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1999).
147. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000).
148. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
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the basis for jurisdiction clearly are subject to dismissal on fo-
rum non conveniens grounds in appropriate circumstances. '19
In its analysis of whether a different federal jurisdictional
statute precluded a possible dismissal under forum non con-
veniens, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals observed that
"if federal law applies to a case in which a forum non con-
veniens dismissal has been sought, the court must inquire fur-
ther to determine if Congress has entrusted the federal courts
with a special duty to implement that federal law, a duty man-
dating that the case should be heard."150 In the case of the
ATS, no part of the statute states or suggests that Congress in-
tended to mandate federal court jurisdiction, requiring that
federal courts hear such cases under all circumstances. Had
Congress intended such an extreme result, it could have
amended the ATS at any point in its 212 year history to insert a
specific venue provision or some other clear statement of ex-
clusivity.
2. Wiwa's Textual Approach to the TVPA
The Second Circuit in Wiwa bases its recognition of a
"policy favoring receptivity" by U.S. courts of human rights
suits under the ATS on the "statutory wording" of the TVPA. 1,I
The Wiwa court relies on the TVPA in its reasoning although
plaintiffs in that lawsuit did not plead a violation of the
TVPA.152 Because the Wiwa lawsuit was an ATS case, -'5 3 the
149. As the Supreme Court observed in Gilbert, a diversity case, "[i]t is
conceded that the venue statutes of the United States permitted the plaintiff
to commence his action in the Southern District of New York and empower
that court to entertain it. But that does not settle the question ivhetlier it
must do so." Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504 (1947).
150. La Seguridad v. Transytur Line, 707 F.2d 1304, 1310 n.10 (11th Cir.
1983) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
excludes forum non conveniens defenses); see also Pioneer Prop., Inc. v. Mar-
tin, 557 F. Supp. 1354, 1362 (D. Kan. 1983) (concluding that "[w]here the
purposes of legislation, together with special venue provisions, indicate [leg-
islative intent to confer on plaintiff broad power over choice of forum,] the
court should not override the legislative purpose by resort to its discretion-
ary powers under forum non conveniens").
151. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 105 (2d Cir. 2000).
152. See First Amended Complaint for Summary Execution; Crimes
Against Humanity; Torture; Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment; Arbi-
trary Arrest and Detention; Violation of the Rights to Life, Liberty and Se-
curity of Person and Peaceful Assembly and Association; Wrongful Death;
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court's analysis of the applicability of forum non conveniens
would have been more persuasive had it addressed the ATS,
not the TVPA. By focusing on the TVPA, the Witrwa court not
only focused on a statute not at issue in the lawsuit, but also
relied on a statutory scheme very different from the ATS,
thereby weakening the court's reasoning.
In particular, the TVPA is not a jurisdictional grant; it
only creates a cause of action. The ATS is also substantively
broader than the TVPA, applying to any tort committed in Nrio-
lation of international law by any person, while the TVPA ex-
tends only to two acts-torture and extrajudicial killing-and
only when the defendant acted "under actual or apparent atu-
thority, or color of law, of any foreign nation."1'5 In addition,
the ATS limits plaintiffs to "aliens," while the TVPA does not
restrict the nationality of plaintiffs. 55 The TVPA also contains
an exhaustion of remedies provision, which is absent from the
ATS.156 While related, the TVPA and ATS are very different
statutory provisions, and the Wriwa court's reliance on the
TVPA in the context of an ATS dispute, without a clear expla-
nation of the TVPA's relevance, is questionable.
Regardless of the wisdom of its approach, the Second Cir-
cuit in Wiwa identified two textual changes between the ATS
and TVPA that supposedly justified a new approach to forum
non conveniens in human rights disputes: (1) Congress
moved from expressly addressing jurisdiction in the ATS to
legislating a federal cause of action in the TVPA; and (2)
While the ATS concerns itself with a tort "committed in viola-
Assault and Battery- Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress; Negligence; and Violations of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act at 19-20, W\wa v. Ro)l Dutch
Petroleum Co., 96 Civ. 8386 (1997) (MMW) (HBP).
153. See id. (noting that plaintiffi' claims arise under the ATS, anong
other sources of law, but with no reference to the TVPA).
154. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L No. 102-256, § 2(a),
106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1999)); see also
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993).
155. See Torture Victim Protection Act § 2(a); sce also irwa, 226 F.3d at
105.
156. SeeTorture Victim Protection Act § 2(b). But seS. REP. No. 102-2,19,
at 9-10 (1991) (noting that, "as a general matter, the committee recognizes
that in most instances the initiation of litigation under this legislation will be
virtually prima facie evidence that the claimant has exhausted his or her
remedies in the jurisdiction in which the torture occurred").
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tion of the law of nations," the TVPA creates a substantive
right to damages under U.S. law. 157 Neither of these factors
justifies the court's novel interpretation of the ATS.
Although the TVPA does create a cause of action by its
wording, most federal courts since Filartiga have recognized
that same cause of action under the ATS. 158 Indeed, the
House and Senate Judiciary Committee reports considering
the TVPA indicate that the Act was intended to "establish an
unambiguous... basis for a cause of action that has been suc-
cessfully maintained under" the ATS. 159 This point also was
observed by Senator Specter, the TVPA's sponsor, on the Sen-
ate floor when he noted that "a cause of action for torture in a
foreign country has existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1350 and was
recognized under Filartiga in 1980."160 While there may have
been valid reasons for passing the TVPA-which are discussed
more in the following section-that litigants lacked a statutory
cause of action for pursuing human rights claims in U.S. court
prior to the TVPA's enactment was not one of those reasons.
The TVPA's focus on substantive rights is not a novel depar-
ture from established ATS case law.
The wording change from the ATS's discussion of a viola-
tion of the law of nations to the TVPA's grant of damages
under U.S. law is, once again, a development more of form
than substance. To the extent the ATS provides a private right
of action, as found by the Filartiga court, the same damages
now available under the TVPA have been available in U.S.
court under the ATS since 1980.161 Indeed, it has been argued
157. See Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 105.
158. See STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 7, at 7-8. See generally id. at 2, 9-12
(discussing Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)).
159. S. REP. No. 102-249, at 4; H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 3 (1991).
160. 138 CONC. REc. S4,176, at S4,177 (1992) (statement of Sen. Specter).
161. International law has been seen as a part of U.S. law since at least the
Supreme Court's decision in The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
However, the notion that customary international law forms a part of this
country's post-Erie federal common law has been challenged recently by
Professors Bradley and Goldsmith. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack C. Gold-
smith, Customay International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the
Modern Position, 110 HARv. L. REv. 815 (1997). While this area of law may be
unsettled now, others have criticized the position of Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith and their approach to the domestic legal status of customary in-
ternational law. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga s Firm
Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FoRDHAm L.
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that the TVPA, if anything, represents a congressional narrow-
ing of international human rights incorporated into federal
law, given the breadth of the Filartiga decision and the limited
focus of the TVPA on only two specific torts in violation of the
law of nations: torture and extrajudicial killing.162 While crea-
tion of an explicit federal statutory cause of action for torture
and extrajudicial killing certainly makes clear that Congress
concurred with the result in Filartiga, the additional language
of the TVPA overlaps to a great extent wsith the ATS and ap-
pears largely symbolic.
While the Wiwa court's reliance on textual changes be-
tween the TVPA and ATS does not further its argument, more
careful scrutiny of the text of the TVPA may undercut the
court's conclusion. The TVPA contains a provision requiring
that plaintiffs suing under the Act must have exhausted availa-
ble and adequate remedies in the country where the alleged
abuse took place.163 This exhaustion provision can be seen as
analogous to a narrow, limited version of forum non con-
veniens that reflects a clear congressional preference for liti-
gating human rights suits outside the United States. Although
the Senate Judiciary Committee considering the TVPA be-
lieved that "in most instances the initiation of litigation under
this legislation will be virtually prima facie evidence that the
claimant has exhausted his or her remedies in the jurisdiction
in which the torture occurred,"16 defendants may neverthe-
less "rais[e] nonexhaustion of remedies as an affirmative de-
REv. 463 (1997); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customna Inter-
national Law: A Response to Professors Bradly and Goldsmith, 66 FoRnIL-.1 L
REV. 371 (1997); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customay International
Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FoRHAw, L RE%,. 393 (1997).
162. See Curtis A. Bradley &Jack C. Goldsmith, The Curr t Illegitimacy of
International Human Rights Litigation, 66 Fomrmtxm L REv. 319,363-68 (1997).
The TVPA further restricts the FMartiga approach by including an exhaustion
provision and a statute of limitations, as well as requiring that the prohibited
acts be committed under color of foreign law. SeeTorture Victim Protection
Act of 1991, §§ 2(a)-(c), Pub. L No. 102-256,106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1999)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993); Brad-
ley & Goldsmith, supra, at 365. The INpA does allow for suit by a U.S. citi-
zen, which is not recognized under the ATS; however, U.S. citizens are al-
most never plaintiffs in international human rights disputes.
163. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, § 2(b).
164. S. REP. No. 102-249, at 9-10; see also H.R. REP,. No. 102-367, at 5.
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fense."' 6 5 If the defendant can demonstrate that remedies ex-
isted in the local country that the claimant did not use, "the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to rebut by showing that the local
remedies were ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged,
inadequate, or obviously futile."'
66
The House Judiciary Committee observed that the ex-
haustion provision "ensures that U.S. courts will not intrude
into cases more appropriately handled by courts where the al-
leged torture or killing occurred. It will also avoid exposing
U.S. courts to unnecessary burdens, and can be expected to
encourage the development of meaningful remedies in other
countries."1 67 The purpose and operation of the exhaustion
provision as voiced by the House and Senate Judiciary Com-
mittees appear largely to mirror those of forum non con-
veniens; accordingly, those seeking to undermine forum non
conveniens in this context face a heightened burden ofjustifi-
cation.
Although similar to one another in some respects, the
TVPA's exhaustion provision does not override or replace the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. 168 Apart from the absence
of any textual or legislative history supporting such a replace-
ment, the exhaustion provision in the TVPA is not as broad as
forum non conveniens. In particular, even if a TVPA plaintiff
has exhausted local remedies in the country where the alleged
abuse took place, a third country might still provide the most
appropriate and convenient forum for litigating the dis-
pute.' 69 In such a case, the TVPA's exhaustion provision
165. S. REP. No. 102-249, at 10.
166. Id.
167. H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 5.
168. While there is no support for the proposition that the TVPA's ex-
haustion provision should trump the common law doctrine of forum non
conveniens, if it were held to do so, such a ruling should not impact the
consideration of how forum non conveniens should be applied in ATS suits,
absent the amendment of the ATS to include an exhaustion provision simi-
lar to the TVPA's.
169. This, in fact, was the very question confronted by the federal courts
in the Wiwa litigation. Although the alleged abuse occurred in Nigeria, de-
fendants sought dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds to England,
the home state of incorporation for Shell Transport and Trading Co., P.L.C.,
one of the named defendants. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226
F.3d 88, 92, 99-103 (2d Cir. 2000).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
[Vol. 33:1001
IS THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE SACROSANCT?
should not be interpreted to block consideration of a forum
non conveniens motion seeking dismissal to a third cotmtry.
Even if the Wiwa court's reliance on the TPA in an ATS
lawsuit is appropriate, its arguments are unpersuasive and fail
to address the textual differences between the provisions, in-
cluding the relevance of the TVPA's exhaustion language.
The court appears to be straining to read into the evolution of
§ 1350's text a "more direct recognition that the interests of
the United States are involved" in human rights cases. 170 This
strained interpretation is necessary for the Wiwa court because
the most direct recognition of the U.S. interests it struggles to
locate-an explicit statutory identification of such interests-
conspicuously is absent from both the ATS and the TVPA.
3. Congressional Policy Behind the ATS and the "TVPA
Because the express language of § 1350 does not justify
the elimination of or, in fact, any modification to forum non
conveniens in human rights cases, the analysis could end
there. 171 Although an inquiry into legislative history might be
gratuitous in this case, courts do address such history when
interpreting some statutes,172 and those advocating the curtail-
ment of forum non conveniens in human rights cases-includ-
170. Id at 105.
171. See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 528 (1993) (S-alia, J., concur-
ring) ("The language of the statute is entirely clear, and if that is not what
Congress meant then Congress has made a mistake and Congress will have
to correct it. We should not pretend to care about legislative intent (as op-
posed to the meaning of the law) ... ."); Schwegnann Bros. v. Calvert Distill-
ers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395-96 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Resort to
legislative history is only justified where the face of the Act is inescapably
ambiguous.. "); United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543
(1940) ("There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of
a statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to give expres-
sion to its wishes. Often these words are sufficient in and of themselves to
determine the purpose of the legislation. In such cases we have followed
their plain meaning."); Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 710-11 (1885)
("[Tihe rule is general, with reference to the enactments of all legislative
bodies, that the courts cannot inquire into the motives of the legislators in
passing them, except as they may be disclosed on the face of the acts, or
inferable from their operation, considered with reference to the condition
of the country and existing legislation.").
172. See, eg., Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426
U.S. 1, 10 (1976) ("When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as
used in the Statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which
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ing the Wiwa court-have relied on § 1350's history; accord-
ingly, I address legislative intent below.
In the Texaco litigation, the plaintiffs contended that the
ATS's legislative intent supported their position that forum
non conveniens should not apply to such disputes. 73 Any ar-
gument that relies heavily on the underlying purpose or legis-
lative history of the ATS faces an uphill battle, given the lack of
any actual legislative history for the Judiciary Act of 1789 and
disagreement among scholars about the true purpose of the
ATS. 174 Nevertheless, the Texaco plaintiffs made two main ar-
guments about the Act's legislative intent in support of their
position.
They argued first that the Second Circuit had "instructed
that the central purpose of the ATS was to 'open[ ] the federal
courts [ ]' to aliens' cognizable claims." 175 This is undoubtedly
true, but it does not advance plaintiffs' theory. Section 9 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789 granted federal courts concurrent ju-
risdiction over suits by aliens alleging tort violations of U.S.
treaty or international law.' 76 However, the Second Circuit's
common sense statement about the purpose of the ATS does
forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on 'superficial examina-
tion.'" (citation omitted)).
173. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law, supra note 126, at 16-19; Plain-
tiffs' Reply Brief, supra note 124, at 12-14.
174. Competing schools of thought certainly exist with respect to the his-
tory and original purpose of the ATS. In addition to the more classical ver-
sion reviewed in Part II (and outlined in more detail by other authors, see
generally Casto, supra note 13; Randall, Inquiries, supra note 14); compare Swece-
ney, supra note 14 (positing that § 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was in-
tended to cover jurisdiction in a narrow category of prize cases, where the
legality of capture was not at issue and the case was one in which an alien
seaman sued solely for a tort) with Burley, supra note 14 (arguing thatjuris-
diction under the ATS originally developed from the Framers' understand-
ing of a general obligation to redress certain violations of international law,
regardless of where the violations occurred or who the victims were, and this
obligation flowed not to individual states, but to the community of civilized
nations as a whole).
175. Plaintiffs' Reply Brief, supra note 124, at 11 (quoting Filartiga v. Pefia-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980)); Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law,
supra note 126, at 16 (providing more of the Filartiga quote: The "central
purpose of the Alien Tort Claims Act (was] to 'open [I the federal courts [to
aliens] for adjudication of... rights... recognized by international law'").
176. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (1789) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1999)).
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not address whether federal courts must maintain jurisdiction
in all such cases-which was the particular issue concerning
the Texaco plaintiffs. Further, the Second Circuit's broad in-
terpretation of the ATS in Filartiga cannot be used to support
the notion that forum non conveniens should be abolished in
such cases because in Filartiga the Second Circuit explicitly
ruled that the "critical question" of forum non conveniens
should be considered by the trial court on remand.
77
The Texaco plaintiffs also contended that the legislative
history of the TVPA supported their position on ATS jurisdic-
tion. In particular, they cited comments made by Senators
Simpson and Grassley on November 26, 1991, relating to "the
'overriding problem' that [the TVPA] provide(s] a federal
forum for all injured aliens and thus render[s] unavailable the
forum non conveniens defense."178 Presumably, because Con-
gress allegedly designed the TVPA to negate forum non con-
veniens, a similar congressional intent should be read into its
predecessor, the ATS.
The Second Circuit in Wiwa also relied on the TVPA's leg-
islative history in seeking to justify its novel interpretation of
forum non conveniens in ATS cases. In particular, the court
cited the U.S. Congress in observing that "universal condem-
nation of human rights abuses 'provide[s] scant comfort' to
the numerous victims of gross violations if they are without a
forum to remedy the wrong." 79 According to the Wiwa court,
this statement expresses "a policy of U.S. law favoring the adju-
dication of such suits in U.S. courts." a0 The Second Circuit
then opined that if U.S. courts take jurisdiction over human
rights cases only long enough to dismiss them on forum non
conveniens grounds, "we will have done little to enforce the
177. Fdartiga, 630 F.2d at 890 ("[We do not reach the critical question of
forum non conveniens, since it was not considered below. In closing, how-
ever, we note that the foreign relations implications of this and other issues
the district court will be required to adjudicate on remand underscores the
wisdom of the First Congress in vesting jurisdiction over such claims in the
federal district courts through the Alien Tort Statute. Questions of this na-
ture are fraught with implications for the nation as a whole, and therefore
should not be left to the potentially varying adjudications of the fifty
states.").
178. Plaintiffs' Reply Brief, supra note 124, at 13; Plaintiffs' Memorandum
of Law, supra note 126, at 19.
179. Wia v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 106 (2d Cir. 2000).
180. IML
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standards of the law of nations."'" Recourse to the TVPA's
legislative history to justify curtailment of forum non con-
veniens in ATS litigation proves unconvincing.
In their pleadings, the Texaco plaintiffs obscured the full,
true statements of Senators Simpson and Grassley. Nowhere
in their minority statement do the senators state, as the Texaco
plaintiffs imply they do, that the TVPA would provide a federal
forum for all injured aliens, thereby making forum non con-
veniens unavailable.1l 2 In fact, nothing in the majority or mi-
nority congressional Judiciary Committee reports specifically
addresses the applicability of forum non conveniens to TVPA
suits. Senators Simpson and Grassley do state that "[t]he prin-
ciple behind the common law doctrine of forum non con-
veniens, which prevents parties from having their dispute adju-
dicated in a forum with which they have no connection, de-
scribes our overriding problem with [the TVPA]." 1 3 The
senators went on to note that "the United States is not the ap-
propriate forum for a foreign national to hold a foreign defen-
dant to answer for action which occurred far from the United
States."1 4 Senators Simpson and Grassley do not appear to
have stated that the TVPA will preclude forum non conveniens
considerations, but simply that concerns underlying the doc-
trine are the very concerns they had with the TVPA.
The argument from the Texaco and Wiwa litigations that
the TVPA precludes or even disfavors forum non conveniens
considerations is inconsistent with the clear legislative history
of the TVPA.1s5 In particular, the Texaco plaintiffs and the
Wiwa court appear to have overlooked important general con-
gressional debates on the statute. 1 6 On Tuesday, March 3,
181. 1&
182. See Plaintiffs' Reply Brief, supra note 124, at 13; Plaintiffs' Memoran-
dum of Law, supra note 126, at 19.
183. S. REP. No. 102-249, at 14 (1991) (minority views of Sens. Simpson
and Grassley).
184. Id.
185. The Texaco plaintiffs are not alone in their failure to credit the ex-
plicit legislative intent behind the TVPA. See infra notes 239-65 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of Professor Boyd's interpretation of the role of
forum non conveniens in TVPA disputes.
186. Within the "last hope of lost interpretive causes, that St. Jude of the
hagiology of statutory construction, legislative history," United States v.
Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 521 (1992) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring), general floor debates appear to be the most scorned. See Schweg-
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1992, Senator Grassley-who later co-authored the minority
opinion in the Senate Judiciary Committee Report-engaged
in a colloquy with Senator Specter about the purpose and ef-
fect of the legislation. 1 7 Senator Grassley began his question-
ing by asking Senator Specter about the wisdom of providing
federal court jurisdiction in cases that lack meaningful con-
nections to the United States.' 88 Later, Senator Grassley asked
the following questions: 'Will courts retain their discretion to
decline jurisdiction over lawsuits under [the TVPA]? Will they
be able to dismiss such suits in favor of a more convenient fo-
rum in another country?"'18 9 Senator Specter-the co-sponsor
of the TVPA-responded unequivocally: "The answer to both
questions is yes. Nothing in this legislation is intended to or
does affect the doctrine of forum non conveniens, which re-
mains applicable to any lawsuit brought under this act." "10
Senator Simpson-who joined Senator Grassley in authoring
the minority opinion in the Senate Judiciary Committee Re-
port- later expressed his understanding of the effect of the
TVPA on the application of forum non conveniens:
My primary concern was with the possibility that for-
eign nationals could come to our courts and file law-
suits against other foreign nationals when neither
party has any real connection to the United States. If
U.S. courts are free to exercise their discretion and
refuse to entertain these suits under the doctrine of
mann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395-96 (1951) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (opining that "to select casual statements from floor debates,
not always distinguished for candor or accuracy, as a basis for making lip our
minds what law Congress intended to enact is to substitute ourselves for the
Congress in one of its most important functions"). Nevertheless, House and
Senate Judiciary Committee reports do not speak directly to tie application
of forum non conveniens in TPA cases-though they certainly do not sug-
gest the doctrine's abolition. Accordingly, and to the extent recourse to leg-
islative history is a valuable exercise at all, general floor debates are the next
most helpful source of information. In preparing this article, no rese~arch
has uncovered any legislative history for the TVPA expressly or implicitly
contradicting the comments by Senator Specter, the Act's sponsor, discussed
in this section.
187. See 138 CONG. Ric. S4,176-78 (statements of Sens. Grassley and Spec-
ter).
188. See id. at S2,667 (statement of Sen. Grassley).
189. Id. at S4,177.
190. Id (statement of Sen. Specter) (emphasis added).
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forum [non conveniens], as the distinguished Sena-
.tor from Pennsylvania has indicated, then that con-
cern has been addressed. 19
1
The intended effect of the TVPA on the doctrine of fo-
rum non conveniens, as understood by the congressmen who
introduced and voted on the TVPA legislation, could not be
clearer: Forum non conveniens was understood to be fully ap-
plicable to TVPA suits, and the doctrine was intended to be
unaffected by passage of the Act.
The arguments advanced by the Texaco plaintiffs and the
Wiwa court relating to § 1350's legislative intent do not take
account of the great weight of scholarship, research, and ex-
isting legislative history. As addressed in more detail in Part II,
it appears reasonable to conclude that the drafters of the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789, motivated by a concern that forcing aliens
into state courts might antagonize international relations, in-
tended to create the option for aliens to sue in federal court
for torts committed in violation of the law of nations. Accord-
ingly, § 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was just one part of a
broader attempt to give the federal government at least con-
current jurisdiction over matters potentially affecting foreign
relations. But even given these concerns, the drafters of § 9
did not vest exclusive jurisdiction over such suits in the federal
courts, signaling their vision that some suits cognizable under
§ 9 would be pursued in jurisdictions other than federal court.
With respect to the TVPA, contrary to the assertions of
the Wiwa court, congressional enactment of the statute was de-
signed to accomplish a variety of goals, none of which involved
establishing a U.S. forum or cause of action that would not be
subject to traditional forum non conveniens arguments. 19
2
191. Id. (statement of Sen. Simpson). The TVPA does not require that
defendants be "foreign nationals," only that they act under actual or appar-
ent authority of a foreign nation, and Senator Specter's explanation that
nothing in the TVPA was intended to or did affect the application of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens was not limited to the subset of TVPA
cases involving foreign defendants (or, far that matter, cases involving for-
eign plaintiffs). See id at S4,176 (statement of Sen. Specter).
192. The clear language of the TVPA suggests that it is not ajurisdictional
grant. Instead, it provides only a cause of action for any individual subject to
torture or extrajudicial killing committed by a person acting under actual or
apparent authority, or under color of law, of any foreign nation. See Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992)
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Legislative history of the TVPA reflects a congressional desire
to "provide [an explicit] means of civil redress to victims of
torture,"193 thereby fulfilling what was considered to be a U.S.
obligation under the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(Convention Against Torture).194 Congress also indicated that
it was seeking to add to the remedies available under the ATS
and to the class of plaintiffs that might avail itself of those rem-
edies, recognizing the need to provide a "clear and specific
remedy, not limited to aliens, for torture and extrajudicial kill-
ing. 195
Perhaps most of all, in enacting the TVPA, Congress was
responding specifically to Judge Bork's concurring opinion in
Tel-Oren, in which he "questioned the existence of a private
right of action under [the ATS], reasoning that separation of
powers principles required an explicit-and preferably con-
temporary-grant by Congress of a private right of action
before the U.S. courts could consider cases likely to impact on
U.S. foreign relations." 196 According to both Judiciary Com-
mittees, "[t]he TVPA would provide such a grant.
" '9 7
The known legislative history of § 1350 does not support,
and even undercuts, the Texaco plaintiffs' arguments and the
conclusions of the Wiwa court. Most strikingly, in its discus-
sion of the purpose of the TVPA, the Wiwa court does not ac-
count for the clear legislative history of the TVPA, which re-
jects any possibility that forum non conveniens would be af-
fected in any way by the Act.
B. Forum Non Conveniens Does Not Nulify the ATS
Other arguments have been presented suggesting that re-
taining forum non conveniens in ATS cases would nullify the
Act because the balance of convenience factors would be
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1999)). But see PrxrN &
ABRAms, supra note 129, at 207 n.52 (observing that it is unclear whether the
TVPA "isjurisdictional or merely provides a cause of action" that gives rise to
ATS or federal question jurisdiction).
193. S. REP. No. 102-249, at 3 (1991); H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 3 (1991).
194. See S. REP. No. 102-249, at 3; H.R REP. No. 102-367, at 3.
195. H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 3.
196. S. REP. No. 102-249, at 4-5; H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 4.
197. S. REP. No. 102-249, at 5; H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 4.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
2001]
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
"heavily weighted against foreign plaintiffs."' 9 8 It has been ar-
gued that this is of particular concern because forum non con-
veniens dismissals would "undermin[e] the federal statutory
scheme which encourages aliens to seek civil redress in U.S.
courts for wrongs occurring on foreign soil."1 9 Most recently,
the Wiwa court hinted at the problem of nullification when it
observed that U.S. courts would do little to enforce interna-
tional law standards if they were to take jurisdiction over ATS
cases only long enough to dismiss them on forum non con-
veniens grounds.
20 0
Even without a substantive analysis of this argument, it ap-
pears clear that the existence of this doctrine as a tool for use
by defendants in ATS suits will not result in such cases being
thrown out of federal court en masse on forum non conveniens
grounds. Since the modem era of litigation under the ATS
began over twenty years ago with Filartiga, scores of cases have
been filed seeking jurisdiction under the ATS;2 0' however,
only two trial courts have dismissed an ATS lawsuit on forum
non conveniens grounds2 2-the Wiwa decision was reversed
198. Kathryn L. Boyd, The Inconvenience of Victims: Abolishing Forum Non
Conveniens in U.S. Human Rights Litigation, 39 VA.J. INT'L L. 41, 48 (1998). In
the recent litigation brought by Holocaust survivors and the heirs of Holo-
caust victims, plaintiffs also raised this argument in response to defendants'
forum non conveniens motion. See Plaintiff's Mem. of Law in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on Forum Non Conveniens Grounds; Motion
to Dismiss on Abstention Grounds; and Motion in the Alternative to Stay All
Proceedings in These Cases at 3 n.7, In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105
F.Supp. 2d 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. 96-4849). These suits were filed in the
Eastern District of New York and were consolidated for pretrial purposes in
In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., No. 96-4849 (E.D.N.Y.) (consolidated
with No. 96-5161 and No. 97-461). For a more detailed discussion of these
proceedings, see infra notes 377-92 and accompanying text. The author was
an associate at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering from 1996 to 1998 and assisted in
the representation of the defendants in In re Holocaust Victim Assets.
199. Boyd, supra note 198, at 48. Reflecting what appears to be the initial
purpose of the statute, the ATS does not require that the alleged tort in
violation of U.S. treaty or international law have occurred on "foreign soil."
This is also true of the TVPA.
200. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 106 (2d Cir.
2000).
201. For a summary compilation of some of the more important cases
filed under the ATS, see STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 7, at 239-44.
202. SeeAquinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see
also Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 88 (discussing the District Court's decision to dismiss).
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on appeal,203 and the Texaco decision was remanded for recon-
sideration by the trial court.20 4 Although the feared banish-
ment of ATS cases, as a broad class, from federal court has not
materialized, the argument continues to be made that forum
non conveniens will eliminate most ATS cases fiom the federal
docket. A more critical consideration of the issue suggests that
this concern is unwarranted.
Forum non conveniens requires a fact-specific, case-by-
case analysis that does not lend itself well to generalized pre-
dictions about how the doctrine might play out in broad cate-
gories of cases. The doctrine requires that trial courts inquire
into the existence of an adequate alternative forum for litiga-
tion outside the United States, as well as whether various pri-
vate and public interest factors justify dismissal. -0 5 Wile cer-
tain documentary evidence in traditional human rights dis-
putes may be located abroad, other tangible e\idence very well
could be in the plaintiff's possession (or possibly the defen-
dant's) and located in the United States.206 W' here multiple
plaintiffs sue a defendant under the ATS, the fact that each
plaintiff will provide oral testimony and is located in the
United States also should weigh against dismissal. In addition,
U.S. courts might choose to use deposition testimony if wsit-
nesses cannot travel from a foreign country.20 7
In what appears to be a recent trend, corporations fre-
quently are facing suit under the ATS.20  WhIere the defen-
203. See Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 88.
204. SeeJota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 155 (2d Cir. 1998).
205. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947); Piper Aircraft v.
Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6, 255 n.22 (1981).
206. See Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
(noting that documents relevant to plaintiffs' claims might be located in the
National Archives in Washington, D.C.). Even where private interest factors
might favor dismissal in a particular case, some courts faced with a suit
brought by individuals against a large corporation have determined that the
corporation is situated better to bear the costs associated ith moving docu-
ments and witnesses to the United States. See, e.g., iwa, 226 F.3d at 107.
207. Bodner, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 132.
208. See, e.g., Aguinda v. Texaco, In and Ashanga i. Texaco, Inc., discussed
supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text; Bano v. Union Carbide Corp..
No. 99 Civ. 11329 (JFK), 2000 WL 1225789 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2000); Beanal
v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997). Wile applica-
tion of the ATS to corporate activities may appear to be a recent trend, one
of the earliest discussions of the ATS occurred in this context. In an opinion
in 1907, the U.S. Attorney General expressed his belief that the ATS pro-
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dant is a U.S. company-as is permissible under the ATS-
significant documentary evidence likely will be located in the
United States. 209 Relevant corporate witnesses also may be
present in the United States. Even when the defendant com-
pany is not based in the United States, it may have U.S. of-
fices,210 and it is possible that evidence relating to the ATS
plaintiff's claims could be found in the United States.
In the area of public interest factors, it is true that dismis-
sal would always relieve the congestion of federal courts and
reduce the burden on U.S. juries; however, this is so in each
case where forum non conveniens is raised as a defense, not
just in ATS disputes. Because the forum non conveniens doc-
trine requires weighing of various private and public interest
factors, concerns about juries and dockets should not trump
other considerations.211 However, where other factors point
toward dismissal as a preferable outcome, it might be appro-
priate, for example, to dismiss an extremely complex ATS dis-
pute scheduled for a jury trial in a heavily congested federal
court.
Even if all of the relevant private and public interest fac-
tors point toward dismissal in an ATS case-the usual human
rights scenario, according to some 212-federal courts will not
dismiss unless an adequate alternative forum exists outside the
United States.213 The adequacy prong has proven to be a sig-
vided jurisdiction in the United States for Mexican nationals to sue a U.S.
company for its alleged modification to the boundary between Mexico and
the United States. See Mexican Boundary-Diversion of the Rio Grande, 26
Op. Att'y Gen. 250 (1907).
209. See Jota, 157 F.3d at 159 (recounting, but expressing no view on,
plaintiffs' argument that, because they challenged Texaco's conduct in the
United States, documents and witnesses would be more accessible in a U.S.
court).
210. See Bodner, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 132.
211. See Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1981) (observing
that "[i]f central emphasis was placed on any one factor, the forum non
conveniens doctrine would lose much of the very flexibility that makes it so
valuable").
212. SeeBoyd, supra note 198, at 48 ("[D]iscretionary dismissal pursuant to
forum non conveniens [is] likely to occur sooner, rather than later, in
human rights cases.").
213. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506-07 (1947); Piper Aircraft,
454 U.S. at 254 n.22.
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nificant impediment to many defendants seeking dismissal
under the doctrine.
In undertaking this analysis, federal courts have been in-
structed by the Supreme Court that an alternative forum gen-
erally will be found adequate when the defendant is amenable
to process in the other jurisdiction.214 In general, courts
should not give "conclusive or even substantial weight" to the
possibility that substantive law in the alternative forum would
be less favorable to the plaintiff,21 5 unless the alterative forum
is "so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy
at all."216 The Court illustrated this point by noting that dis-
missal would not be appropriate, for example, where the alter-
native forum does not permit litigation of the subject matter of
the dispute.
217
Opponents of forum non conveniens have argued that
"[d]efendants in human rights cases have a reasonably good
chance to show that an adequate alternative forum exists, even
though often the country where the alleged abuses took place
will not be an adequate forum due to a corrupt legal system or
the presence of forces of violence which may pose a threat to
the plaintiff."218 This assertion is inconsistent with numerous
federal decisions in a wide range of cases in which forum non
conveniens motions were denied because adequate alternative
fora were lacking.21
9
214. Piper AircrafA 454 U.S. at 254 n.22.
215. Id at 247.
216. Id. at 254.
217. See id. at 254 n.22.
218. Boyd, supra note 198, at 62. Ironically, the Second Circuit in lWiwa
seized on the opposite extreme to justify its ruling, namely, that human
rights victims often have no forum in which to file suit. See Wiwa v. Ro),ad
Dutch Petroleum, 226 F.3d 88, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2000). Of course, if the a'aiil-
ability of such fora is limited, the creation or recognition ofa U.S. forum for
human rights plaintiffs might be appropriate. However, the lack of foreign
fora does notjustify a modification of forum non conveniens to favor retain-
ing ATS cases in the United States. Instead, the availability or lack of an
adequate alternative forum is already a consideration in the forum non con-
veniens analysis, and an appropriate forum must exist outside the United
States before any case can be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds.
219. Outside the area of forum non conveniens, federal courts frequendy
have acknowledged the inadequacies of foreign fora. S, e.g., Bhatnagar v.
Surrenda Overseas Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220, 1228-30 (3d Cir. 1995) (ruling that
extreme delay in India'sjudicial proceedings could render it inadequate as
an alternative forum); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Islamic Republic of lIn,.
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In human rights cases brought under the ATS, federal
judges have evaluated carefully and rejected inadequate fora
outside the United States.220 In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin,
for example, the plaintiff company brought an ATS suit
against its Bolivian distributor alleging that the plaintiff's em-
ployee was imprisoned wrongfully in Bolivia.22 1 In response to
the defendant's forum non conveniens argument, the plaintiff
contended that the Bolivian court system was too corrupt to
serve as an adequate alternative forum.222 Noting an "appar-
ent lack of redressibility for individual litigants" and the "easily
manipulable" justice system in Bolivia, the trial court agreed
with the plaintiff and refused to dismiss the case on forum non
conveniens grounds. 223
In another example, a former Ghanaian trade counselor
filed suit against a state-employed security officer alleging acts
of torture in Ghana, and the Southern District of New York
was confronted with a motion to dismiss on forum non con-
veniens grounds.224  The plaintiff in Cabir v. Assasie-Gyimah
argued that he would be in personal danger if he returned to
Ghana to pursue an action there against the defendant, who
was then a Commander in the Ghanaian Navy and the Deputy
758 F.2d 341, 346 (8th Cir. 1985) (determining that plaintiff corporation
would be deprived of its day in court because litigation in Iran would be so
difficult and inconvenient); Menendez Rodriguez v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co.,
311 F.2d 429, 433 (5th Cir. 1962) (concluding that Cuba did not constitute
an available forum for Cuban political refugees), vacated by 376 U.S. 779
(1964); Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 45 F. Supp. 2d 276, 286-88 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (finding that the "Liberian judicial system was not fair and impartial
and did not comport with the requirements of due process"), afJ'd, 201 F.3d
134 (2d Cir. 2000).
220. In forum non conveniens contexts other than human rights cases,
courts also have evaluated freely the adequacy of alternative fora. See, e.g.,
Hatzlachh Supply Inc. v. Tradewind Airways Ltd., 659 F. Supp. 112, 114-15
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (refusing to dismiss contract case to Nigeria where that
country's legal system was "at a minimum quite suspect"); Can. Overseas
Ores Ltd. v. Compania de Acero del Pacifico, 528 F. Supp. 1337, 1341-43
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (rejecting defendant's forum non conveniens argument and
noting "serious questions" about whether the Chilean judiciary was indepen-
dent, as well as the possibility that the militaryjunta could amend or rescind
constitutional provisions by decree).
221. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1080-83 (S.D. Fla.
1997).
222. See id. at 1084.
223. Id. at 1086-87.
224. See Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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Chief of National Security.225 The trial court agreed, observ-
ing that the "plaintiff is highly unlikely to obtain justice in
Ghanaian courts" and that he would "unnecessarily [be] put in
harm's way" if forced to return to Ghana for trial.226 Because
no adequate alternative forum existed in which suit could be
brought, the court rejected the defendant's forum non con-
veniens motion.
227
Most recently, the Second Circuit considered the possibil-
ity of dismissing ATS and TVPA claims of Bosnia-Herzegovina
residents against Radovan Karadzic under the doctrine of fo-
rum non conveniens in Kadic v. Karadzic.228 The plaintiffs al-
leged that Karadzic-led troops committed various atrocities, in-
cluding rape, forced prostitution, forced impregnation, tor-
ture, and summary execution. 229 In sustaining jurisdiction
under the ATS, the Second Circuit also addressed whether dis-
missal on forum non conveniens grounds would be appropri-
ate.23 0 The court observed that "no party has identified a
more suitable forum, and we are aware of none."-"" Clearly
determining that an adequate alternative forum was not availa-
ble, the court concluded that "it seems evident that the courts
of the former Yugoslavia, either in Serbia or war-torn Bosnia,
are not now available to entertain plaintiffs' claims" even if
other factors pointed toward dismissal.
2 32
Concern about the adequacy of an alternative forum 'uis
evident even in the Filartiga litigation. On remand, the district
court considered arguments that Paraguayan courts would not
serve as adequate fora for litigation of plaintiffs' claims.L- - In
reevaluating the pending forum non conveniens motion after
remand, the trial court observed that the merits of the motion
"depend[ed] on whether the courts of Paraguay are not only
more convenient than this court but as available and 'prepared
to do justice."234 Noting that the defendant had "submitted
225. See id. at 1191, 1199.
226. Id at 1199.
227. See id.
228. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1995).
229. See id. at 236-37.
230. See id. at 250.
231. Id. at 250.
232. Id. at 250-51.
233. Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
234. Id
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nothing to cast doubt on plaintiffs' evidence showing that fur-
ther resort to Paraguayan courts would be futile," the district
court retained jurisdiction.
2 35
It seems clear that federal courts considering forum non
conveniens motions can and do engage in factual inquiries to
determine whether dismissal is appropriate given the unique
circumstances of each dispute. While cases brought under the
ATS often may involve elements that weigh in favor of granting
defendants' motions, that fact does not lead accurately to the
conclusion that such lawsuits are more likely to be dismissed
than other categories of cases. Instead, courts must engage in
a thorough evaluation of all relevant factors, including
whether a truly adequate alternative forum exists. Given the
highly fact-intensive nature of the forum non conveniens in-
quiry and given ATS defendants' overwhelming failure in prac-
tice to persuade federal judges to grant their motions to dis-
miss, it seems inaccurate to describe the forum non con-
veniens doctrine as being unfairly slanted against ATS lawsuits.
However, even if the doctrine were slanted against ATS
suits, this would not nullify the ATS any more than dismissing
a suit brought under any other jurisdictional statute would
nullify that statute.236 Instead, the forum non conveniens doc-
trine identifies the rare case that should be dismissed to a for-
eign court without inquiry into what a plaintiff's jurisdictional
basis was for filing in federal court. That certain cases will be
dismissed under the doctrine does not eviscerate ATSjurisdic-
tion. It simply means that ATS plaintiffs, like all plaintiffs in
federal court, must demonstrate that their disputes involve suf-
ficient connection to the United States for U.S. courts to re-
tain jurisdiction when confronted with a forum non con-
veniens motion. ATS jurisdiction remains an available option
235. Id.
236. Forum non conveniens would nullify the ATS only if courts were to
base their decisions to dismiss such cases solely on the fact that they were
brought by an alien alleging a tort in violation of international law-the stat-
utory requirements for establishing jurisdiction under the ATS. In the lim-
ited number of ATS cases initially dismissed on forum non conveniens
grounds, this is clearly not the case. See, e.g., Aquinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F.
Supp. 625, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated and remanded, Jota v. Texaco, Inc.,
157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998).
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open to those plaintiffs who can demonstrate such connec-
tion.2 7
While it seems clear that forum non conveniens does not
place an unusually onerous burden on ATS plaintiffs, it is un-
deniably true that the prototypical ATS lawsuit has very little
connection to the United States. There is good reason to ap-
proach with care and deliberateness the claims of a non-U.S.
citizen brought in federal court when most, if not all, relevnt
documents and witnesses are located abroad, all of the actions
giving rise to the suit took place outside the United States,
complex foreign law is likely to apply, and the defendant is
likely to be a foreign citizen resident abroad. In such cases,
the doctrine of forum non conveniens provides a useful check
on the possible overextension of federal court subject matter
jurisdiction in cases with few meaningful ties to the United
States.
C. U.S. Interests in Human Rights Litigation Do Not Trzmp
Forum Non Conveniens
The final major argument raised by those seeking to un-
dermine forum non conveniens in ATS lawsuits is that compel-
ling U.S. interests present in human rights litigation %-arrant
abolition or significant curtailment of the doctrine. In Wiwa,
the Second Circuit's decision contains a strong undercurrent
of concern about U.S. interests-in particular, policies that
the court finds in § 1350 "favoring receptivity by our courts" to
ATS suits. 23 8 Further, in a recent article, Professor Kathr)n
Boyd identifies and analyzes similar interests that, she main-
tains, justify abolition of forum non conveniens in ATS suits.'3'
In particular, Professor Boyd argues that the stage has
been set for rejecting the doctrine in human rights cases be-
cause "[t]he notion that a legislative creation of a right of ac-
ion must not be defeated by the common law doctrine of con-
venience has been made in contexts other than human rights
237. For example, the increasing trend of suing U.S. companies under the
ATS appears to bode well for plaintiffs seeking to resist fonm non con-
veniens motions. As explained in the text, a U.S.-based company could face
more difficultyjustifying dismissal under the forum non conveniens criteria.
238. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroluem, 226 F.3d 88, 105 (2d Cir. 2000).
239. Boyd, supra note 198, at 75-83.
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cases, ' 240 and she cites "areas such as antitrust, securities regu-
lation, environmental, or employment laws" as examples of
"the legislature ... intend[ing] to override the common law
forum non conveniens doctrine."2 41 Next, she argues that
compelling interests present in the adjudication of human
rights claims in U.S. courts-such as the intrinsic value of fun-
damental human rights norms and the need for the United
States to influence and enforce such norms-place ATS cases
into the category of disputes that should not be dismissed
under the doctrine.
24 2
1. Categorical Policy Exceptions to the Application of Forum Non
Conveniens
Federal courts, as a general rule, do not recognize whole-
sale, categorical exceptions to the traditional doctrine of fo-
rum non conveniens where important policy interests are at
stake, and there does not appear to be any sound justification
for them to do so. Although Professor Boyd cites a variety of
cases in support of her contention that certain statutory pro-
tections have been interpreted by courts as exhibiting the leg-
islature's intent to override forum non conveniens, 243 these
cases are not compelling.
Most of the cases cited by Professor Boyd are complaints
brought under the Jones Act.244 As addressed in Part III.A.,
24
5
the Jones Act contains a specific venue provision mandating
that trial "shall be under the court of the district in which the
defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is
located."2 46 The circuits currently are split on whether that
specific venue provision precludes consideration of forum non
240. Id at 75.
241. Id.
242. See id. at 78-83.
243. See id. at 75 n.189.
244. See id. (citing Demateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 1977)).
See generally Zipfel v. Halliburton Co., 832 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987); Need-
ham v. Phillips Petroleum Co. of Nor., 719 F.2d 1481 (10th Cir. 1983);
Antypas v. Cia. Maritima San Basilio, S.A., 541 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1976).
245. See general discussion of Jones Act jurisdiction, supra notes 132-37
and accompanying text.
246. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (2000).
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conveniens factors in Jones Act cases,2 '7 but it is certainly true
that some courts have held that it does.24' 8 However, for the
courts that do reject categorically forum non conveniens in
Jones Act cases, the existence of specific venue is practically-
if not actually-the only reason cited to justify their deci-
sions.249 Because the ATS does not contain a specific venue
provision,250 cases interpreting the applicability of forum non
conveniens in Jones Act disputes are inapplicable to an analy-
sis of the same question in ATS cases.
Outside the unrelated and inapplicable area of specific
venue, federal courts have not identified special statutory pro-
tections or policy considerations that are so overridingly im-
247. Compare Zipfel 832 F.2d at 1487 (holding that dismissal of aJones Act
case for forum non conveniens is precluded) with De Mateos v. Texaco. Inc.,
562 F.2d 895, 903 (3d Cir. 1977) (rejecting argument that Jones Act suits are
insulated from forum non conveniens arguments).
248. One of the cases cited by Professor Boyd in her 1998 article is
Ant)pas, 541 F.2d at 307. In Antypas, the Second Circuit undertook a factual
review of the district court's dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds
and determined, contrary to the decision of the trial court, that "contacts
between the transaction involved and the United States [are] substantial."
Id at 310. However, the Second Circuit also observed that tie Jones Act
applied to the dispute and that "[w]here the Jones Act applies, this Court
has held that a district court has no power to dismiss on grounds of fonarm
non conveniens." Id Regardless of the court's reasoning in overturning the
grant of dismissal, in 1983, the Second Circuit declared its previous position,
that forum non conveniens did not apply in Jones Act cases, to be in error.
See Cruz v. Maritime Co. of Philippines, 702 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1983). Since
1983, courts within the Second Circuit have considered forum non con-
veniens arguments in Jones Act cases and, on occasion, have dismissed cases
on such grounds. See, &g., Doufexis v. Nagos S.S., Inc., 583 F. Supp. 1132,
1133-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (concluding, in granting defendants' motion for
dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds, that "Greece is a more conve-
nient and available forum for the litigation of this action").
249. See, e-g., Creative Tech., Ltd. v. Aztech System PTE, Ltd., 61 F.3d 696.
699-700 (9th Cir. 1995) (ruling that specific venue provision in Jones Act
precluded forum non conveniens analysis); Szumlicz v. Norwegian Am. Line,
Inc., 698 F.2d 1192, 1195 (11th Cir. 1983) (noting that if the American law-
i.e. the Jones Act-applied to a dispute, forum non conveniens arguments
would be unavailable); Needham v. Phillips Petroleum Co. of Nor., 719 F.2d
1481, 1483 (10th Cir. 1983) (same); see also Timothy P. O'Shea, Note, 77ie
Jones Act's Speczfw Venue Provision: Does It Preelude Fonm Non ConenieWs Dismis-
sal?, 14 FoRDHANi INT'L L.J. 696, 714-19 (1990-91).
250. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993). It should also be noted, for the sake of
completeness, that, like the ATS, the TVPA does not contain a specific venue
provision.
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portant as to trump the traditional forum non conveniens
analysis. Although Professor Boyd cites lawsuits brought
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ER-
ISA) 25 1 and RICO 25 2 as evidence that federal courts have over-
ridden forum non conveniens when important national policy
interests were at stake,253 these cases do not prove her point.
In neither of the cases cited did the district court hold, as a
matter of law, that forum non conveniens is inapplicable in
ERISA or RICO actions; instead, the courts undertook the
standard forum non conveniens analysis specified in Gilbert
and Piper to determine whether those particular lawsuits
should be dismissed.254 The existence of the ERISA and RICO
claims was just one factor considered by those courts in their
forum non conveniens analyses. Furthermore, although some
courts may refuse to dismiss RICO or ERISA claims after a full
weighing of relevant considerations, at least two circuits have
explicitly rejected the argument that the forum non con-
veniens doctrine does not apply to RICO claims as a matter of
law.
255
251. Lawford v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 739 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
252. Gen. Envtl. Sci. Corp. v. Horsfall, 753 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
253. See Boyd, supra note 198, at 75 n.189.
254. See Lawford, 739 F. Supp. at 919-20; Horsfall, 753 F. Supp. at 674.
Both the Lawford and Horsfall courts did raise the existence of the ERISA
and RICO claims as part of their forum non conveniens analyses. In Law-
ford, the court noted during its consideration of defendant's motion that
.plaintiff's ERISA claim would be lost if plaintiff were required to bring his
action in Canada." Lawford, 739 F. Supp. at 920. However, the court made
this observation in the overall context of a full forum non conveniens analy-
sis and concluded "the Court cannot find that Canada is a substantially more
appropriate forum in this action." Id. Similarly, in Horsfall, the trial court
observed that "the interest of the United States in a uniform application of
RICO" was one of the "most weighty" of the "various conflicting interests
involved" in the forum non conveniens consideration. Horsfall, 753 F. Supp.
at 674. Accordingly, in both cases, the existence of ERISA or RICO claims
was just one factor in the broader forum non conveniens analysis and did
not mandate categorical rejection of defendants' motions to dismiss. The
Second Circuit in Wiwa undertook a similar analysis to determine the weight
that should be given in the forum non conveniens analysis to plaintiffs' invo-
cation of the ATS, as well as to the existence of the TVPA. See Wiwa v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 103-08 (2d Cir. 2000).
255. See Kempe v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 876 F.2d 1138, 1144-
45 (5th Cir. 1989). The Kempe court could find no legislative history for
RICO disclosing "that Congress intended directly or by fair inference to sug-
gest that RICO would be immune from the doctrine's operation." Id. at
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Indeed, federal courts often have ruled that cases impli-
cating sensitive national interests brought under various fed-
eral statutes need not be resolved in a federal judicial forum.
For example, in addition to the forum non conveniens context
discussed above, federal courts have dismissed RICO lawsuits
under choice of forum provisions256 and ERISA claims pursu-
ant to the Princess Lida doctrine.2 7 In the antitrust context,
forum non conveniens has been used to support dismissal,2''-
1144. The court went on to determine that, even though RICO claims
would not be enforceable in Bermuda, the case should be dismissed on fo-
rum non conveniens grounds because "even without the RICO count, Ber-
muda permits litigation in its courts" of other claims raised by plaintiffs. Id.
at 1145; see also Transunion Corp. v. PepsiCo., Inc., 811 F.2d 127, 130 (2d
Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (observing that "[a] review of the legislative history
of RICO . .. discloses no mandate that the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens should not apply").
256. See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220
(1987); Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1998).
257. See, e.g., Dailey v. Nat'l Hockey League, 987 F.2d 172, 178-79 (3d Cir.
1993).
258. See; e.g., Capital Currency Fxch., N.V. v. Nat'l Wesuninister Bank
PLC, 155 F.3d 603, 609-12 (2d Cir. 1998) (concluding "that antitrust suits
are subject to dismissal under the forum non conveniens doctrine" and, in
fact, dismissing an antitrust suit on such grounds); see also Howe v. Goldcorp
Invs., Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, 947-50 (1st Cir. 1991) (suggesting that intema-
tional transfers under the doctrine of forum non conveniens should be al-
lowed in antitrust suits).
In her 1998 article, Professor Boyd makes the point that '[u]ntil re-
cently, courts have followed the reasoning that unique federal interests out-
weighed convenience in antitrust actions." Boyd, supra note 198, at 77. She
cites a 1989 amendment to the Clayton Act as providing, for the first time,
the opportunity for forum non conveniens analyses where foreign regulatory
interests are particularly strong. See id. 'Without Congress explicitly ending
judicial deference to antitrust, courts would likely have continued to exempt
antitrust actions from application of the forum non conveniens doctrine."
Id at 77-78. The "amendment" to the Clayton Act that Professor Boyd refer-
ences is the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1989, S. 50, 101st
Cong. § 102 (1989). This proposed amendment died in committee and
never became law. See S. REP. No. 102-17, at 54 (1991). For a history of the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1989, see http://
thomas.loc.gov/.
Nevertheless, courts are now split on whether forum non conveniens
may be considered in antitrust disputes. Some courts have held that the
doctrine cannot be applied in such cases. They rely on a variety of reasons,
including the existence of a specific venue provision in the Clayton Act, see
Indus. Inv. Dev. Corp. v. itsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 890 (5th Cir. 1982); the
fact that the Clayton Act imposes quasi-penal obligations, and foreign coun-
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and other antitrust suits have been referred to binding arbitra-
tion for resolution.2 59 Federal courts also have ordered that
suits under U.S. securities laws be resolved in arbitration2
6t
and in foreign countries pursuant to both forum selection
clauses261 and the doctrine of forum non conveniens.26 2 Al-
though forum non conveniens, choice of law, and arbitration
clause analyses are not identical, national interests play an im-
portant role in each. Clearly, it cannot be said that U.S. courts
overridingly are concerned with resolving, within the U.S.
court system, all suits implicating important U.S. interests.
Nevertheless, because federal courts or the U.S. Congress
could identify categories of dispute that must be heard in U.S.
courts because of the important U.S. interests at stake, it is
worth considering whether adjudication of international
human rights cases triggers such important policy interests.
2. Policy Considerations Favor Judicial Discretion
a. Forum Non Conveniens as a Gatekeeper
International law has been recognized and applied by fed-
eral courts for over one hundred years. 263 Early concepts of
international law focused on the interrelationships among sov-
ereign states, and although the law governing state relations
still serves as the bedrock of international law, its reach has
been extended to provide for the protection of individuals and
tries will not enforce our penal laws, see id. at 891; and the notion that anti-
trust laws embody a congressional purpose to encourage suits filed in U.S.
court to vindicate a national policy against monopolies, see Laker Airways
Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Ainvays, 568 F. Supp. 811, 818 (D.D.C. 1983). How-
ever, as the National Westminster case demonstrates, other courts have explic-
itly rejected the proposition that antitrust suits should be insulated from fo-
rum non conveniens analyses. See Nat'I Westminister Bank PLC, 155 F.3d 603.
259. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614 (1985).
260. See Rodrigues de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
483 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238
(1987).
261. See Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1998);
Bonny v. Soc'y of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1993).
262. See Alfadda v. Fenn, 159 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1998); Allstate Life Ins. Co.
v. Linter Group Ltd., 994 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1993).
263. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
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the prohibition against certain conduct committed by individ-
uals.
2 64
When applying and interpreting international law, U.S.
courts look to the existence of applicable treaties or an), other
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, as
well as to the "customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as
evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commenta-
tors."265 In the area of human rights, the applicable substan-
tive law is generally customary law, as many of the treaties cov-
ering relevant behavior either have not been signed or ratified
by the United States or may not be self-executing or have ac-
companying implementing legislation.266 Customary interna-
tional law norms, known as jus dispositivum,2 67 are derived from
the consent of states; they are the "general and consistent
264. See LYAL S. SUNGA, INDIVIDUAL REsPONSIILrI" IN INTEIIRNTIONL,% LAW
FOR Sjmous HuxtAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 13940 (1992). ATS case kaw clearly
holds that individuals may be found to have violated customary internationul
law, such as in the case of Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
Most recently, the Second Circuit recognized that individuals may commit
certain violations of customary international law even where no state action
is present. See Kadiz v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241-43 (2d Cir. 1995) (ruling
that genocide and war crimes required no state action). The body of laws
regulating principally how nations treat their citizens has been labeled 'new
customary international law" by Professors Bradley and Goldsmith. &e Brad-
ley & Goldsmith, supra note 162, at 327.
265. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
266. See Paul C. Hoffman & Nadine Strossen, Enforring hItenational
Human Rights Law in the United States, in HLthLN Rica ris: AN AcEaNt).% FOR TIE
NExr CENTURY 479-80 (Louis Henkin & John Lawrence Hargrove eds.,
1994). Even where the United States has ratified an international human
rights treaty, it usually enters various "reservations, understandings, and dec-
larations that severely limit the impact of ratification." I. at 479. Such res-
ervations have questionable impact under international law, but to the ex-
tent they are effective, the result on the treaties' effectiveness can be signifi-
cant. See LIESBETH LIjNzAAD, RESERVATIONS TO U.N.-Hu'%v.% RMtirm
TREATIES: RATIFY AND RuuN? 3 (1995). In addition, reliance on treaties as a
basis for creating human rights obligations creates an "ultimately unsatisac-
tory patchwork quilt of obligations and still continues to leave many States
largely untouched." Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human
Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AuST.. Y.B. OF Ir'L
L. 82, 82 (1992).
267. See David F. Klein, Comment, A Theory for the Application of ite Custom-
ary International Law of Human Rights by Domestic Courts, 13 Y ux J. INr'L L
332, 351 (1988).
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practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obliga-
tion."2 68
In some instances, norms of customary international law
applied in human rights cases rise to the level of jus cogens, or
peremptory norms of international law that are "accepted and
recognized by the international community of states as a whole
as [norms] from which no derogation is permitted."2 69 Al-
though customary international law and jus cogens are re-
lated, 270 jus cogens does not depend on the consent of the state
in question and is considered binding on all nations, as it rep-
resents "values taken to be fundamental by the international
community."271 Jus cogens norms "enjoy the highest status
within international law' 272 and "prevail over and invalidate in-
ternational agreements and other rules of international law in
conflict with them."
2 73
Regardless of the international status of customary inter-
national law or even jus cogens, U.S. courts are under no obliga-
tion to adjudicate each and every case alleging a violation of
such norms. 2 74 Even though jus cogens norms are non-dero-
268. RESTATEMENT (THID) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TilE
UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. According to
the International Court of Justice, a norm must meet two requirements
before being considered customary international law: (1) the norm must be
reflected in consistent state practice, and (2) the norm must be adhered to
out of a sense of legal obligation. See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v.
Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 4446 (Feb. 20).
269. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714 (9th
Cir. 1992) (quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23,
1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332); see also Princz v. Federal Republic of Ger-
many, 26 F.3d 1166, 1173-74 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
270. Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 714.
271. Klein, supra note 267, at 351.
272. Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
273. RESTATEMENT, supra note 268, § 102 cmt. k.
274. Countries face similar issues in the adjudication of customary inter-
national law norms in both the civil and criminal contexts. Although coun-
tries generally are not understood to be obligated to exercise criminal juris-
diction in cases of alleged human rights violations, the concept of aut dedere
autjudicare-extradite or prosecute-arises in various multinational treaties
focused on securing cooperation in the suppression of certain kinds of crim-
inal conduct. See M. CHERIF BAssIoUNI & EDWARD M. WIsE, AUT DEDERE Aur
JUDIcARE--THE Dury TO ExTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 3
(1995). See generally M. CHERIF BASSIoUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 217-21 (1999). While the position has been
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gable-that is, they cannot be abrogated by agreement of
states or set aside by unilateral state action 2 75-no tenet of in-
ternational or domestic lav mandates that U.S. courts take ju-
risdiction over such matters and render judgments on the
merits, without considering traditional common law, statutory,
and constitutional defenses to jurisdiction.
27 6
Indeed, human rights cases raising customary interna-
tional lav issues often implicate sensitive political and foreign
affairs considerations, the resolution of which must precede a
U.S. court taking jurisdiction over such a matter.27 7 In such
cases, federal courts may be required to determine whether
taken that customary international law obligates states either to extradite or
to prosecute in the absence of an applicable treaty to that effect, state prac-
tice does not support this assertion, even in the case of gross violations of
human rights. See BASSIoutI & WISE, supra, at 20-25, 43-46; see also Christine
Van den Wyngaert, War Crimes, Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity-Are
States Taking National Prosecutions Seriously?, in III INrmERNnoMU Cu.%PtiNL
LAw 227, 229-30 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999) (obsening that even
where international agreements obligating states to either prosecute or ex-
tradite suspected criminals are in place, the principle aul dedere autjudicare is
followed inconsistently in practice). The existence of a forum non con-
veniens motion in a civil human rights dispute provides an interesting paral-
lel to the criminal context. In a case where even jus cogens norms are at
issue, a U.S. court is under no domestic or international obligation to adjudi-
cate the civil dispute; however, when entertaining a forum non conveniens
motion, the court essentially is adopting aut dedere autjudicar--the court %%ill
either deny the motion and adjudicate the claims or it will dismiss the case
to a foreign country where the case, in all likelihood, will be heard and re-
solved.
275. See RESTATFEMNENT, supra note 268, § 702 cmt. n. (recognizing that in-
ternational agreements violatingjus cogens are void); BAssIoUNI & WtSE, supra
note 274, at 52.
276. The underlying jurisdictional legitimacy of the ATS may be traced to
the concept of universality, which recognizes that certain offenses, due to
their very nature, affect all states and, accordingly, constitute violations
against mankind. BASSIOUNI, supra note 274, at 228-29; see also Klein, supra
note 267, at 342. While the ATS may represent a jurisdictional grant al-
lowing U.S. courts to hear disputes of universal concern, the doctrine of
universal jurisdiction simply allows states to grantjurisdiction in appropriate
cases; it does not mandate jurisdiction. See SuNcaA, supra note 264, at 114
("International law does not import a mandatory obligation upon State au-
thorities to undertake prosecution."). For a thorough treatment of the con-
cept of universal jurisdiction, see Kenneth C. Randall, UnitemalJurisdiction
Under International Law, 66 TEX. L RE%,. 785 (1988).
277. See generally Hon. John M. Walker, Jr., Domestic Adjudication of Intema-
tional Human Rights Violations Under the Alien Tort Statute, 41 ST. Louis U. LJ.
539, 551-59 (1997) (discussing the role of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
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judicial abstention is appropriate under the political question
doctrine or whether a defendant is amenable to suit under the
Act of State doctrine or the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act.278 Complex notions of international comity also may
overlie such determinations. 279 In each of these analyses, fed-
eral courts use doctrines or principles of domestic or interna-
tional law to identify which claims alleging violations of custom-
ary international law or jus cogens the courts appropriately
should entertain.
Forum non conveniens, like the political question doc-
trine, the Act of State doctrine, and the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act, serves an important gatekeeper function to en-
sure that only appropriate cases are heard by the federal
courts, regardless of the nature of the substantive claim at is-
sue.280 Forum non conveniens allows federal judges to avoid
the inconveniences and difficulties associated with adjudicat-
Act, head-of-state immunity, and the Act of State doctrine in human rights
litigation brought under the ATS).
278. See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714-19
(9th Cir. 1992). In Siderman de Blake, plaintiffs alleged that Argentina had
tortured one of its citizens in violation ofjus cogens norms. Id. at 702, 714-19.
Plaintiffs argued that because jus cogens norms trump other concepts of in-
ternational law, their allegation of official torture trumped any notion of
sovereign immunity. See id. at 718. However, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals disagreed, noting that the deciding factor was not customary inter-
national law but, instead, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), an
affirmative act of Congress. See id. Accordingly, the court analyzed plain-
tiffs' claims through the prism of the FSIA and determined that, although
plaintiffs alleged jus cogens violations, the FSIA did not contain an exception
to sovereign immunity for such alleged behavior. See id. at 719.
279. International comity first was defined by the Supreme Court as
"neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere cour-
tesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one na-
tion allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and conve-
nience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are
under the protection of its laws." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64
(1895). Difficult comity issues often arise in international human rights dis-
putes. See, e.g.,Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998) (evaluating
comity arguments in suit involving alleged environmental and personal inju-
ries relating to oil work in Ecuador); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp.
2d 424, 432 (D.N.J. 1999) (granting motion to dismiss in part on interna-
tional comity grounds in case involving claims that defendant employed
slave labor during World War II).
280. Jus cogens norms may trump other aspects of international law, see RE-
STATE MENT, supra note 268, § 102 cmt. k, but they should not be interpreted
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
[Vol. 33:1001
IS THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE SACROSANCT?
ing a dispute with attenuated connections to the United States
if an adequate alternative forum exists outside the United
States and relevant interest factors support dismissal. Without
access to the doctrine, unnecessary burdens would be imposed
on the U.S. court system and the parties involved: Courts
might be forced to interpret and apply complex foreign law
and make rulings on large volumes of documents witten in
languages other than English; parties could become subject to
inconsistent legal obligations imposed by U.S. and foreign
courts and could be required to produce witnesses from for-
eign countries who might not speak English and not under-
stand the U.S. legal system; and factfinders could be burdened
with deciding cases with no meaningful ties to their home fed-
eral districts, states, or nation.
Forum non conveniens serves a further gatekeeping role
by helping to ensure, along with other jurisdictional doctrines
mentioned above, that domestic litigation does not unnecessa-
rily disrupt U.S. foreign policy. Because ATS suits require a
U.S. court to sit in judgment of claims that often involve signif-
icant foreign governmental elements, they result in an in-
creased likelihood of straining international relations. Even
where doctrines primarily focused on such concerns are inap-
plicable for various reasons,28' forum non conveniens allows
to override domestic law considerations, including those relating to a court's
power to decline exercising jurisdiction in appropriate cases.
281. Because human rights lawsuits usually involve claims of foreign sover-
eign involvement in the alleged abuse, such suits raise a disproportionate
risk of disrupting U.S. foreign relations. Sre, e.g., S-EPniis & RTNMR, supra
note 7, at 270-71 (reflecting concern of President Bush that suits under the
TVPA might pose "a danger that U.S. courts may become embroiled in diffi-
cult and sensitive disputes in other countries, and possibly ill-founded or
politically motivated suits, which have nothing to do with the United
States"). Retaining forum non conveniens is particularly important because
foreign relations concerns might not be addressable in human rights litiga-
tion through other means, such as the Act of State or political question doc-
trines. See, &g., Nat'l Coalition Gov't of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc.,
176 F.R.D. 329, 353 (C.D. Cal. 1997). See generally Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 457 (1964) (White, J., dissenting) (observing that
under the Act of State doctrine "reasons for nonreview... lose much of
their force when the foreign act of state is shown to be a violation of interna-
tional law"); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that
"it would be a rare case in which the act of state doctrine precluded suit
under section 1350" and that the Supreme Court in Sabbatino was carefuil to
apply the doctrine only in a context-expropriation of an alien's property-
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judges to exclude from federal court the subset of internation-
ally sensitive suits with overriding foreign components, thereby
reducing the risk of disrupting international relations.
Protection of U.S. interests-including the conservation
of scarce judicial resources and maintenance of international
political stability-requires that federal courts be given flexi-
bility to identify cases more appropriately resolved in other
fora or through other means, regardless of the subject matter
or jurisdictional basis at issue.
b. National Priorities Reflected in the ATS and the TVPA
In the Wiwa decision, the Second Circuit ruled that the
TVPA reflects a U.S. interest favoring domestic adjudication of
ATS disputes.28 2 Professor Boyd agrees and argues that, given
the broad construction of the ATS in Filartiga, dismissing such
suits on forum non conveniens grounds "would be antithetical
to U.S. interests and principles."
2 83
As demonstrated earlier, the idea that U.S. interests favor
domestic adjudication of human fights claims is not reflected
in the express language or known legislative intent of the ATS
or the TVPA. This is damaging particularly to the Wiwa
court's rationale given the Supreme Court's instruction that to
undermine an established common law doctrine, a statute
in which world opinion was "sharply divided," rather than where "control-
ling legal principles exist"); STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 7, at 270-71 (ex-
pressing President Bush's opinion that unnecessary international friction re-
sulting from TVPA suits could be avoided by "sound construction of the Stat-
ute and the wise application of relevant procedures and principles").
Concern over foreign relations has led most countries to allow adjudica-
tion of human rights claims against foreign government officials only in the
context of criminal suits, which are under the control of the executive
branch. See Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International
Human Rights Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REv. 2129, 2168 (1999). As observed by
Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, the United States may be alone in al-
lowing civil suits by foreign plaintiffs against foreign governmental officials
for human rights violations that took place on foreign soil. See id. In some
instances-such as the Kadic litigation against Radovan Karadzic-human
rights Iavsuits may be consistent with U.S. interests; however, nothing in the
ATS guarantees such consistency as human rights plaintiffs pursue their own
agendas against alleged abusers. See Kadic, 70 F.3d 232.
282. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 105-06 (2d Cir.
2000).
283. Id.
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must "speak directly" to the specific issue in question.2 8*1 In
the absence of any clear legislative recognition of such na-
tional interests, federal judges should be hesitant to inject into
statutory interpretation their personal views of what U.S. inter-
ests should exist. Failure to do so raises concerns about judi-
cial rulings from judges that are both unpredictable and anti-
democratic.
(i) U.S. Involvement in International Human Rights
Initiatives
Any U.S. interest evidenced by § 1350 is best seen in the
overall context of this country's attitude toward international
human rights obligations. While it is true that the United
States has assisted in the general development of human rights
norms,28 5 it lags far behind the rest of the developed world
(and a sizable portion of the under-developed world) in sign-
ing, ratifying, and implementing major human rights initia-
tives.28 6 Among the international treaties the United States
has failed to ratify are agreements addressing economic, so-
cial, and cultural rights,287 the rights of women, 21s the rights
of children,2 9 and a leading treaty addressing the laws of
war.29° In cases where the United States has ratified a human
284. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying tC.XL
285. See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The
Ghost of SenatorBricker, 89 A .J. IW'L L. 341, 341 (1995).
286. See Panel Discussion, The United States: Human Rights Leader or Lag-
gard., 11 PACE INT'L L RE,. 261, 265-71 (1999) (statement of Kenneth
Roth); see also Hoffman & Strossen, supra note 266, at 479-80. Hoffman and
Strossen note that "[o]f the more than forty international human rights trea-
ties to which the United States could be a party, it has ratified only a handful
altogether, and only one of the major international human rights treaties,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." Id. at 480.
287. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3,
1976).
288. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, Dec. 18, 1981, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
289. Convention on the Rights of the Child, GA. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR.
44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989).
290. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, Re-
lating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Proto-
col I),June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. In addition, the United States his not
ratified an important international agreement addressing the use of anti-
personnel land mines, see Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stock-
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rights treaty, such as the Convention Against Torture,29 1 the
United States often declares that the treaty is non-self-execut-
ing-thereby precluding private rights of action unless imple-
menting legislation is enacted-and enters various declara-
tions or reservations to limit the scope and dilute the power of
the agreement.292 Ratification of human rights initiatives
under such terms has been labeled "specious, meretricious,
and hypocritical." 29
3
piling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and Their Destruc-
tion, opened for signature Dec. 3, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507 (entered into force Mar.
1, 1999), ratification status available at http://untreaty.un.org/englisi/biblc/
englishinternetbible/parti/chapterxxvi/treaty7.asp#participant (last visited
Sept. 17, 2001), and it opposed the establishment of the International Crimi-
nal Court, see Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for
signature July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999, ratification status available at http://un-
treaty.un.org/english/bible/englishinternetbible/parti/chapterxviii/
treatylO.asp#participant (last visited Sept. 17, 2001). For a general discus-
sion of the United States's ineffective participation in international human
rights initiatives, see Panel Discussion, supra note 286, at 265-71 (statement
of Kenneth Roth).
291. Convention Against Torture, G.A. Res. 46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess.,
Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. 1/39/51 (1984) (reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027
(1984)).
292. Among other reservations to the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the United
States limited the definition of "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment" to "cruel and unusual" punishment under the U.S. Constitu-
tion and expressly noted its opinion that international law does not prohibit
the use of the death penalty. See U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Under-
standings, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment, 136 CONG. REc. 36, 198 (1990); see also
U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 140 CONG.
REc. 14,326 (1994); U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, In-
ternational Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, 132 CONG. REc. 22,584 (1986). For analyses critical of the United
States's approach to treaty reservations, understandings, and declarations,
see M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on the Ratfication of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights by the United States Senate, 42 DEPAUL L. REV.
1169 (1993); Henkin, supra note 285; William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is the United States Still
a Party?, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 277 (1995). For a contrary view, see Curtis A.
Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent,
149 U. PA. L. REv. 399 (2000); Madeline Morris, Few Reservations About Reser-
vations, I CHi. J. INT'L L. 341 (2000).
293. Henkin, supra note 285, at 341. Such narrow interpretations of
human rights treaties also may restrict ATSjurisdiction. For a tort to trigger
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Although the United States may be committed to the de-
velopment of international human rights law, that commit-
ment at least is balanced, if not outweighed, by a long-stand-
ing, deeply held U.S. desire to avoid international entangle-
ments.294 These competing goals mean that while the United
States may actively encourage compliance with international
law and has taken steps to ensure that U.S. actions largely are
consistent with recognized human rights standards, its com-
mitment to leading the human rights movement has limits.
Embroiling U.S. courts in foreign disputes contested by for-
jurisdiction under the ATS, the conduct must violate "well established, uni-
versally recognized norms of international law." Filartiga v. Peia-rala 630
F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980). Multinational treaties or conventions would
appear to be generally good reflections of such well established or widely
recognized norms of behavior. However, the precise contours of the use of
treaties in this context have not been explored yet. For example, it is tin-
clear whether a plaintiff in U.S. court may rely on a multinational human
rights treaty that the United States has not ratified as evidence of 'wel estab-
lished" norms of conduct supporting ATS jurisdiction. It is also not clear
what the effect on ATSjurisdiction would be where the United States ratified
the treaty as a whole but entered reservations to the agreement either ob-
jecting to the particular provision relied on by the ATS plaintiff for jurisdic-
tional purposes or explicitly stating that the treaty would have no direct ef-
fect in U.S. court. It appears inherently "illegitimate for courts to apply as
domestic law a [customary international law] of human rights based almost
exclusively on human rights treaties that the political branches have taken
pains to ensure do not apply as domestic law." Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note 281, at 2168.
294. Concern over becoming unnecessarily embroiled in international af-
fairs has its roots in the founding of the United States. See supra notes 15-34
and accompanying text. Notwithstanding President Clinton's executive or-
der in 1998 that led to the creation of an Interagency Working Group on
Human Rights Treaties, there has been little measurable improvement in
the U.S. commitment to international human rights initiatives since that
time. See HurtrN RIHTS WATCH, WORLD R~roiRT 2001, available at hIp://
wv.hnv.org/r2kl/. Even where the United States takes what appear to be
important steps in the area of international human rights, significant ques-
tions about its commitment to international initiatives may remain. Before
leaving office, President Clinton signed a multinational treaty that would es-
tablish an International Criminal Court for tie trial of war criminals. .ee
Steven L. Meyers, U.S. Signs Treay for World Court to T , Atrocities, N.Y. T.Evs,
Jan. 1, 2001, at Al. HoweverJesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, has voiced his vehement opposition to this initiative.
According to Sen. Helms, "[t]his decision uill not stand," and he will make
"reversing" President Clinton's signing "one of [his] highest priorities" in
the new Congress to protect U.S. citizens "from duis international kangaroo
court" and "global Star Chamber." Id.
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eign parties where U.S. interests are not clearly at issue may
exceed those limits and create unnecessary international en-
tanglements.
(ii) Policy Interests Underlying the ATS and the TVPA
To the extent Filartiga and its progeny are accurate inter-
pretations of the scope of the ATS in modern litigation, it
seems clear that some U.S. national interest is expressed
through application of the ATS. Contrary to the suggestions
of the Wiwa court and Professor Boyd, however, that national
interest is in providing the possibility of a federal forum to ap-
propriate plaintiffs, not the guarantee of such a forum. What
we know about the historical context of the ATS and the con-
cerns occupying the minds of the drafters of the Judiciary Act
of 1789 compels this interpretation. Nothing in the language
or known legislative intent of the ATS supports an argument
that Congress intended to mandate or even prefer jurisdiction
under the statute, and federal courts' interpretation of the
ATS-with the lone exception of Wiwa-has never suggested
such a result.
U.S. interests underlying the TVPA are much clearer,
largely because legislative history exists for that act. As ex-
plained in the House and Senate Judiciary Committee reports
on the TVPA, Congress felt the Act was necessary, despite the
existence of the ATS, for a variety of reasons: (1) to expand
the class of plaintiffs that could bring suit for human rights
violations to include U.S. citizens; (2) to give special attention
to the international torts of official torture and summary exe-
cution; (3) to carry out the intent of the Convention Against
Torture; and (4) to make clear that Congress agreed with the
broad Filartiga interpretation of the ATS and rejected Judge
Bork's narrow concurring opinion in Tel-Oren.295 Absent from
the text or legislative history of the TVPA is any congressional
statement that the Act reflected or was intended to carry out a
U.S. interest in providing a mandatory forum for human rights
litigation.
Despite the Wiwa court's pronouncement that domestic
adjudication of human rights claims is preferred, in part, be-
cause the TVPA makes such claims "our business," the court
295. See S. REP. No. 102-249, at 3-5 (1991); H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 3-5
(1991); see also supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
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did not distinguish the U.S. interests underlying the TVPA
from those furthered by any other statutory cause of action.
Presumably, every federal statute reflects some U.S. national
interest, and the Second Circuit in Wiwa did not explain
meaningfully why the TVPA reflects special U.S. interests.
This is noteworthy because in a variety of cases, federal courts
have ruled that suits brought pursuant to federal statutes im-
plementing other important national interests must be re-
solved outside of federal court.296 The Tiwa court's emphasis
on the U.S. interests behind the TVPA is particularly troubling
given the absence of congressional language identifying such
interests in the relevant House and Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee reports.
The Wiwa court also opined that a U.S. policy interest ex-
ists favoring domestic adjudication of human rights suits be-
cause, according to Congress, "universal condemnation of
human rights abuses 'provide[s] scant comfort' to the numer-
ous victims of gross violations if they are without a forum to
remedy the wrong."29 7 Even had Congress made this state-
ment,2 98 the Second Circuit's observation did not take account
of basic forum non conveniens law. The forum non con-
veniens analysis already requires that an adequate alternative
forum exist before allowing dismissal. To the extent a TVPA
or ATS plaintiff "cannot sue in the place where the torture
occurred," 99 or where "the victim would be endangered
merely by returning to that place,"300 an adequate alternative
forum does not exist in the country of alleged torture, and
forum non conveniens will not allow dismissal to that country.
Given the threshold alternative forum inquiry, there is no
need to ascribe added weight to the possibility that a plaintiff
may not be able to return to her home country to sue as part
of the interest balancing component of the forum non con-
veniens inquiry. Nor is there any need to make the creation of
296. See supra notes 256-62 and accompanying text
297. WiNa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 226 F.3d 88, 106 (2d Cir. 2000).
298. This attribution to Congress is inaccurate. The full quote from the
HouseJudiciary Committee report in the TVPA is as follows: -These univer-
sal principles [against torture and summary execution] provide scant com-
fort, however, to the many thousands of,.ictims of torture and summary ex-
ecutions around the world." H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 3.
299. Witwa, 226 F.3d at 106.
300. Id.
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a domestic forum in such situations a national interest when
the forum non conveniens doctrine already assigns weight to
that factor.
Contrary to the observations of the Wiwa court, congres-
sional history of the TVPA specifically identifies a U.S. interest
that is in tension with mandating a federal court forum in all
cases. In particular, the legislative history of the TVPA high-
lights the intent to "[s]trike[ ] a balance between the desirabil-
ity of providing redress for a victim and the fear of imposing
additional burdens on U.S. courts."30' To facilitate this bal-
ance, "the bill recognizes as a defense the existence of ade-
quate remedies in the country where the violation 'allegedly
occurred,"3 0 2 which ensures that "U.S. courts will not intrude
into cases more appropriately handled by courts where the al-
leged torture or killing occurred."30 3 Nonexhaustion of local
remedies is an affirmative defense under the TVPA, and a
TVPA claim also is subject to defenses under the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act and the doctrines of diplomatic and
head-of-state immunity.30 4 Most importantly, any assertion
that the TVPA reflects U.S. interests favoring domestic adjudi-
cation of human rights claims is in direct conflict with the
Act's clear legislative intent: "Nothing in [the TVPA] is in-
tended to or does affect the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens, which remains applicable to any lawsuit brought
under this act."
30 5
Given the language, history, and policies underlying
§ 1350, there appears to be no persuasive argument that Con-
gress intended to create a mandatory forum and cause of ac-
tion not subject to the usual docket management and immu-
nity-based defenses. Accordingly, any U.S. policy interests re-
flected in the ATS and the TVPA should not be interpreted to
override established common law doctrines. In the case of fo-
rum non conveniens, such interests should be considered in
the overall balancing of relevant factors;30 6 however, the ques-
301. H.R. REP,. No. 102-367, at 4.
302. Id.
303. Id at 5.
304. Id.
305. See 138 CONG. REc. 4,177 (1992) (statement of Sen. Specter); see also
supra notes 182-97 and accompanying text.
306. The U.S. interests referenced here are interests the United States has
in serving as the forum for human rights litigation generally and inform an
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tion remains as to how heavily such interests should be
weighted in the forum non conveniens analysis. This is an im-
portant consideration because assigning an inappropriate
weight to U.S. policy interests as reflected by the ATS and the
TVPA could yield the same result as either failing to consider
such interests at all or making ATS/TVPA suits immune from
forum non conveniens analyses.
When faced with a forum non conveniens motion in a suit
under the ATS, federal courts recognizing only ajurisdictional
component to the ATS (as opposed to any substantive aspect)
should find that no significant U.S. policy interests are at
stake. When the ATS serves only ajurisdictional function, it is
indistinguishable from other simple grants of federal court ju-
risdiction-such as federal question or diversity jurisdiction-
and as a result, should be accorded no significant weight in
the balancing process. If the federal court recognizes a sub-
stantive component to the ATS, or if the TVPA is relied on in
addition to the ATS, courts should attach the same weight to
plaintiffs' invocation of the ATS/TVPA as they would to reli-
ance on any other federal statutory cause of action.3
0 7
Absent an express-preferably textual--congressional
recognition of a heightened U.S. policy interest favoring do-
mestic adjudication of human rights claims, federal courts
should attach a relatively uniform weight to the invocation of
any statutory cause of action, including suits under the ATS/
TVPA. This approach is fully consistent with the words chosen
by Congress in § 1350. If it intends to favor domestic adjudica-
tion of ATS claims or to attach heightened U.S. interests to
such lawsuits, Congress can amend § 1350 to make such intent
dear.
analysis of whether forum non conveniens should ever be av'allable in ATS
disputes. The specific U.S. and foreign national interests implicated by any
particular dispute are a separate matter for consideration and go to wiether
a particular lawsuit, based on its individual facts and circumstances, should
be heard in federal court. See iyfra notes 343-46 and accompanying text.
307. A case may even be made for attaching less weight to an ATS/TPA
suit than to a suit brought under a detailed, comprehensive regulatory
scheme such as U.S. antitrust law. In stark contrast to the voluminous, de-
tailed antitrust laIs, the TVPA has a much more modest scope, extending
only to torture and extrajudicial killing committed under color of foreign
law. While certainly important, the TVPA cannot be said to reflect a broad
U.S. interest in combating a wide array of human rights abuses committed by
various types of defendants.
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c. Declining Jurisdiction and the Development of
Customary International Law
The United States, as a member of the international com-
munity, has a national interest in assisting the development of
customary international law norms. In an increasingly interde-
pendent world, the United States, like all other advanced in-
dustrial democracies, is moving more toward multilateral-
ism.30 8 Global interdependence means that, if the United
States wishes to advance any national policy with a foreign
component, it must do so in cooperation with other coun-
tries.30 9 Because the appropriate use of forum non con-
veniens in human rights suits is consistent with a global ap-
proach to the development of customary international law-
and will advance, not hinder, that development-a prudent
application of the doctrine should be encouraged in ATS liti-
gation.
By definition, customary international law is deduced
from, among other things, "the general usage and practice of
nations" 310 and requires the "general assent of civilized na-
tions" to become binding.31' In ATS lawsuits, usage and prac-
tice of other countries is particularly important because, under
that statute, courts "must interpret international law not as it
was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations
of the world today."3 12 Only when an inquiry into the practice,
customs, and judicial decisions of the international commu-
nity demonstrates that the "defendant's alleged conduct vio-
lates 'well established, universally recognized norms of interna-
tional law' . ..as opposed to 'idiosyncratic legal rules"' will
308. See Andrew Moravcsik, Conservative Idealism and International Institu-
lions, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 291, 294 (2000).
309. See id. ("In other words, in an interdependent world, governments
must increasingly trade away a certain amount of unilateral policy discretion
in order to achieve the domestic policy objectives to which they collectively
aspire.").
310. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820).
311. Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (quoting The Paquete Ha-
bana, 175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900)). But see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note
162, at 328 (arguing that the new customary international law applicable to
human rights disputes is not created by the "accretion of [state] practices"
but rather represents a more "purposive creation of custom" that does not
reflect the actual current practice of states).
312. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881.
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jurisdiction under the ATS be established.313 Regardless of
the number of U.S. federal courts that pass judgment on a par-
ticular behavior and determine that it should violate customary
international law, that behavior will not become an actual vio-
lation absent official practice by other nations exhibiting a
similar disapprobation. Indeed, U.S. courts have encountered
this obstacle when evaluating whether certain alleged conduct
violates customary international law and can be used as the
basis for ATS jurisdiction.
In a recent example, Indonesian citizens brought suit
under the ATS and the TVPA alleging genocide and other
human rights violations committed by domestic mining com-
panies in Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, InC3 14 One of the claims
reviewed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Beanal was
plaintiffs' contention that the defendant mining companies
had engaged in environmental abuses that violated interna-
tional law.3 1 5 In evaluating whether "environmental torts"
could be considered violations of the law of nations, the Fifth
Circuit observed that breaches of international law occur only
where "the nations of the world have demonstrated that the
wrong is of mutual and not merely several, concern,"3 16 and
that ATSjurisdiction applies only to "shockingly egregious vio-
lations of universally recognized principles of international
law."3 17 The Fifth Circuit determined that the evidence mus-
tered by the plaintiffs to demonstrate an international consen-
sus in the area of environmental torts showed only "a general
sense of environmental responsibility and state[d] abstract
rights and liberties devoid of articulable or discernable stan-
dards and regulations to identify practices that constitute in-
313. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting /lar-
tiga, 630 F.2d at 881, 888). In Flartiga, the Second Circuit explained that
"[i]t is only where the nations of the world have demonstrated that the
wrong is of mutual, and not merely several, concern, by means of express
international accords, that a wrong generally recognized becomes an inter-
national violation within the meaning of the [ATS]." Filartiga, 630 F.2d at
888.
314. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 163-64 (5th Cir.
1999).
315. See id. at 166-67.
316. Id. at 167 (quoting Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 888).
317. Id. (quoting Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1983) (per
curiam)).
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ternational environmental abuses or torts."318 Accordingly,
the lower court's ruling that the plaintiffs had failed to demon-
strate a violation of international law caused by defendants'
mining operations was upheld.
3 19
Regardless of the egregious nature of the alleged conduct
in Beanal and regardless even of how violative of U.S. law the
alleged conduct might have been, the Fifth Circuit could not
find that customary international law was violated.320 Had ju-
dicial practice and governmental decrees in other countries
reflected a clear record of punishing environmental torts and
318. Id
319. See id Other examples of U.S. courts struggling to define the con-
tours of customary international law include the lower court's evaluation of
plaintiffs' § 1350 claim of "cultural genocide" in Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran,
Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 373 (E.D. La. 1997), the district court's consideration
of free speech rights under the ATS in Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276,
279-80 (S.D. Cal. 1986), and a California court's review of "cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment" allegations in Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp,
1531, 1543 (N.D. Cal. 1987). Outside of these examples, a variety of ques-
tions exist as to the precise limits of international law, including the extent
of liability of non-state actors under customary international law norms. See,
e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241-44 (2d Cir. 1995) (evaluating
whether a private individual could be found to have committed violations of
the law of nations for acts of genocide, war crimes, torture, and summary
execution); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 268, § 702 (indicating that a
"state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encour-
ages, or condones (a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave trade, (c) the murder or
causing the disappearance of individuals, (d) torture or other cruel, inhu-
man, or degrading treatment or punishment, (e) prolonged arbitrary deten-
tion, (f) systematic racial discrimination, or (g) a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights") (emphasis added);
Beana 969 F. Supp. at 371 (observing that, according to the list of offenses
in the Restatement recognized by the community of nations to be of univer-
sal concern, genocide "is the only relevant offense for which universal juris-
diction exists and no state action must be proven"). These and other areas
of law are ripe for consideration and development by the courts of the
United States and other countries.
320. See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir.
1999). In Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527 (VLB), 1994 WL 142006
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994), the court considered plaintiffs' claims that environ-
mental torts were actionable under the ATS. See id. at *6-7. The court noted
various domestic statutes aimed at governing hazardous wastes that would
prohibit the alleged conduct if it had occurred in the United States. See id.
at *7. The court found these statutes to be "relevant as confirming United
States adherence to international commitments to control such wastes," but
deferred judgment on the applicability of § 1350 to such claims pending
further discovery. Id
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a widespread desire that such torts should be found to violate
international law norms, perhaps the court's decision in
Beanaliwould have been different. As it was, state practice and
usage had not developed sufficiently for the judges to identify
norms of customary international law.
32'
Appropriate use of forum non conveniens in human
rights disputes will assist the necessary development of an in-
ternational consensus in appropriate cases. In particular, for-
eign courts can help establish opiniojuris, which is a necessary
prerequisite to the development of new customary interna-
tional law norms.3 22 A suit will not be dismissed on forum non
conveniens grounds unless there is an adequate alternative fo-
rum available outside the United States.323 Although federal
courts have been rightly cautious in creating a checklist for
determining what constitutes such a forum, an adequate alter-
native forum, at the very least, is one that can exercise its
power over the defendant, will hear the subject matter of the
dispute, and is capable of providing a satisfactory renedy.32-'
When human rights cases are dismissed to foreign courts,
those courts and judges are provided an opportunity to evalu-
ate the evidence and to add their voices to the international
appraisal of the conduct in question. In this way, the creation
of a more accurate and complete picture of international
norms and practice is facilitated-and the faster other coun-
321. See Beana/, 197 F.3d at 167. For recent discussions of using the ATS to
pursue environmental claims, see Richard L. Herz, Litigating Environmental
Abuses Under the Alien Tort Claims Act: A Practical Assessment, 40 V.J. INVtL L
545 (2000); Joanna E. Arlow, Note, The Utili, of ATCA and the "Lawy of Na-
lions" in Environmental Torts Litigation: Jota v. Texaco, Inc. and Large &ale
Environmental Destruction, 7 Wis. Etri . Uj. 93 (2000).
322. Opiniojuris refers to the fact that a state follows a particular practice
out of a sense of legal obligation. See Rr.-irtENr, supra note 268, § 102
cmt. C.
323. See Piper Aircraft ,. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981) ("At the
outset of anyforum non conveniens inquiry, the court must deternine whether
there exists an alternative forum.").
324. See David Epstein, An Examination of the 'Adcquag of the AIenative Fo-
rum"Factor in Forum Non Conveniens Deleninations, in INTERNATIONAL DIsPrtE
RESOLUTION: THE REGULATION OF FORUM SEIucMON (FouRTEMLTI SOKOL
COLooOuIuM) 295, 296 (lack L. Goldsmith ed., 1997) [hereinafter SOKOL
COTOQUIuMlI].
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tries are urged to participate, the faster additional customary
international law norms may develop.
325
Allowing a true multinational approach to the develop-
ment of customary international law also would help address
what appears to be a U.S. centricity in the area of global
human rights norms. Most rights considered important under
U.S. law, as well as almost all rights that the United States criti-
cizes other countries for violating, are held to be part of cus-
tomary international law; however, rights generally not recog-
nized by this country conveniently are considered not to be a
part of customary international law.326 International input to-
ward the development of human rights norms will assist in the
creation of standards of conduct more reflective of the global
approach to these issues.
Ensuring a collective approach to the treatment of human
rights cases also will assist in the enforcement of customary in-
ternational law norms. Enforcement has been identified as
the "weak link" in both the international legal system in gen-
eral and international human rights law in particular.32 7 By
allowing foreign countries to develop their own internal pro-
cedures and substantive bodies of law in the area of human
rights even, and perhaps especially, where a U.S. court could
take jurisdiction over the dispute, the United States increases
the possibility that adequate foreign adjudicatory and enforce-
ment mechanisms will be in place for future disputes-per-
325. The U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee voiced its
support for the proposition that the dismissal of certain human rights dis-
putes brought in federal court may assist in the development of customary
international law norms. In the legislative history of the TVPA, the House
Judiciary Committee recognized that requiring TVPA plaintiffs to show ex-
haustion of local remedies as a prerequisite to filing suit in federal court not
only would help U.S. courts avoid unnecessary burdens, but also would "en-
courage the development of meaningful remedies in other countries." H.R.
REP. No. 102-367, at 5-6 (1991).
326. See Simma & Alston, supra note 266, at 94-95. ("In the final resort it
must be asked whether any theory of human rights law which singles out
race but not gender discrimination, which condemns arbitrary imprison-
ment but not capital punishment for crimes committed byjuveniles or death
by starvation and which finds no place for a right of access to primary health
care, is not flawed in terms both of the theory of human rights and of United
Nations doctrine.")
327. Louis Henkin, Lecture, Human Rights and State "Sovereignty," 25 GA. J.
INT'L & ComP. L. 31, 41 (1995).
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haps disputes over which a U.S. court could not take jurisdic-
tion. In this way, a federal court's decision to decline jurisdic-
tion could improve significantly international enforcement
capabilities in human rights disputes. To the extent the inter-
national enforcement net could be tightened in the area of
human rights, a more stable international legal order would
be created, thereby furthering U.S. interests.
Lest the argument be raised that federal courts should
not shirk their duty to adjudicate cases raising complex inter-
national legal issues, it should be recalled that forum non con-
veniens dismissals are appropriate only in "rare cases"328 and
only under the most compelling circumstances. In most cases,
when dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds is not ap-
propriate, U.S. courts are free to judge the conduct in ques-
tion and to survey the global legal community to determine
whether any customary international legal standard has been
violated or, perhaps, whether recent developments in state
practice and usage merit the recognition of new norms of cus-
tomary international law. Under this multinational scenario,
U.S. courts would work cooperatively with judicial bodies and
governments across the world to identify and establish stan-
dards of international conduct, and the United States would
be an equal-not a dominating-player in the process.
Beyond the importance of developing and enforcing
norms of customary international law, allowing courts in other
countries the opportunity to take the lead in adjudicating cer-
tain human rights claims is critical to deterring human rights
abuses. As has been observed, "[t]he courts of a single state, of
course, cannot provide even a partial solution to the problem
of providing redress to victims of gross human rights viola-
tions. Other states should be encouraged to enact legisla-
tion . . . to enable their courts to provide similar redress
against human rights violators found within their jurisdic-
tion."329 Surely those committing human rights abuses
around the world would be more deterred by local govern-
mental and judicial steps taken to prohibit and even to
criminalize their behavior than by the seemingly much more
remote and distant possibility that, one day, a U.S. court might
328. Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501. 509 (1947).
329. Richard B. Lillich, Damages for Gross Violations of hilentational Human
Rights Awarded by US Courts, 15 Hut. RTs. Q. 216 (1993).
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issue a default judgment 330 against them on which the plain-
tiffs likely would never be able to collect.A
3 1
D. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: A Reprise
By recognizing a new U.S. policy interest favoring domes-
tic adjudication of ATS cases, the Second Circuit's decision in
Wiwa results in the de facto abolition of forum non conveniens
in virtually all human rights cases, at least within the Second
Circuit. The justifications advanced by the Wiwa court and
others seeking to undermine application of the doctrine in
ATS disputes, while perhaps well-intentioned insofar as they
seek to provide extra protection to human rights plaintiffs, do
not withstand critical scrutiny. A review of the express lan-
guage and known legislative history of § 1350 demonstrates
that no clear intent to override forum non conveniens exists-
making Wiwa inconsistent with Supreme Court case law on
how to interpret a statute and common law doctrine together.
Legislative history of the TVPA is also directly inconsistent with
the Wiwa court's rationale, as well as that of commentators:
Forum non conveniens was intended to remain available in
human rights cases and be unaffected by passage of the Act.
The continued availability of forum non conveniens in
ATS cases will not eviscerate the ATS-as should be clear from
the fact-intensive nature of the forum non conveniens inquiry
and the reality that no federal district court yet has dismissed
successfully an ATS lawsuit pursuant to the doctrine. In addi-
tion, no policy consideration at issue in human rights litigation
identified by the Wiwa court or others warrants dismantling
forum non conveniens.
330. Most defendants in human rights litigation in U.S. courts, if they ever
make an appearance, flee at some point during the pendency of the matter.
See RATNER & ABRAis, supra note 129, at 205; STEPHENS & RATNER, spra
note 7, at 3.
331. See STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 7, at 3 (reporting that victorious
human rights plaintiffs in U.S. court have been unsuccessful in securing
"the millions of dollars awarded" to them). Beyond the United States's in-
terest in assisting the development of customary international law norms, it
has a significant interest in encouraging stability in international politics.
Michael Byers, International Law and the American National Interest, 1 Cm,. J.
INT'L L. 257, 257 (2000). Pursuing a multinational approach to the develop-
ment and enforcement of human rights norms in countries across the world
would appear to be an important part of ensuring such stability.
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While there are no reasonable justifications to abandon
the doctrine in ATS cases, compelling reasons exist for its re-
tention. Prudent applications of forum non conveniens in
ATS lawsuits further U.S. interests in encouraging the global
development of human rights law and avoiding unnecessary
antagonism of international relations. The doctrine also plays
a unique role in federal court docket management, alloing
courts to evaluate the extent to which litigation filed in a fed-
eral court has sufficient connection to that forum to justify re-
taining the case. Although personal jurisdiction analyses at
times332 may look to the contacts that the defendant has had
with a particular forum in order to determine whether there is
a constitutional basis for haling the defendant into that court,
such analyses involve extremely broad, generous criteria and
do not touch on whether the federal court should retainjuris-
diction over the case. Regardless of the jurisdictional bases
claimed by plaintiffs, the doctrine of forum non conveniens
helps to identify cases with few meaningful connections to the
332. In the area of personal jurisdiction, general contacts with a forum
may be relevant to determining whether a court constitutionally may exert
its authority over a defendant. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945). In International Shoe, the Supreme Court ruled that a defen-
dant must have certain minimum contacts with a forum so as not to offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. (quoting Milli-
ken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). However, these minimum contacts
are relevant only "if [the defendant] be not present within the territory of
the forum." Id. In Burnham v. Superior Court of California, the Supreme Court
affirmed a lower court's ruling that due process was satisfied with respect to
personal jurisdiction where a defendant was present in the forum statt-
even temporarily-and served personally with process there. 495 U.S. 60-t,
628-29 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring). In his plurality opinion, Justice
Scalia observed that "[a]mong the most firmly established principles of per-
sonal jurisdiction in American tradition is that the courts of a State have
jurisdiction over nonresidents who are physically present in the State." Id. at
610. While a minimum contacts analysis may take the place of physical pres-
ence as the basis for jurisdiction, it would be "unfaithful to both elementary
logic and the foundations of [the Court's] due process jurisprudence" to
assert that a defendant's mere presence in a jurisdiction is not sufficient to
establish jurisdiction. Id. at 619. As long as courts continue to accept juris-
diction over a defendant because it exercised-even for a brief moment-
power over him, the availability of forum non conveniens is "logically neces-
sitate [d] ... to mitigate potentially unfair results." Margaret G. Ste'art, Fo-
rum Non Conveniens: A Doctrine in Seard of a Role, 74 Ga. L REv. 1259, 1279
(1986); see also Morley, supra note 63, at 27-30.
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United States that more appropriately would be heard in an
alternative forum.
The Wiwa court and others have contended that human
rights plaintiffs have significant difficulties in finding an availa-
ble forum and usually choose to file suit in U.S. court only as a
last resort.33 3 In many instances, this is true; however, such
plaintiffs also receive significant procedural and substantive
benefits by pursuing their claims in the United States. When
suing in federal court, plaintiffs enjoy the advantage that "the
trier of fact will be ajury that is 'prone to award fabulous dam-
ages." 3 34 U.S. courts also allow extraordinarily broad pretrial
discovery-broader than any other country335-1imited only
by the requirement that requests be "reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. " - 36 While individ-
uals sued for alleged human rights abuses may not fear broad
discovery in U.S. courts, corporate defendants likely will have a
very different perspective.337 In addition, U.S. plaintiffs have
333. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 105-06 (2d Cir.
2000); S. REP. No. 102-249, at 9-10 (1991). In discussing the TVPA, the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee observed that human rights defendants usually have
more substantial assets outside the United States, and it is usually easier to
prove the "jurisdictional nexus" in a foreign country. S. RE. No. 102-249, at
9. Accordingly, the committee believed that a plaintiff's suit under the
TVPA should be considered "virtually prima facie evidence" that the plaintiff
has exhausted all local remedies where the alleged abuse occurred. Id. at 9-
10.
334. Russell J. Weintraub, The United States as a Magnet Forum and What, if
Anything, to Do About It, in SOKOL COLLOQUIUM, supra note 324, at 216 (quot-
ing Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730, 734 (Eng.
C.A. 1982) (Denning, M.R.)). "Whatever the reason, U.S.juries arc likely to
award more money for various categories of damages than juries or courts in
other countries." Id. at 217.
335. Id. at 218-19.
336. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1).
337. Companies are being sued for human rights violations with increas-
ing frequency. See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 353-54 (1993) (in-
volving claims against foreign hospital and government relating to plaintiff's
alleged detention and torture); Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d
109, 111 (5th Cir. 1988) (addressing claims under the ATS that corporations
conspired with the Saudi government to jail and torture plaintiff); Aquinda
v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (involving charges that
defendant damaged the environment in Ecuador as a result of oil explora-
tion activities). Companies, with potentially voluminous documents in the
United States and across the world, rightly will be concerned about the po-
tential broad scope of U.S. discovery and related document production.
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access to lawyers that represent them on a contingency fee ba-
sis and may not require them to pay for court or other admin-
istrative costs if the plaintiffs do not prevail in their litigation.
U.S. courts also apply broad personal jurisdiction and venue
provisions and make available a powerful tool for plaintiffs-
the class action. Plaintiffs (or their lawyers) also know that su-
ing a defendant not resident in the United States on human
rights claims likely will result in a defaultjudgment, thus avoid-
ing a protracted, expensive, time-consuming contested case on
the merits. 3
38
None of this is to say that foreign human rights plaintiffs
are seeking to reap unfair advantages by suing in the United
States or that they should be denied the usual benefits enjoyed
by other plaintiffs in U.S. court; indeed, an underlying theme
of this article is that ATS and other human rights plaintiffs
should be treated like any other plaintiffs filing suit in the
United States. At the same time, given all of the advantages
that inure to any plaintiff by choosing a U.S. forum over a for-
eign forum, it is perhaps disingenuous to argue that human
rights plaintiffs would prefer to not file suit in U.S. court and
do so reluctantly, "only as a last resort.
"339
IV. FORMALLY RECOGNIZING SOVEREIGN INTERESTS IN THE
FORUM NON CONVENJENS ANALYSIS
Although forum non conveniens is a useful and impor-
tant tool that should remain available in human rights litiga-
tion, the Supreme Court first articulated the doctrine's test
338. Most ATS suits result in default judgments; however, those defaults
have occurred at various stages of litigation, from the failure to file an an-
swer to the failure to appear for a deposition. See STEPHENs & R,%rNEi, supra
note 7, at 175. If the defaulted defendant does not have assets to enforce
against in the United States, enforcement of the U.S. judgment in a foreign
country may be possible in rare circumstances. Se id. at 220-24. Even if no
monetary recovery is possible, human rights victims receive the satisfaction
that comes from a judicial acknowledgment that they have been wronged;
such an acknowledgment likely serves other purposes as well, including de-
nying the perpetrator a safe haven and deterring future, similar conduct. See
id. at 234; Harold H. Koh, Tranmzalional Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE LJ.
2347, 2349 n.11 (1991).
339. S. REP. No. 102-249, at 9 (1991) (arguing that human rights plaintiffs
do choose to file suit in a U.S. court "only as a last resort").
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over fifty years ago340-at a time when international human
rights matters were not the subject of federal litigation. Since
then, important changes have occurred in American culture,
federal practice, and international relations, justifying a reap-
praisal of the forum non conveniens factors.3 4 1 In observing
that the forum non conveniens factors it identified did not
constitute an exhaustive list of considerations that appropri-
ately could be considered by a trial court, the Supreme Court
recognized that the test is malleable to account for future de-
velopments relevant to the forum non conveniens inquiry.
3",2
340. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). The factors even-
tually articulated by the Gilbert Court began to be developed in the nine-
teenth century in Scotland and were tested and applied by lower federal
courts before 1947. See supra notes 63-81 and accompanying text.
341. One of the general criticisms that has been levied against use of the
forum non conveniens doctrine is that modes of communication and ineth-
ods of international travel have advanced significantly since 1947. As a re-
sult, it is unreasonable and improper to attach a significant weight to the
difficulty of moving documents and witnesses from one country to another.
See Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., 521 F.2d 448, 456 (2d Cir. 1975) (Oakes, J.,
dissenting) ("One may wonder whether the entire doctrine offorum non con-
veniens should not be reexamined in the light of the transportation revolu-
tion that has occurred [since 1947]."). As the Second Circuit has observed,
'advances in modem telecommunications and jet travel may further circum-
scribe a district court's discretion in dismissing a suit on the ground of fo-
rum non conveniens." Overseas Programming Cos. v. Cinematographische
Commerzanstat, 684 F.2d 232, 232 n.1 (2d Cir. 1982) (and cases cited
therein). It is true that international travel, overnight delivery of docu-
ments, faxes, e-mails, and videotaped depositions have all reduced the in-
conveniences associated with international litigation; however, such inconve-
niences still exist to one degree or another, particularly in cases where volu-
minous documents must be transported to the United States and translated
from a foreign language or where significant numbers of relevant witnesses
are located abroad. To the extent modem modes of communication and
transportation would render a lawsuit in the United States involving foreign
documents and witnesses less inconvenient than such a suit would have been
fifty years ago, those new technologies should be factored into the forum
non conveniens consideration. See Manu Int'l, S.A. v. Avon Products, Inc.,
641 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1981) (identifying "much recent sentiment in this
Circuit for evaluating the forum non conveniens factors in light of the in-
creased speed and ease of travel and communication"). However, as long as
inconveniences exist associated with litigating international matters, the fo-
rum non conveniens doctrine should remain an available tool to both liti-
gants and federal courts.
342. The Court in Gilbert avoided establishing a rigid forum non con-
veniens test and noted that "[wlisely, it has not been attempted to catalogue
the circumstances which will justify or require either grant or denial of rem-
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
[Vol. 33: 10011082
IS THE ALLEN TORT STATUTE SACROSANCT?
A. Governmental Concerns in Human Rights Litigation
The new breed of federal human rights litigation impli-
cates a variety of considerations that may not surface in other
disputes or are present to a less significant extent. One issue
arising frequently in ATS lawsuits is the existence of important
sovereign interests of the United States and/or foreign coun-
tries. Given the relevance of these interests to determining
which forum is the most appropriate for resolving a human
rights dispute, the doctrine of forum non conveniens formally
should recognize sovereign interests as a factor to be identified
and weighed in the overall balancing of considerations. More
specifically, federal courts should weigh the sovereign interests
associated with the particular litigants, claims, and national
and international implications raised by each human rights
dispute-much as they do in other contexts, such as choice of
law,3 4 3 antisuit injunctions, 344 and international abstention. - 5'
An evaluation of national interests implicated by a particular
ATS lawsuit is a process separate and distinct from weighing-
as discussed in Part III.C.-U.S. policy interests underlying
§ 1350 to determine whether forum non conveniens ever
should be available in such disputes. To facilitate a considera-
tion of sovereign interests triggered by particular human
rights lawsuits, federal courts formally should request state-
edy." Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508; see also Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,
249 (1981) (recognizing the Court's decisions that "repeatedly emphasized
the need to retain flexibility" in the forum non conveniens inquiry).
343. See; ag., Schexnider v. McDermott Int'l, Inc., 817 F.2d 1159, 1161-62
(5th Cir. 1987); Zacaria v. Gulf King 35, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 560, 563 (S.D.
Tex. 1999); Solano v. Gulf King 55, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 960, 962-44 (S.D.
Tex. 1998).
344. National interests and international comity concerns frequently arise
in the antisuit injunction context. See, e.g., Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull
Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 431-32 (7th Cir. 1993); Gat Shan Co., Ltd. v.
Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1352-55 (6tlh Cir. 1992); Laker Airans
Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 937-39 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Seattle Totems Hockei
Club, Inc. v. Nat'l Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852, 856 (9th Cir. 1981); Cna-
dian Filters (Hanrich) Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, 412 F.2d 577, 578-79 (lst Cir.
1969).
345. See, e.g., Soci&td Nationale Industrielle Mrospatiale v. United States
Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 554-68 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Turner Entm't Co. v. Degeto Film, GmbH, 2 F.3d
1512, 1519-21 (11th Cir. 1994); In reVitamins Antitrust Litig., 120 F. Supp.
2d 45, 50-51 (D.D.C. 2000); Madanes v. Madanes, 186 F.R.D. 279, 285-86
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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ments of interest from both the U.S. government and the gov-
ernment of the alternative forum.
346
Formal weighing of national interests will require federal
courts to recognize explicitly what has been implicit in the fo-
rum non conveniens inquiry before now: The doctrine does
not concern itself solely with convenience. Instead, forum
non conveniens looks broadly to where litigation appropriately
should be heard and would serve "the ends of justice"; to
achieve this result, courts inquire into a variety of factors,
which include convenience concerns. However, the Supreme
Court has always acknowledged in the forum non conveniens
inquiry that there is a "local interest in having localized con-
troversies decided at home."3 47 Only under a strained inter-
pretation of "convenience" could this factor be considered di-
rectly relevant to weighing the relative conveniences of trying
a lawsuit in one forum as opposed to another.348
346. Admittedly, federal courts have not been unanimous in their adop-
tion of sovereign interest balancing tests in other contexts. Although, as dis-
cussed later in this section, some courts readily have balanced national inter-
ests of the United States and other countries, various other courts have re-
jected such balancing. See, e.g., Societi Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale, 482
U.S. at 551-54 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (recognizing, in the context of a
Hague Evidence Convention analysis, that the Executive "is best equipped to
determine how to accommodate foreign interests along with our own"); Re-
insurance Co. of Am., Inc. v. Admin. Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275,
1284 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook,J., concurring) (stating that he "would be
at sea" if forced to weigh competing national interests in the area of inconsis-
tent obligations regarding whether to produce or protect relevant inforna
tion); Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 n.2 (D.C. Gir.
1987) (describing sovereign interest balancing test in securities fraud case as
"difficult to apply and... inherently unpredictable"); Laker Airways Ltd., 731
F.2d at 948-51 (rejecting proposition that the court should balance sovereign
interests in the context of determining whether to assert prescriptive juris-
diction and noting that it was "ill-equipped to 'balance the vital national
interests of the United States and the [United Kingdom] to determine which
interests predominate'" (citation omitted)).
347. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 509; Piper, 454 U.S. at 241 n.6 (quoting Gilbert, 330
U.S. at 509).
348. It might be argued that a strong local interest in litigation might
make a U.S. court faced with a complex lawsuit involving foreign litigants
and requiring application of foreign law more willing to incur the inconve-
niences associated with trying the case in the United States. Such a case
would not be more convenient for the court-the difficulties associated with
the case would remain; the court would simply decide to endure the incon-
veniences because of a strong local interest. However, regardless of whether
local interests are directly relevant to a convenience consideration or
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Scottish courts wrestling with the scope and application of
the doctrine before the Supreme Court's decision in Gilbert
focused not just on convenience, but also-and arguably to a
greater extent-on the broader question of which forum
would be preferable for "securing the ends ofjustice."M9 One
Scottish judge even observed that "It] he proper translation" of
conveniens in the plea "is 'appropriate.'" 350 U.S. courts, while
focusing on convenience in the analysis, also have noted that
determining where trial would serve "the ends ofjustice" is the
ultimate goal of a forum non conveniens inquiry.35 1 The exis-
tence or absence of strong national interests appears to be
highly relevant to a court's determination of which forum
would serve the ends ofjustice. In fact, U.S. courts informally
have weighed sovereign interests as part of jurisdictional con-
siderations in international cases for over one hundred
years.352
whether the forum non conveniens inquiry encompasses more than solely
convenience issues, local and national interests in the litigation remain rele-
vant to, and should be considered in, the forum non conveniens analysis.
349. See La Socidtd du Gaz de Paris v. La Soci~td Anonyme de Navigation
"Les Armateurs Frangais," [1926] Sess. Cas. (H.L) 13, 22. LordJustice Clerk
Alness noted that a forum non conveniens plea would be granted where
another forum was open to the litigants and where "that other forum is
more suitable for the trial of the cause from the point of .iew of the interests
of the parties and for the ends ofjustice." La Soci6 du Gaz de Paris v. La
Socift6 Anonyme de Navigation "Les Armateurs Frangais," [1925] Sess. Cas.
(H.L.) 332, 347. In fact, the Lord Justice observed that although in some
earlier cases "mere convenience or expediency" may have been the criterion
for decision, the proper analysis was "broader." Id. Although Scottish courts
did not usually explain in detail what "justice" factors were relevant outside
of "convenience" concerns, judges did address in the forum non conveniens
analysis both the law to be applied and "relation" of the lawsuit to the cho-
sen forum. See, e-g., id. at 348.
350. See id. at 18 (Lord Dunedin); see also Blair, supra note 63, at I (observ-
ing that Anglo-American law recognizes forum non conveniens when a cause
"may be more appropriately tried elsewhere").
351. Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Gas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 528 (1947)
(explaining that the doctrine of forum non conveniens "resists formalization
and looks to the realities that make for doing justice"); Barrett, supra note
63, at 415, 421 (noting that the basic consideration in forum non conveniens
should be "whether the ends ofjustice might better be served by trial else-
where") (citation omitted).
352. See supra notes 340-42 and accompanying text.
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In particular, courts on occasion have evaluated sovereign
interests as part of their forum non conveniens analyses. 35
For example, in Harrison v. Wyeth Laboratories,3 5 4 the district
court considered forum non conveniens arguments in the
context of a products liability case. The pharmaceutical prod-
ucts in question were manufactured, marketed, and sold in the
United Kingdom, and as part of its consideration, the court
inquired into the relative interests of the fora in question.
3 55
In observing the strong foreign interests involved in the case,
the court opined that "[q]uestions as to the safety of drugs
marketed in a foreign country are properly the concern of that
country; the courts of the United States are ill-equipped to set
a standard of product safety for drugs sold in other coun-
tries."356 The court particularly was focused on allowing the
United Kingdom to develop and impose its own laws in the
area of drug safety: "Each country has its own legitimate con-
cerns and its own unique needs which must be factored into its
process of weighing the drug's merits, and which will tip the
balance for it one way or the other. The United States should
not impose its own view of the safety, warning, and duty of care
required of drugs sold in the United States upon a foreign
country when those same drugs are sold in that country.: 
7
Trial courts have weighed national interests in other fo-
rum non conveniens contexts, including suits involving RICO
and other claims in an international data-communications dis-
pute,358 Securities Act claims arising from a failed computer
353. Even outside the formal context of forum non conveniens, federal
courts have, for over one hundred years, evaluated the existence and impor-
tance of national interests in deciding whether to retain jurisdiction over
disputes involving foreign litigants. See, e.g., The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 335,
363-65 (1885). See generally supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
354. Harrison v. Wyeth Labs. Div. of Am. Home Prods. Corp., 510 F.
Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
355. See id at 1-4 (holding that "[t]he local interest in having this localized
issue decided at home is strong").
356. Id. at 4.
357. Id The court granted defendant's forum non conveniens motion
but imposed on it various conditions, including that it must submit to juris-
diction in the United Kingdom. See id. at 4-5.
358. See Winex, Ltd. v. Paine, Civ. A. No. 89-2083, 1990 WL 121483, at *7
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 1990) (granting a conditional dismissal on forum non
conveniens grounds, in part because "England has an interest in seeing that
shareholder subscription and service agreements, executed in London and
governed by English law, are properly interpreted and enforced").
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
[Vol. 33:1001
IS THE ALLEN TORT STATUTE SACRO 4CT?
medicine venture, 59 claims stemming from a gas plant disas-
ter,3 60 wrongful death allegations in a lawsuit stemming from a
helicopter crash,3 61 and a suit brought under U.S. antitrust
laws,3 6 2 as well as others.3 63 The Supreme Court's own deci-
sion in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno demonstrated that national
interests are an appropriate consideration in forum non con-
veniens inquiries. 364 In that case, the Court evaluated -rious
public interest factors in a wrongful death lawsuit stemming
from an airplane crash in Scotland3 65 and observed that "Scot-
land has a very strong interest in this litigation."3 66 The Court
concluded that the "American interest in this accident is sim-
ply not sufficient to justify" the inconveniences of trial in the
United States.3
67
While federal human rights jurisprudence is not as devel-
oped as other substantive areas, a few courts have considered
sovereign interests in these cases as well, while evaluating mo-
359. See Diatronics, Inc. v. Elbit Computers, Ltd., 649 F. Supp. 122, 129
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (noting that "the community in Israel has a greater interest
in this dispute than the New York community").
360. See In re Union Carbide Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842, 863-64
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (recognizing the "immense interest[s]" that India had in
serving as the forum for litigating claims involving a plant licensed and regu-
lated by the Indian government).
361. See Dahl v. United Techs. Corp., 632 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1980) (con-
sidering both the U.S. interest in certifying all aircraft as safe that are manu-
factured for sale in the United States, as well as the Norwegian interest in
applying a domestic statute passed to cover precisely the fact pattern found
in Dahl).
362. Laker Ainvays Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airays, 568 F. Supp. 811, 817
(D.D.C. 1983) (recognizing the existence of strong public interest factors
where the Sherman Act, "our charter of economic liberty," wvas in jeopardy
of being "emasculated").
363. See, ag., Scottish Air Int'l, Inc. v. British Caledonian Group, PLC, 81
F.3d 1224, 1234 (2d Cir. 1996) (observing in the context of a suit by an
equity investor in an airline, that "Great Britain has a more substantial inter-
est because the litigation involves the right to a seat on the board of direc-
tors of a Scottish corporation"); DeYoung v. Beddome, 707 F. Supp. 132, 139
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (recognizing that "the interest of Canada in having contro-
versies relating to one of its major corporations decided at home is substan-
tial" and granting defendants' motion to dismiss on comity and forum non
conveniens grounds in suit brought by the Canadian company's stockhold-
ers).
364. See Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
365. See id. at 238.
366. Id. at 260.
367. It. at 261.
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tions to dismiss. In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin,3 68 the trial
court considered whether to dismiss an ATS suit brought for
alleged wrongful imprisonment in Bolivia.369 In weighing the
various forum non conveniens factors, the court observed that
plaintiffs' claims would require the court to "sit in judgment
upon the alleged corruption of a nation's entire legal sys-
tem."3 70  Considering the relative sovereign interests was
clearly important to the trial court: "If Bolivia's courts do not
have a surpassingly greater interest in their own integrity than
do the American courts, then the public interest factor is
meaningless. '371 U.S. and foreign national interests have been
raised in several other human rights cases, often where forum
non conveniens is considered in combination with other doc-
trines such as international comity372 and the political ques-
tion doctrine.
373
International human rights disputes often involve either
claims of direct governmental involvement in the abuses or al-
legations that trigger significant foreign governmental inter-
ests. When the actions of a sitting foreign government are
questioned, that country's sovereign interests clearly are impli-
cated. Moreover, when claims of human rights abuse are lev-
ied against former governmental officials, the foreign country
may have a significant domestic interest in serving as the fo-
rum for litigation aimed at correcting past governmental
368. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
369. See i& at 1080-82.
370. &L at 1084.
371. Id.
372. SeeJota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 159-61 (2d Cir. 1998). In Jota,
the court addressed the changing attitude of the government of Ecuador vis-
A-vis litigation of plaintiffs' claims in the United States. See id. The Second
Circuit remanded the matter for the trial court to reevaluate its findings that
"exercise ofjurisdiction by this Court would interfere with Ecuador's sover-
eign right to control its own environment and resources" and that "the Re-
public of Ecuador has expressed its strenuous objections to the exercise of
jurisdiction by this Court." Id. at 160.
373. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1995). In Kadic, the
Second Circuit evaluated various statements of interest or opinions submit-
ted by the U.S. government, including the opinion that the defendant was
not immune from suit as an invitee of the United Nations. See id. The Solici-
tor General and the Department of State also expressed their opinion that
"[a]lthough there might be instances in which federal courts are asked to
issue rulings under the [ATS] or [TVPA] that might raise a political ques-
tion, this is not one of them." Id.
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wrongs.3 74 Similarly, where the alleged abuse is committed by
a non-state actor-for example, in certain cases of genocide or
war crimes375-foreign states may have an important national
interest in helping to restore peace and instilling confidence
in the international community that the countries can manage
their own domestic affairs and administer justice impartially.
In these cases, foreign countries may have significant interests
in helping to further the development of customary interna-
tional law norms by adjudicating human rights disputes within
their borders. Such interests should be factored into a forum
non conveniens analysis.
The federal court considering a forum non conveniens
motion in a human rights case also should consider the U.S.
interests, if any, in the particular litigation. The executive
branch may feel that the allegations of abuse largely raise is-
sues of domestic concern to the foreign country, and that the
foreign country is ready, willing, and able to adjudicate the
plaintiff's claims. The U.S. government also might hold the
opinion that domestic adjudication of a foreign dispute un-
necessarily could threaten sensitive international relations. In
these instances, U.S. interests in the stability of the interna-
tional legal and political order might warrant dismissal. Alter-
374. The importance of allowing a foreign government the opportunity to
adjudicate claims against a prior regime goes beyond internal concerns for
that country. Such resolution of claims is good for the broader international
community and the international legal order. See Diane F. Orentlicher Sri-
tling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Riglts iolations of a Prior Reginze,
100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2594 (1991) (observing in particular that "[p]reeminent
values underlying the international legal order are best served if a govern-
ment whose predecessors committed crimes against humanity assumes re-
sponsibility for punishment. Prosecution under these circumstances recon-
ciles international law's insistence on the one hand that crimes against hu-
manity must not escape punishment, and its concern on the other hand to
respect national sovereignty"). Similar concerns hold true in the civil con-
text. There exists the possibility that a corrupt foreign state that has perpe-
trated abuse may argue strenuously for dismissal, citing its sovereign inter-
ests in serving as a forum for litigation, with the real motivation of avoiding
international embarrassment resulting from a U.S. trial. In such a case, as in
all others, the U.S. court should weigh all relevant forum non conveniens
factors and evaluate the appropriateness of dismissal, based on the totality of
the evidence before it.
375. The Second Circuit in Kadic determined that certain violations of
customary international law, including genocide and war crimes, could be
committed in the absence of state involvement. See 70 F.3d at 241-43.
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natively, the U.S. government might feel strongly that U.S. in-
terests are consistent with those of the plaintiff because the
ATS defendant, for example, is a U.S. corporation. In such a
case, strong U.S. interests could weigh in favor of providing a
U.S. forum for the dispute.
Formally incorporating sovereign interests into the forum
non conveniens analysis would not require the judiciary to en-
croach into the realm of foreign policy constitutionally dele-
gated to the executive branch.376 While federal courts should
request statements of interest from the countries involved,
those countries are under no obligation to respond; if they do,
the identified interests simply would be considered in the over-
all balancing of factors. By doing so, courts would not identify
or articulate foreign policy goals or national interests of the
United States; they only would weigh the interests provided to
them as part of a broader analysis. In this broad analysis,
courts would consider interests that are centrally important to
whether they should retain jurisdiction over particular dis-
putes, and that are not evaluated adequately through means
other than forum non conveniens.
B. In re Holocaust Victim Assets
A recent ATS lawsuit considered by the Eastern District of
New York provides a good example of the importance of evalu-
ating sovereign interests in the context of a forum non con-
veniens analysis. Beginning in 1996, several individual suits
later consolidated for pretrial purposes under the name In re
376. In Klinghoffer v. S.N.G. Achille Lauro, the Second Circuit considered
arguments by the PLO that a suit against it for participation in the Achille
Lauro hjacking raised "foreign policy questions and political questions in a
volatile context lacking satisfactory criteria for judicial determination." 937
F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991). However, the court observed that the doctrine "is
one of 'political questions,' not one of 'political cases.'" Id. (quoting Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). The Second Circuit concluded that, al-
though the issues before it arose "in a politically charged context," the suit
was not transformed from "an ordinary tort suit into a non-justiciable politi-
cal question." Id. In Baker v. Car, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
courts have authority to address disputes that implicate foreign and interna-
tional relations issues. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (observing
that "it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches for-
eign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance").
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Holocaust IrWtim Asse. 3 77 were filed against three Swviss finmciad
institutions alleging that the banks conspired with Nazi Ger-
many during World War II in furtherance of Germany's war
crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity.3 78
The plaintiffs in In re Holocaust Victim Assets sought juris-
diction in part, under the ATS and alleged a variety of tort and
contract claims, including negligence, breach of fiduciary
duty, conspiracy, and breach of contract, as well as damages of
$20 billion.3 79 In response, the defendant banks filed warious
motions to dismiss or stay the litigation, including a motion to
dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds.380 The parties
traded arguments about relevant private and public interest
factors, as well as whether Swiss courts could provide an ade-
quate alternative forum for the litigation. One factor that the
litigants argued over at length was the weighing of relative sov-
ereign interests that the United States and Swvitzerland had in
serving as the forum for resolving plaintiffs' claims. Although
In re Holocaust Victim Assets was settled before Judge Korman
had an opportunity to evaluate the litigants' forum non con-
veniens arguments, reviewing the sovereign interests at play in
377. By the time the court approved the settlement in this action, four
separate actions had been consolidated under Master Docket No. 96 Cir.
4849: Sonabend v. Union Bank of Switz.; Trilling-Gratch v. Union Bank of Sitz.;
Weisshaus v. Union Bank of Switz; and Wodd Council of Orthodox Jaish Cmtys.,
Inc. v. Union Bank of Swi1t. See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F.
Supp. 2d 139, 141 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (mem. and order approving settlement
agreement) [hereinafter Korman Order].
378. The litigants in In re Holocaust Vdin Assets reached a settlement
before Judge Korman issued a ruling on any of defendants' motions to dis-
miss or stay the litigation. In exchange for the withdrawal of all of plaintiffs'
claims, the defendants agreed to pay $1.25 billion. See Konnan Order, supra
note 377, at 142; see alsoJohn M. Goshko, Swiss Banks Agree to Holocaust Pact;
$1.25 Billion Setlement for VWactins, Heirs, WAs. Posr, Aug. 13, 1998, at Al.
Judge Korman formally approved the settlement on July 26, 2000. Sre Kor-
man Order, supra note 377, at 140.
379. See Korman Order, supra note 377, at 141; Am. Compl. 1 35-62,
Weisshaus v. Union Bank of Switzerland, No. 96-4849 (E.D.N.Y., filedJan. 24,
1997); Frendi Banks Named in Lawsuit, WAuL ST.J. EUL, Dec. 19, 1997, availa-
ble at 1997 WL-WSJE 17301519.
380. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dis-
miss on Forum Non Conveniens Grounds, it re Holocaust Victim Assets Li-
fig., 105 F.Supp. 2d 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. 96-4849) [hereinafter Defend-
ants' Forum Non Conveniens Mem.].
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that case provides a useful look at how such interests might
arise and be evaluated in future disputes.
The Swiss interests in serving as the forum for the litiga-
tion were relatively clear. The Swiss government recently had
undertaken and supported a variety of initiatives "to investi-
gate and redress injuries to Holocaust victims arising from the
war years," including the creation of a Swiss Historical Inquiry
Committee to investigate (without the usual constraints of
Swiss bank secrecy laws) the fate of all assets that entered the
country during World War II and belonged to victims of the
Holocaust.381 Switzerland also had endorsed and pledged co-
operation with an independent, international forensic investi-
gation effort led by Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
3 82
Importantly, Switzerland appeared to have a significant
national interest in serving as the forum for litigation because
plaintiffs' allegations went beyond the three private Swiss bank
defendants and sought "an examination of the Swiss Govern-
ment's neutrality and foreign policy decisions during [World
War II]."s83 In their complaints, plaintiffs alleged that Switzer-
land "had close ties to the Nazi Regime which were knowingly
used and exploited to further the war objectives of that Re-
gime" and that Switzerland had "collaborated and acted in
complicity with and aided and abetted the activities of the Nazi
Regime," including the commission of war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and genocide.38 4 Because of these and simi-
lar allegations, the Swiss government took a keen interest in
resolving all outstanding claims. The chief of the Swiss govern-
381. Defendants' Forum Non Conveniens Mem., supra note 380, at 25-26.
However, plaintiffs maintained that the Swiss government's failure to under-
take any investigation into these issues in the previous fifty years undercut its
argument. See Plaintiff's Mem. of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss on Forum Non Conveniens Grounds; Motion to Dismiss on Ab-
stention Grounds; and Motion in the Alternative to Stay All Proceedings in
These Cases at 19 n.24, In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F.Supp. 2d
139 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. 96-4849).
382. See Defendants' Forum Non Conveniens Mem., supra note 380, at 26.
The defendants also maintained that litigation in the United States, with the
extraordinary discovery burdens placed on defendants, would disrupt and
derail the important work of these internationally supported endeavors. See
id. at 28-29.
383. Id at 29.
384. 1& at 29 n.54 (quoting Friedman Compl. 50, 208).
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ment's task force on Holocaust-related issues underscored his
country's important national interest in the dispute:
"[N]othing is more important to the people and Government
of Switzerland than establishing the complete truth in this
matter as swiftly and humanely as possible. We are fully aware
that nothing less than our reputation as an honorable country
and reliable friend is at stake."a 5
While important Swiss interests appeared to be at stake in
In re Holocaust rwctim Assets, U.S. interests in the litigation were
somewhat less apparent. One clear U.S. interest was the exis-
tence of some U.S. citizens as named plaintiffs in the lawsuits;
however, not all named plaintiffs were citizens of the United
States. The plaintiffs also claimed important U.S. interests in
the dispute as evidenced by congressional hearings held to ad-
dress the fate of assets belonging to Holocaust victims, the
work of Undersecretary of State-Designate Stuart Eizenstat, ap-
pointed by President Clinton to head the Administration's ef-
forts on Holocaust asset issues, on the same issue, and arious
hearings at the state level into related bank activities.-a 6
However, in contrast to their Swiss counterparts, U.S. gov-
ernment officials did not stress the existence of strong U.S.
interests in the litigation; instead, Undersecretary Eizenstat ob-
served that, in addressing the claims against defendants,
"[c]onfrontation would be counterproductive, it would be a
set-back. It would be a way of saying that despite all of the
efforts that [the Swiss] have made over the last several months,
that those efforts, far from being admired and rewarded, were
being punished."8 7 At the very least, the U.S. Administration
did not endorse litigation in U.S. court as the appropriate
method for resolving the plaintiffs' claims.311
While a proper, complete forum non conveniens analysis
would take into consideration a variety of different considera-
385. iL at 28 (quoting The Disposition of Asses Deposited in Swiss Banks l'"
Missing Nazi Victims: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Banking and fInandal
Services, 104th Cong. 31, 32 (1996) (statement of S%%iss Special Ambassador
Thomas Borer)).
386. See id at 21.
387. Id at 30-31 (quoting Marcus Kabel, US. Says Swiss Bank B'coll IMoudd
Be Wrong Move, RErtrs WoRLD SER\v., Jan. 30, 1997).
388. See i&L at 30.
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tions,389 the existence of strong, unique Swiss national inter-
ests in In re Holocaust Victim Assets made a compelling case for
dismissal. The lawsuits fundamentally questioned not only the
activities of three Swiss banks, but also the extent to which
Switzerland, as a country, collaborated and conspired with
Nazi Germany during World War II. Absent a clear indication
that Swiss courts could not or would not administer justice
properly in this matter,390 it appears that modem-day Switzer-
land would have had a strong national interest in serving as
the forum for evaluating its predecessor government's ac-
tions-and those of Swiss banks fifty years ago-and in hold-
ing persons and institutions found to be responsible accounta-
ble for their actions within the Swiss legal system.
Regardless of how national interests would have played
out in In re Holocaust Victim Assets, there appears to have been a
lack of full information provided to Judge Korman about the
existence of U.S. interests. During oral argument on the de-
fendants' forum non conveniens motion, the litigants dis-
agreed strongly about whether the United States had a stake in
the litigation.3 9' By formally requesting a statement of interest
389. With respect to the other forum non conveniens considerations, the
defendant banks argued that because all of the challenged conduct oc-
curred in Switzerland, the vast majority of relevant witnesses and documents
were located in Switzerland, and the documents-totaling at least hundreds
of thousands of pages-would need to be translated from German, French,
Italian, or Romansch to be understandable in a U.S. court. See Defendants'
Forum Non Conveniens Mem., supra note 380, at 12-16. The defendants
also pointed out that Swiss law would likely apply to most claims, and litiga-
tion of the dispute in U.S. court would create significant administrative bur-
dens. See id at 16-21. Finally, the banks maintained that Swiss courts were
open and available to the plaintiffs and would provide an adequate alterna-
tive forum. See id at 31-38.
390. Federal courts previously have found Switzerland to constitute an ad-
equate alternative forum in forum non conveniens analyses. See
Schertenleib v. Traum, 589 F.2d 1156 (2d Cir. 1978) (finding Switzerland's
courts to be adequate fora); Fustok v. Banque Populaire Suisse, 546 F. Supp.
506, 515 n.32 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (same); Defendants' Forum Non Conveniens
Mem., supra note 380, at 31-32 nn.59 & 60.
391. During oral argument on defendants' motions to dismiss or stay the
litigation, Judge Korman inquired into the existence of U.S. governmental
interests:
THE COURT: ... Can I ask you, does the United States Govern-
ment have an interest in the subject matter of this litigation?
[COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS]: I think that [U]nder-
secretary Eisenstadt has indicated that the United States does have
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from the United States, Judge Korman would have eliminated
any question about whether the U.S. government had failed to
express an interest in the litigation simply because it had not
been asked by the court. In fact, Judge Korman wondered
aloud during oral argument why the U.S. government had not
communicated its position on the litigation directly to him,
dearly suggesting confusion over whether the U.S. govern-
ment had no significant interest in the lawsuits or whether it
simply was waiting to express those interests until it was asked
by the judge.3 9
2
In re Holocaust Victim Assets highlights at least two points
relevant to the resolution of forum non conveniens motions in
future human rights lawsuits. First, given the unique allega-
tions, litigants, and context of every suit, significant sovereign
interests may exist that can and should be factored into the
an important interest. But he has indicated that that interest would
be best served by resolving these issues in a cooperative rather than
a confrontational way and his comment in testimony before Con-
gress and elsewhere suggests that [U]ndersecretary Eisenstadt...
and the U.S. Government [do not] think that class action litigation
in the New York court is the right way to proceed.
[COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS]: I don't mean to interrupt at
all but there is a peripheral issue with regard to Mr. Eisenstadt and
[forum non conveniens] .... Mr. Eisenstadt officially informed us
that it is the official position of the United States State Departnent
at this time that it has no interest in this litigation.
Transcript of Civil Cause for Oral Argument Before the Honorable Edw,ard
R. Korman, United States District Judge on July 31, 1997 at 116-17. fi re
Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F.Supp. 2d 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (Nos. 96-
4849, 96-5161, 97461).
392. Judge Korman was obviously troubled during oral argument with
whether and under what circumstances the U.S. government would express
any interest it had in the litigation:
THE COURT: Why haven't I heard from anybody in the govern-
ment of the United States directly about what the position is of the
government of the United States?
[COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS]: Because you haven't
asked ....
THE COURT: But the government only asserts its interest
when it's requested?
[COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS]: The government may vol-
unteer or it may not. No inference can be drawn from the fact that
they haven't volunteered. But if the viewpoint of the United States
is important to the Court, the Court may and should ask.
Id. at 24-25.
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forum non conveniens analysis. Second, when a federal judge
is attempting to weigh relevant forum non conveniens factors,
like Judge Korman in In re Holocaust Victim Assets, he or she
would be well-served by formally requesting statements of in-
terest from the governments in question. Such requests would
not only provide the judge with the most accurate identifica-
tion of relevant national interests, but also would eliminate any
confusion that otherwise might exist from a country's silence
in the absence of being asked.
V. CONCLUSION
On September 24, 2000, Vojislav Kostunica defeated in-
cumbent Slobodan Milosevic in the election for the Yugoslav
presidency. 393 When Milosevic finally and grudgingly con-
ceded power in early October, his thirteen-year reign of mis-
management, suppression, and violence in Yugoslavia was
brought to an end.3 94 Even before being stripped of power,
Mr. Milosevic was a wanted man on the international scene.
Several years ago, the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia issued an indictment for Milosevic, charg-
ing him with crimes against humanity during his reign, includ-
ing murder, deportation, and persecution, as well as violations
of the laws and customs of war, particularly in connection with
his conduct in the Serbian province of Kosovo before and dur-
ing NATO bombing raids in 1999. 3 9 5 After receiving encour-
agement from the United States3 96 and other countries, the
Yugoslav government extradited Milosevic to the Hague,
where he currently faces various charges, including allegations
of genocide.
3 9 7
393. See Peter Finn & R. Jefferey Smith, Kostunica and Milosevic Allies Set to
Sign Joint Power Accord, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2000, at A24.
394. See Dusan Stojanovic, Serbs Hope for New Democracy, A.P. ONLINE, Oct.
26, 2000, at http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story.asp.
395. See Press Release, The International Court of Justice, Statement of
Justice Louise Arbour, Prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (May 27, 1999); R.Jefferey Smith & Ellen Nakashima,
Serb Leader Hints at Milosevic Trial WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2000, at A24.
396. Steven A. Holmes, $100 Million Voted for Serbia, but with War-Crimes
Strings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2000, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/
10/26/world/26AID.html.
397. See Keith B. Richburg, Milosevic, U.N. Judge Spar. Genocide Count to be
Filed, WASH. Posr, Aug. 31, 2001, at A18.
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As of the writing of this article, no civil case has been filed
in U.S. court against Milosevic since his electoral defeat;31- 3
however, that may change in the near future as survivors of the
Milosevic brutality and relatives of those killed or tortured by
his forces emerge from the shadows of his repressive reign.
The procedural and substantive advantages that such plaintiffs
would enjoy in U.S. court likely will draw some of them to the
United States. In addition, the expansive interpretation of the
ATS by federal courts, as well as the existence of the TVPA,
make the United States a particularly attractive magnet for
alien plaintiffs seeking to sue Milosevic. However, if and when
such cases are filed in federal court, they should be ap-
proached with caution.
Suits brought by citizens of Yugoslavia against Milosevic
for violence committed in that country appear to be particu-
larly well suited for resolution in the courts of Yugoslavia. The
democratic overthrow of Milosevic signals the desire of the Yu-
goslav people and its new government to move past the vio-
lence and repression of their former leader. The country as a
whole may have a strong national interest in serving as the fo-
rum for meting out justice to Miosevic on behalf of his vic-
tims.3 99 President Kostunica recently voiced this concern:
"Justice [for Milosevic] is very important because we have been
living for a long time with something that is contrary to jus-
tice.... [The trial of Milosevic] should be in [the] hands [of
398. On May 17, 1999, John Doe v. Slobodan Milosevi, No. 99-CV-I 1058 (D.
Mass. filed May 17, 1999) (WESTLAW, Massachusetts, District Court,
Docket), was filed in U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
The lawsuit was filed by two Kosovo Albanians and alleged genocide and
other war crimes committed by Milosevic and his fellow Yugoslav leaders. Set
Dave Howland, Two Kosovo Albanians File Lawsuit Against Yugoslav Leaders for
Assets, A.P. ONUNE, May 25, 1999, at http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/pib-
lib/story.asp. The lawsuit was based, in part, on the ATS and the TVPA. See
id Milosevic and the other defendants apparently have defaulted in that
suit. If Milosevic had answered the John Doe suit, the trial court likely would
have been forced to dismiss the lawsuit on grounds of sovereign immunity.
See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714-19 (9th
Cir. 1992); Chuidian v. Phil. Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1099-103 (9th Cir.
1990) (ruling that an individual acting in his official governmental capacity
is protected under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); see aLso 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a) (7) (1994) (providing a very narrow exception to sovereign immu-
nity for certain acts of human rights abuse occurring within the scope of a
foreign governmental official's employment).
399. See generally Orentlicher, supra note 374.
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Yugoslavia's citizens] and not the hands of foreigners. '' 0 0' As
long as Milosevic and his allies do not retain control over any
aspects of Yugoslavia's court system 40 and those courts are
free from corruption and bias and provide basic justice, a per-
suasive case seems to exist for allowing Yugoslav tribunals to
resolve such claims.
Beyond possible suits involving Milosevic, all indications
are that the number of human rights suits filed in federal
court will continue to increase in the years to come, and most
of those suits are likely to be brought under the ATS. 40 2 As
repressive rulers are overthrown across the globe and as mul-
tinational corporations face increased scrutiny into their treat-
ment of indigenous peoples and the environment, human
rights suits in the United States will flourish. In some ATS law-
suits to come, like many cases in the past, dismissal on forum
non conveniens grounds may not be appropriate for a variety
of reasons, including the inability of human rights plaintiffs to
obtain a fair trial in an alternative forum. However, eliminat-
ing the possibility of invoking forum non conveniens in ATS
cases is an additional step that is both unnecessary and unwise.
The continued existence of the doctrine in ATS cases furthers
important U.S. interests, and it ensures that courts will be em-
powered to exclude cases with few meaningful ties to this
400. Marc Lacey, Bush Links Aid to Yugoslavia to the Extradition of Milosevic,
N.Y. TmEs, May 10, 2001, at A14.
401. In the recent past, concern has existed about the control over power
and media that Milosevic continued to exert, even after his electoral defeat.
See Peter Finn & R. Jefferey Smith, Kostunica and Milosevic Allies Set to Signt
Joint Power Accord, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2000, at A24; R. Jefferey Smith &
Peter Finn, How Milosevic Lost His Grip, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2000, at A01.
For the courts of Yugoslavia to be considered adequate alternative fora, at a
minimum, Milosevic and his allies would have to be shown not to control or
exercise any meaningful influence over the Yugoslav court system.
402. Examples of potential human rights abuses around the world, partic-
ularly those perpetrated by government agents, appear to be virtually end-
less. Recently, in the Ivory Coast, former military ruler Gen. Robert Guei was
driven from power by civilian mobs protesting Guei's decision not only to
call a national election but also to ban his main rival-Alassane Ouatarra-
from participating in the election. See Charlayne Hunter-Gault, Ivory Coast
Officials Promise to Investigate Massacre, CNN ONLINE, Oct. 28, 2000, at http://
www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/africa/ 10/ 28/ivorycoast.bodies. 02/index.
html. Subsequent to Guei's departure, Ivory Coast officials found a mass
grave of more than fifty bodies, believed to be the remains of Ouatarra's
supporters who summarily were executed by military officials. See id.
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country, regardless of the substantive claim at issue. At the
same time, proper application of the doctrine ensures that
plaintiffs are not unfairly prejudiced because, even where pri-
vate and public interest factors point toward dismissal, cases
will not be excluded from federal court where courts in a for-
eign country are incapable of administering justice. To facili-
tate the proper evaluation of considerations in the forum non
conveniens context, U.S. courts would be well-senred by for-
mally recognizing sovereign interests in the weighing of factors
and by explicitly requesting statements of interest from the
countries in question.
While courts should take care that hard cases do not
make bad law,4 °3 the same must hold equally true for emotion-
ally compelling ones. Justice Holmes referred to these dis-
putes as "great cases":
Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great
cases are called great, not by reason of their real im-
portance in shaping the law of the future, but be-
cause of some accident of immediate overwhelming
interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the
judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind
of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously
was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well
settled principles of law will bend. What we have to
do in this case is to find the meaning of some not
very difficult words.40 4
Human rights suits frequently allege some of the most
horrendous, inhumane, and unconscionable conduct imagina-
ble. In these extreme cases, the easy and immediate reaction
may be to demand that the perpetrators face justice in the
United States because U.S. justice must be best; however, the
appropriate role of U.S. courts in such foreign disputes is
much more nuanced. Where U.S. courts recognize, pursuant
to well-established doctrines, that disputes with significant for-
eign components can and should be resolved outside U.S. bor-
ders, the United States plays a more powerful role in the cases
that are retained, while at the same time it allows other coun-
403. United States v. Clark, 96 U.S. 37, 49 (1877) (quoting E. India Co. v.
Paul, 7 Moo. P.G.C. 111).
404. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (White.J.,
dissenting).
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tries the opportunity to influence the development of interna-
tional law in meaningful ways.
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